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INTRODUCTION:
CLIMATE DISRUPTION AND GOVERNMENTAL ACTION:
APPROACHES, OBSTACLES, AND OPPORTUNITIES
JOEL A. MINTZ*
On February 6th and 7th, 2014, Nova Southeastern University and
the Center for Progressive Reform co-sponsored a symposium on New
Directions in Energy Law and Policy, Climate Disruption and Sea Level
Rise. The gathering—which was held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida—featured
presentations by an outstanding interdisciplinary group of scientists, legal
scholars, federal, state and local government officials, representatives of nongovernmental organizations and others, along with thoughtful questions and
comments from the audience. Preparation of a written law review article was
not made a prerequisite to speaking at the symposium, and—primarily due to
other professional commitments—most of those who spoke on symposium
panels chose not to summarize or expand their oral comments in a written
piece.
Nonetheless, three distinguished, nationally prominent legal
scholars—Professors David Driesen, Joseph Tomain, and Thomas
McGarity—followed up by submitting the articles that comprise this
important issue of the Nova Law Review. In this brief symposium
introduction, I will summarize some of the key points advanced by each of
the article authors, note two themes that are common to their pieces, and
discuss a few of the implications of their perceptive work.
In Phasing Out Fossil Fuels, David Driesen advances a powerful
case for a planned and reasonably rapid phase out of fossil fuels. Noting that
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions account for fully eighty percent of all
greenhouse gas emissions—both in the United States and globally—that
once emitted CO2 remains in the atmosphere for centuries, and that fossil
fuels cause immense problems wholly apart from their impacts on climate,
Driesen argues that the predicted and possible consequences of climate
disruption are simply too serious to permit a very gradual shift to a carbon
free economy.
Professor Driesen soundly rejects the theory that any phase out of
fossil fuels should set emission targets or prices designed to equalize costs
and benefits at the margins. He perceptively observes that cost-benefit
analysis does not provide a useful guide to policy since the costs and benefits
of particular mitigation measures cannot be quantified with precision; and it
is morally unacceptable to refuse to prevent deaths in developing—and some
developed—countries because prevention would be too costly. Instead,

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
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Driesen calls for a focus on distribution of the costs of phasing out fossil
fuels, including particularly the hardships this needed policy might create for
individuals who are employed in the fossil fuels industry, and for energy
consumers. He advocates the use of emission trading to phase out fossil
fuels. He also suggests the enactment of an environmental competition
statute—legislation that would allow facilities reducing their carbon
emissions to collect the cost of their emission reductions from competitors
with higher carbon emissions—as a spur to technological innovation in the
control of CO2.
With regard to the politics of phasing out fossil fuels, Professor
Driesen advises environmental leaders to make the phasing out of fossil fuels
part of a rhetorical strategy that prepares the American public for much more
significant changes than are now politically feasible. However, he concedes
that it is not possible for anybody to prove a view about what political
strategy is best, and he views his own strategic recommendation as simply a
starting point for further discussion.
In contrast with David Driesen’s article, Professor Thomas
McGarity’s illuminating piece, The Disruptive Politics of Climate
Disruption, focuses less on the normative question of what the energy policy
approach of the United States should be, and far more on the sobering
realities of national climate disruption politics.
In a remarkably
comprehensive, detailed, and well-documented way he describes five failed
attempts by supporters of a federal program to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to move legislation through Congress. These include the Clinton
administration’s proposed BTU tax, Senator Jim Jeffords’ four pollutant bill,
the Lieberman-Warner proposal, and the Waxman-Markey and KerryLieberman-Graham bills. In each instance, Professor McGarity demonstrates
coordinated, well-funded, ideologically-driven campaigns—conducted by the
business community, a small coterie of conservative funders, and various
foundations and institutions that they created—that successfully forestalled
the passage of climate disruption legislation.
McGarity carefully analyzes the lessons to be learned by
environmental advocates from these successive legislative defeats. He
observes that the political infrastructures that the business community has
erected over the past thirty-five years have had a powerful influence on both
public opinion and the sentiments of federal elected officials. Due to those
efforts, America is now deeply divided on numerous issues—certainly
including climate disruption; and many Americans are now persuaded that
climate disruption is neither caused by humans nor a genuine threat, and that
the government should not interfere in private economic arrangements. The
business community has adeptly taken advantage of regional differences and
made effective use of ginned up grassroots organizations. Moreover,
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although they have experienced internal difficulties, business interests have
generally remained unified in their political positions regarding climate
disruption legislation.
McGarity notes that—like the general public—the two major
national political parties are now substantially divided along ideological
lines. While Democratic leaders in Congress have experienced great
difficulty corralling enough votes to get mandatory climate disruption bills
through committees and past floor votes, Republican congressional leaders
have been able to persuade nearly all of their party’s members to vote against
all such proposals as a bloc.
Additionally, major environmental
organizations supporting anti-climate disruption bills have been repeatedly
outgunned and outclassed by the sophisticated, well-resourced efforts of
lobbyists and public relations experts working to further the positions of
industry. Furthermore, notwithstanding its profoundly harmful impacts,
climate disruption is too gradual a process to create the sort of crisis
atmosphere among the public that is likely to generate Congressional action.
Given these various considerations, Professor McGarity concludes
that Congress is not likely to enact national anti-climate disruption
legislation for some time to come. And even if such legislation somehow
does emerge, it will probably contain a jumble of conflicting provisions that
may not actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effective way.
Unlike the Driesen and McGarity articles, Professor Joseph
Tomain’s well-reasoned article concentrates on investor owned electric
utility companies and state public utility commissions. He argues that the
utilities must recognize the realities of enormous shifts in the electricity
market, create new business models, and join with state regulators to create a
new regulatory compact.
As Professor Tomain’s piece lucidly describes, the demand for
centrally generated electricity has fallen very considerably since the early
1990s, and it is projected to decline much further in coming years. This
trend is the result of a combination of factors, including competition from
new technologies, increases in energy efficiency, lifestyle changes among
energy consumers, and certain shifts in federal and state regulatory
requirements. At the same time, electric utilities are now called upon to
make significant new investments in order to upgrade the current grid, to
develop and use new technologies, and to promote interconnections with
renewable resources. To meet these new challenges, Tomain contends, a
new set of regulatory principles is now urgently needed.
More specifically, Joseph Tomain proposes five new precepts as a
general guide to state regulation of utilities. First, he writes, utilities should
not be required to incur “stranded costs,” i.e. excess costs due to regulatory
or policy changes that force utilities to lose customers. Simultaneously,
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however, universal electric service must be maintained by the utilities.
Third, traditional cost-of-service rulemaking should not be used to allow
utilities to build coal-fired plants or projects based on nuclear power. Fourth,
competition and the development of innovative energy technologies—
including technologies friendly to distributed generation of energy and the
development of solar, wind, and other renewable energy projects—must be
encouraged. Finally, public utility commissions should encourage electric
utilities to adopt new business models that are more in sync with a rapidly
shifting electricity marketplace.
Professor Tomain argues for some significant departures from
traditional ratemaking practices. He favors rate designs that base utility rates
on factors other than the volume of electricity sales, such as the number of
customers that a utility serves, and the sums that the utility has invested in
smart grids, energy audits, smart meters, and the like. He also favors regular,
mandatory reviews of the prudence of utility capital investments, and state
regulatory assessments of the need for power, before investments are made
in new large-scale utility construction projects.
Finally, Tomain urges investor-owned utilities to place their
emphasis on distribution and customer service instead of on generating
electricity. In his view, utilities should evolve into the managers of a modern
infrastructure system. In the future, their focus should be on providing
financial products for firms that wish to install distributed energy technology,
develop and provide energy storage, and promote distributed generation and
energy efficiency retrofits.
Although the three articles that form this symposium issue concern
quite disparate aspects of the policy and politics of climate disruption, upon
close examination two common themes are evident. First, each of the article
authors either identifies or presumes a very clear need for a change in the
status quo. Professor Driesen identifies a need for a reasonably rapid
phasing out of fossil fuels at the national level and assays its implications.
Professor Tomain urges a new regulatory regime and a new business model
for electric utilities that responds to the realities of climate disruption. And,
although his article is primarily historical and empirical, Professor McGarity
also identifies a need for new legislation to curb climate disruption, writing
that the impact of human greenhouse gas emissions “may well be the most
profound environmental problem that the civilized world has ever
encountered.”
Secondly, all three authors note the need for a meaningful
governmental role in curbing climate disruption. Driesen takes the view that
climate disruption poses problems of coordination that make it unsolvable
without a significant government role; and he proposes profound changes in
our national approach to energy policy. McGarity assesses the prospects for
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national legislative change through the enactment of a federal statute to curb
greenhouse gas emissions; and Tomain argues for new directions in state
administrative regulation of electric utilities.
Beyond these similarities, the three fine articles in this symposium
issue also imply some less obvious conclusions. Given the dismal prospects
for the enactment of federal legislation to curb climate disruption
demonstrated in Professor McGarity’s piece, it may well be that those
concerned with this grave and burgeoning threat should focus, to an
increased extent, on pressing for policy changes among the states, rather than
at the national level. Professor Tomain’s recommendations, of course,
already emphasize a need for regulatory reforms by state electric utility
regulators and state legislatures. Although Professor Driesen’s provocative
energy policy recommendations would clearly be most effective on a
national—if not an international—level, their adoption by state legislators
and regulators, and environmental non-governmental organizations, would
nonetheless count as a forward step toward a carbon free economy.
In addition, given the ongoing political obstacles to reforming
governmental energy policies among some U.S. states and in the federal
government, these symposium articles seem to imply a need for climate
disruption opponents to concentrate more on persuading non-governmental
actors to make helpful changes. Thus, for example, environmental advocates
may wish to improve their relationship with the news media generally and
with television weather reporters in particular. Much of what the public
learns about disastrous climate disruption-related events is gleaned from the
reports of television meteorologists. If weathercasters noted that particular
severe droughts, floods, and cyclonic storms are consistent with wellsupported scientific studies that predict an increase in human caused
weather-related disasters—even though no individual weather event may be
directly linked to climate disruption—public awareness of the perils of
climate disruption may be significantly increased. Patient relationshipbuilding with television weather reporters, and their editors and producers,
might persuade some of them to adopt that progressive approach.
Anti-climate disruption advocates will also do well to friend raise
among business enterprises that already recognize the acute dangers posed
by global climate disruption. Even though few such companies have thus far
been willing to break openly with the anti-regulation/anti-government
positions espoused by the business community, over time some anti-climate
disruption business leaders may find the courage to do so. Their political
support would certainly be of benefit. Along the same lines, quiet
discussions with leaders of electric utility companies might persuade a
number of them to modernize their business models along the sensible lines
recommended by Professor Tomain.
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All in all, the outstanding articles contained in this symposium issue
provide a rich sampling of the sorts of careful research, thorough analysis,
and creative thought that is much needed in discussions of climate disruption
and public energy policy. Each one is a valuable contribution to the field. I
hope these top-notch symposium articles will provoke your thought, stir your
conscience, and benefit your work.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The impact of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases (“GHG”s) on the Earth’s climate may well be the most
profound environmental problem that the civilized world has ever
encountered. Since the United States has until quite recently been the largest
emitter of greenhouse gases, its efforts to ameliorate climate disruption by
reducing those emissions have been of considerable interest to its citizens
* Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law,
University of Texas School of Law; board member, Center for Progressive Reform.
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and the rest of the world’s inhabitants.1 Yet, it has done very little to reduce
GHG emissions until very recently, and even those initial steps have been
tiny in comparison to what reputable scientists say is needed to mitigate
climate change. In the years since climate disruption became a serious
political issue in the late 1980s, supporters of a federal program to reduce
GHG emissions have made five serious attempts to move legislation through
Congress—the Clinton Administration’s British Thermal Unit (“BTU”) tax
in the 103rd Congress, Senator Jim Jeffords’ four-pollutant Bill in the 107th
Congress, the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the 110th Congress, and the
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bills in the 111th
Congress.2 All five of these efforts failed.3
This article will examine these five major legislative initiatives with
an eye toward extracting lessons for future efforts to enact major
environmental legislation. While there are many reasons for Congress’
failure to enact climate disruption legislation, including concerns about the
underlying science and the efficacy of proceeding ahead in the absence of
commitments from other massive GHG emitters like China and India,4 I will
argue that one powerful explanation lies in a thirty-five-year war against
government regulation waged by the business community, several prominent
conservative foundations, and the institutions that they created and
nourished. I will show how these institutions played a prominent role in
defeating climate disruption legislation, even when the business
community’s solid opposition to climate disruption appeared to be dissolving
as some companies accepted the reality of climate disruption and amended
1.
Anup Shah, Climate Change and Global Warming Introduction, GLOBAL
ISSUES (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/233/climate-change-and-globalwarming-introduction.
2.
See infra Part III.
3.
Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap Emissions—Democrats Forgo
Centerpiece of President Obama’s Energy Plan, As Cap-and-Trade Fails to Lure Broad
Poiltical Support, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A3 [hereinafter Power, Senate Halts Effort to
Cap Emissions]; Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less
Likely, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Aug. 6, 1993, at 12, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Eric
Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME (June 9, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1812836,00.html; S. 556 (107th): Clean Power Act of 2002: Overview,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s556 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014);
111th Congress Climate Change Legislation, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
4.
See James Parker-Flynn, The Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Climate
Science, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 11098, 11118 (2013); Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold,
Missteps Weigh on Agenda for Climate; Academic Breaches, Flaws in Seminal Report Feed
Doubts on Warming, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A1; David Bennett, Cap and Trade—
Tough Questions, DELTA FARM PRESS (July 30, 2009), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/
management/cap-and-trade-tough-questions.
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their business models accordingly, while others saw opportunities to profit or
gain competitive advantage from such legislation.5
My thesis is that the institutions that trade associations and
conservative funders created and continue to create have by-and-large
remained true to a laissez faire minimalist prescription for the nation’s
economy, and they are therefore unalterably opposed to legislation that
would subject greenhouse gas emitters to government-imposed controls,
even when such controls might serve the economic interests of a substantial
number of businesses. This adamant opposition, which has in turn
influenced members of Congress from both political parties, has effectively
forestalled climate disruption legislation. I will further argue that the
presence of these powerful negative voices in the legislative debates proved
to be of great strategic value to companies that preferred that Congress not
enact any legislation, but wanted a place at the table when Congress was
shaping the bills that would greatly affect their interests if they became law.
Hence, the fractures in the business community are not likely to affect the
vitality of these institutions in the foreseeable future.
Part II of this article will briefly describe the Laissez-Faire Revival
that I document in my book—Freedom to Harm—by highlighting the
institutions that the business community and conservative funders created to
resist progressive governmental initiatives like climate disruption
legislation.6 Part III will describe the five attempts to enact climate
disruption legislation and detail the role those institutions played in defeating
each of those initiatives. Part IV will explore some of the lessons that we
can learn from these failed attempts. The article reaches the rather
discouraging conclusion that strong climate disruption legislation is not
likely to emerge from a deeply divided Congress that reflects the deep
divisions in the current political culture over the proper role of government
in today’s economy.
II.

THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL

The Laissez Faire Revival began in the late 1970s as a reaction
against the progressive legislation that Congress enacted during the late
1960s and early 1970s to protect consumers, workers, and the environment

5.
See Reena Jana, The Business Benefits of Going Green, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-22/thebusiness-benefits-of-going-greenbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice.
6.
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 6 (2013).
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from risky products and business practices.7 Several wealthy conservative
benefactors spent millions of dollars to create an idea infrastructure
consisting of think tanks and free enterprise centers in universities and law
schools.8 Financed largely through conservative foundations and corporate
contributions, this idea infrastructure conducted an air war against federal
regulation in books, scholarly journals, magazines, white papers, internet
blogs, op-ed columns, media interviews, and talk shows.9 Three think tanks
that played prominent roles in the climate disruption battles were the
Heritage Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”), and the
George C. Marshall Institute.10
The business community also created an influence infrastructure to
conduct the ground war against regulation in the regulatory agencies and
Congress.11 The most visible of the ground troops during the climate wars
were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“CoC”) and the National Association
of Manufacturers (“NAM”).12 Less visible, but still highly influential were
the so-called astroturf grassroots organizations that trade associations and
conservative funders created to run advertising campaigns in the districts of
swing members of Congress, sponsor local rallies, and generate phone calls,
letters, and emails to members of Congress.13 Some of these organizations,
like the American Energy Alliance (“AEA”), Citizens for a Sound Economy
(“CSE”), and Americans for Prosperity, were permanent institutions that
fought in many wars.14 Others were created on an ad hoc basis by public
relations firms working for companies and trade associations to conduct
focused campaigns against particular legislative initiatives.15 Another
critical component of the influence infrastructure was an extremely effective
media echo chamber for influencing the content of news and political
commentary at both the national and local levels.16 Two highly influential
7.
Id. at 5.
8.
Id. at 40.
9.
See id. at 41–56.
10.
Id. at 247; Parker-Flynn, supra note 4, at 11100.
11.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 57.
12.
Id. at 60.
13.
Id. at 58–59.
14.
See id. at 59; Robert Parry, What Wouldn’t Bob Do for Koch Oil?,
NATION, Aug. 26–Sept. 2, 1996, at 11, 13–14; Peter H. Stone, Grass-Roots Goliath, NAT’L J.,
July 13, 1996, at 1529, 1530. “Established in 1984 by George Mason University economics
professor Richard Fink with funding from the David H. Koch Foundation,” CSE was a
sophisticated Astroturf grassroots operation committed to “‘lower taxes, less spending, less
regulation, and free trade.’” MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 58; Stone, supra note 14, at 1530.
15.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33.
16.
See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER:
RUSH LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 20 (2008); JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN
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pro-business media outlets were Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation and
David Smith’s Sinclair Broadcast Group, both of which hosted
commentators, like Rush Limbaugh and Steve Milloy, who preached a
populist-flavored laissez faire minimalist message to millions of viewers and
listeners and provided ready access to conservative think tank scholars.17
With strong idea and influence infrastructures in place, the business
community launched three powerful assaults on the protective governmental
infrastructure that Congress established during the Progressive Era, New
Deal Era, and Public Interest Eras.18 Those assaults have thus far failed to
achieve their fundamental goal of repealing the landmark environmental and
consumer protection statutes of the 1970s, but the business community’s idea
infrastructure has been remarkably successful in shaping public attitudes
toward government regulation in society.19 After a 35-year barrage of antiregulation rhetoric, many Americans have lost faith in the capacity of
government to protect it from the vicissitudes of the marketplace.
The business community has never been monolithic in its opposition
to federal regulation.20 Pollution control technology vendors, for example,
have not always been strong supporters of the CoC’s fierce attacks on
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulations.21 Indeed, the fact
that the bedrock regulatory statutes have survived may, in part, be
attributable to an understanding on the part of influential members of the
business community that the appearance of a protective governmental
infrastructure is necessary to maintain the public’s perception that it is not
wholly at the mercy of unconstrained economic forces, and that perception,
in turn, is necessary to maintain a stable economic structure within which
businesses can thrive.22 During the past few years, there has been a highly
visible split in the business community on the issue of global warming that
AMERICA 162 (2004); Patricia J. Williams, The Disquieted American, NATION, May 26, 2003,
at 9. Compare Distorting Climate Change Findings on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s
“Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in the ‘20s and ‘30s,” MEDIA
MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 24, 2007, 5:02 PM), http://www.mediamatters.org/research/2007/10/
24/distorting-climate-change-findings-on-kcol-jame/141487, with Company Profile, SINCLAIR
BROADCAST GROUP, http://www.sbgi.net/about/profile.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
17.
DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE: RIGHT-WING MEDIA
AND HOW IT CORRUPTS DEMOCRACY 171 (2004); JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 16, at 46;
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 16, at 162; Distorting Climate Change Findings
on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s “Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in
the ‘20s and ‘30s,” supra note 16.
18.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 6, 60–61.
19.
See id. at 61.
20.
See id. at 39–40, 61.
21.
See Elizabeth Williamson, Climate Issues Divide U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Big Members, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at A6.
22.
See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 5–6.
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goes deeper than the fraying at the edges that might be expected in any large
organization putatively devoted to a single cause.23 The following
description of the battles over climate change legislation will highlight these
divisions and evaluate their significance.
III.

THE ASSAULTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION

Climate disruption became a salient public policy issue in the mid1980s as scientists verified the reality of human activity-induced global
warming and called for increased energy efficiency to reduce GHG
emissions.24 During his 1988 campaign to be the nation’s first environmental
president, candidate George H.W. Bush promised to take action to address
global warming.25 Soon after his inauguration, the EPA delivered a report to
Congress proposing bold action, including fees on coal, oil, and natural gas
to discourage future use of those fossil fuels in producing electricity.26 A
panel of experts assembled by the National Academies of Sciences urged the
federal government to take concrete steps to reduce GHG emissions,
including raising energy taxes and enacting mandatory efficiency
standards.27
The business community responded to these developments with a
coordinated campaign to sew doubt in the minds of policymakers and the
public about the scientific basis of global warming predictions.28 Relying
heavily on think-tanks and a small group of mostly industry-funded scientists
in academia, the electric utility and manufacturing industries sponsored an
effective public relations campaign to persuade Congress not to enact
legislation requiring mandatory GHG reductions.29 The Global Climate
23.

Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2009, at 1, 1,

5–6.
24.
See Erik Eckholm, New Predictions See Rise in CO2 Transforming Earth,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1984, at C1; Philip Shabecoff, Major ‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is
Unavoidable, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, at C1 [hereinafter Shabecoff, Major
‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is Unavoidable, Experts Say].
25.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 108.
26.
Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A. Proposes Rules to Curb Warming, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1989, at C7.
27.
Rudy Abramson, Prompt Action to Curb Global Warming Urged
Environment: Science Panel Says U.S. Could Cut ‘Greenhouse’ Pollution 40% with Little
Economic Cost, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at 1.
28.
ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS; THE COVER-UP;
THE PRESCRIPTION 9, 19, 31 (1998); SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE
EXPERTS! HOW INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 272
(2001).
29.
GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19, 31; RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note
28, at 270.
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Coalition (“GCC”) was created in 1989, comprising of the CoC, the NAM,
and the auto and energy industries to lobby against climate change
legislation.30 In 1991, the National Coal Association (“NCA”), the Western
Fuels Association, the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”), and trade
associations for the coal, oil and gas, and electric utility industries, created a
group called the Information Council on the Environment (“ICE”) which
“launched a[n] . . . advertising and public relations [effort] to . . . ‘reposition
global warming as theory—not fact.’”31 The public relations firm it hired
arranged for the sympathetic scientists on its advisory board to appear in
broadcast appearances, op-ed pages, and newspaper interviews.32 Faced with
this strong opposition from the business community, the Bush
Administration did not seriously attempt to fulfill the president’s campaign
promise.33
Toward the end of the Bush Administration, however, a thin fracture
line began to develop in the business community’s opposition to climate
disruption regulation as the American Gas Association (“AGA”)—a trade
association of natural gas producers and distributors—joined the Solar
Energy Industries Association in sponsoring a study concluding that the
United States could reduce GHG emissions and increase employment by
moving rapidly to natural gas-fired power plants, renewable energy, and
high-efficiency technologies.34
A.

The BTU Tax in the 103rd Congress

The Clinton Administration hit the ground running with a proposal
for a tax on energy consumption as part of the Administration’s broader
legislative effort to balance the federal budget and stimulate the economy.35
During the first two weeks of January 1993, transition officials debated
whether the tax should be on the carbon content of all fuels—a carbon tax—
or the heating value of all fuels—a BTU tax.36 The BTU tax offered a
weaker incentive to move toward renewable energy than a carbon tax, which
would not have affected dams, solar energy generators, or nuclear power
30.
RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 270; Margaret E. Kriz, WarmButton Issue, NAT’L J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 319, 322 (1992) [hereinafter Kriz, Warm-Button
Issue].
31.
RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 272.
32.
Id. at 272–73.
33.
Kriz, Warm-Button Issue, supra note 30, at 319, 320.
34.
Margaret E. Kriz, The New Eco-nomics, NAT’L J., May 30, 1992.
35.
Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, PLATTS INT’L GAS REP., Feb. 5, 1993,
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
36.
David Hage & Sara Collins, Pointing to Tax Increases, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 46; Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, supra note 35.
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plants.37 Environmental groups therefore favored the carbon tax.38 The coal
industry and coal-burning utility companies, however, strongly opposed the
carbon tax, arguing that it would result in substantial price increases for coal
compared to natural gas and sources of energy that did not burn fossil fuels.39
Both energy taxes were more attractive to the incoming administration than
an addition to the federal gasoline tax, which would have been immediately
noticeable to consumers.40 Since the Democratic Party controlled the White
House and both houses during the 103rd Congress, supporters of an energy
tax were optimistic.41
Both the energy industry and industries that were large consumers of
energy were united in their opposition to any new energy taxes.42 The EEI,
the primary trade association for the electric utility industry, prepared a set of
economic analyses of several variations of energy taxes and presented them
to members of the transition team and incoming Energy Secretary Hazel
O’Leary.43 The industry argued that any tax capable of reducing GHG
emissions would have to be so high that it would have an undesirable impact
on the economy and a disproportionate impact on the poor.44 The CoC also
took an uncompromising stand against any energy tax.45 Long before the
Clinton Administration drafted proposed legislation, industry lobbyists and
Astroturf grassroots groups were meeting with—and phoning and sending
emails to—White House officials and members of Congress, urging them to
stop the energy tax in its tracks.46 The President publicly complained that
37.
Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Matthew L. Wald, Pondering an Energy
Tax That Can’t Please All the People: Experts See Three Practical Ways to Levy a ‘BroadBased’ Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at F10.
38.
Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Wald, supra note 37.
39.
Hage & Collins, supra note 36 (referencing coal-producing state
opposition); Wald, supra note 37.
40.
Eric Pianin & Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Suggestions Propel
Opponents to the Barricades; Coalitions of Interests Make Enactment Difficult, Analysts Say,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at A10; David Wessel & Rick Wartzman, Energy Interests
Mobilize Against a New Tax, But Real Fight May Focus on What Form It Takes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 1993, at A16.
41.
Michael Weisskopf & Steven Mufson, Lobbyists in Full Swing on Tax
Plan; Some Groups Already Have Shaped Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1993, at A1.
42.
Viveca Novak, An Energy Tax? Ok, If It’s Not on Us, NAT’L J., Feb. 13,
1993; Wessel & Wartzman, supra note 40.
43.
Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial
Balloon, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Feb. 5, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1739616.
44.
Id.; Utilities, Automakers Note Comments by O’Leary That Energy Tax
May Be Delayed, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Jan. 25, 1993 (quoting Alan Richardson,
American Public Power Association).
45.
Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40.
46.
Weisskopf & Mufson, supra note 41; Michael Wines, Clinton Makes
Lobbyists a Target in Opening Battle over Tax Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A15.
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opponents of the carbon tax “ha[d] already lined the corridors of power with
high-priced lobbyists.”47
In late January, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen announced that
the incoming Administration was considering an energy tax, and the major
players in the business community’s influence infrastructure sprang into
action to shoot down the trial balloon.48 The American Petroleum Institute
(“API”) hosted a well-attended gathering for all interested companies and
trade associations at which the message was “[l]et’s not fight each other.”49
The GCC circulated reports concluding that an energy tax would increase
unemployment and precipitate an economic downturn.50 A brand new
association of public utility companies calling itself the Alliance Against a
Carbon Tax conducted grassroots organizing and lobbying against the tax.51
A Denver-based think tank called the Center for a New West contracted for
studies concluding that a carbon tax would cause regional imbalances and
put more than 600,000 jobs at risk.52 Nearly all electric utility companies
opposed any tax on electrical energy,53 but Southern California Edison—a
large utility company that had already invested heavily in natural gas
facilities—supported a BTU tax.54
On February 17, 1993, President Clinton announced a four-year
blueprint for stimulating the American economy that included, among its
many revenue-enhancing provisions, a BTU tax on nearly all fuels.55 The
decision to go with a BTU tax, rather than a carbon tax, reflected the
Administration’s determination to make the proposal as palatable as possible
to Democrats from coal-producing states by spreading the burden to other

47.
Wines, supra note 46.
48.
Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial
Balloon, supra note 43; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40.
49.
Novak, supra note 42.
50.
Id.; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40.
51.
Novak, supra note 42.
52.
Carbon Tax Could Harm Economy, Environment, Think Tank Studies
Claim, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 16, 1993.
53.
See Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes
Less Likely, supra note 3.
54.
AES’ Sant Backs Energy Tax, Citing Environmental, Efficiency Benefits,
UTIL. ENV’T REP., Apr. 2, 1993, at 13, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
55.
Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All; Yearly Cost
Estimated at Up to $150 Per Household, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter
Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All]; Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to
‘Face Facts,’ Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993,
at A1.
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fuels, including nuclear and hydroelectric power.56 Yet, in a victory for
environmental groups, the proposal exempted wind and solar power from the
tax.57 The Bill also included additional funding for the federal low-income
energy assistance program to offset some of the adverse effect on lowincome Americans.58 Since the tax would be hidden in gas, electric, and fuel
bills, most Americans would probably not notice that they were paying it.59
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) predicted that the tax would result in the
reduction of GHG emissions by about 25 million tons per year.60
Environmental groups supported the proposal.61 Although they
favored a carbon tax, they were persuaded by Treasury Secretary Bentsen
that it was politically infeasible.62 They worried that the tax rate was too low
to result in a reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but they
decided that any increase in the cost of fossil fuels would encourage power
plants to consider moving to renewable sources of energy.63 And they were
pleased that President Clinton had chosen the BTU tax over a gasoline tax.64
Consumer groups were dubious about the tax because of its regressive effects
on low-income consumers.65 But they applauded the provisions in the
proposal ensuring that low-income consumers did not bear a disproportionate
burden of the tax.66 They warned regulated utility companies that if they
tried to persuade state public utility commissions to allow them to pass the
tax through to consumers, the groups would argue that the companies already

56.
Margaret Kriz, A Green Tax?, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 1997; Energy Tax
Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Feb. 22,
1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1748628.
57.
Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55.
58.
Id.; Clinton Plan: BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS,
Feb. 18, 1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
59.
Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55.
60.
Clinton Plan: BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, supra note 58.
61.
Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, NAT’L
ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 22, 1993 (quoting Dan Lashof, National Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”)); Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint;
Environmentalists Back Plan They Helped Draft, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at D1
[hereinafter Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint].
62.
Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61.
63.
See Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax,
supra note 61; Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 917–18 (quoting Dan Lashof, NRDC).
64.
Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61.
65.
Novak, supra note 42; Economist: Energy Tax Would Penalize Western
Coal, Could Hurt Environment, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Mar. 5, 1993, at 3, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
66.
Environmental Groups Flex For Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra
note 61.
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owed consumers hundreds of millions of dollars in rebates because of
unexpected declines in interest costs on capital projects.67
The energy industry was unified in its opposition to the tax.68 The
API predicted that the tax would cost seven hundred thousand jobs and
reduce the gross national product by about $5 billion.69 The coal industry
estimated that coal prices would increase by more than 25%.70
Manufacturing trade associations argued that it would bring a nascent
economic recovery to a rapid end.71 Even the natural gas industry was
unhappy.72 Its primary concern was the decision to collect the tax from
natural gas producers at the wellhead, rather than from consumers at the
consumption end of the pipeline.73 At the same time, the major natural gas
players did not join the chorus of energy interests in the hope that a less
categorical stand would be more likely to get it a seat at the negotiating table
when the proposal began to work its way through Congress.74 The Electric
Generation Association, a trade association representing independent power
producers, offered qualified support for “a properly structured broad-based
energy tax.”75 Not surprisingly, the American Wind Energy Association and
the Geothermal Resources Association strongly supported the proposal, so
long as wind and geothermal energy remained exempt from the tax.76
67.
Craig S. Cano, Gas Groups Gain Some Ground in BTU-Tax Debate;
Discussions Continue, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR
1756589 (quoting Edwin Rothschild, Citizen Action).
68.
Republican, Democratic Senators Voice Concern on BTU Proposal,
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 26, 1993 (quoting Jerry Jasinowski, National Association of
Manufacturers).
69.
Administration Figure on Consumer Costs “Grossly Underestimated,”
Industry Says, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 24, 1993.
70.
Congress Checks Impact of BTU Tax; NCA Registers Protest, PLATTS
COAL OUTLOOK, Mar. 1, 1993, at 8, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (discussing a
perverse effect); Economist: Energy Tax Would Penalize Western Coal, Could Hurt
Environment, supra note 65.
71.
Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 919.
72.
Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl,
supra note 56 (undermining competitiveness; devastating impact).
73.
Sonali Paul, ‘Where?’ Is Gas Worry over Clinton BTU Tax, PLATTS
OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1726354; President Clinton’s
Proposal to Tax Energy Sources Including Natural Gas Is Part of Broad Economic Reform
Program That Also Emphasizes Natural Gas R&D and Use, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Feb. 18,
1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
74.
See Craig S. Cano, Gas Industry Distancing Itself from Harsh Criticism of
Energy Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1709083.
75.
Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl,
supra note 56 (quoting Thomas Dodd, Electric Generation Association).
76.
Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra
note 61.
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Stung by the industry criticism, the Clinton Administration adopted
“a strategy of placate and conquer.”77 As they worked out the details of a
proposed bill, high-level officials engaged in a series of meetings with
industry lobbyists over a two-week period in an attempt to address their
objections.78 They hoped to convince the industries that an energy tax was
inevitable and they were better served by working with the Administration
than by standing on the outside denouncing any energy tax.79 Trade
associations for the natural gas industry quickly agreed to meet with
Administration officials to argue that the tax should not be collected at the
wellhead.80 The manufacturing, petroleum, and electric utility industries
continued to take a hard line against any energy tax, even though that meant
that they were not invited to participate in the negotiations.81 The NAM
assembled an ad hoc 1300-member umbrella group containing a broad array
of energy, manufacturing, and transportation companies called the
Affordable Energy Alliance—later renamed the American Energy Alliance—
the exclusive goal of which was to kill the BTU tax.82 It hired two public
relations firms to conduct a $2 million advertising campaign to generate
pressure on members of Congress from energy-producing states to oppose
the tax.83 The Sierra Club responded with a far less resource-intensive
appeal to its members to urge their representatives to support the tax.84
President Clinton’s BTU tax proposal got off to a bad start in
Congress.85 At a hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy and
the Environment in late February 1993, Committee Chairman Bennett
77.
Thomas W. Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at D1 [hereinafter Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes].
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.; see White House Firm on BTU Tax, Appears Flexible on Collection
Point, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1718127.
81.
Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, supra note 77;
Environmentalists Question Utility Efforts to Move BTU Tax Downstream, UTIL. ENV’T REP.,
Mar. 19, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR 1727921 (reporting the position of the EEI).
82.
Compare New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint
Effort, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 6, 1993, at 3, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com,
with Lobbyists Boast BTU Tax Beaten in the House, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 24, 1993, at
1, available at 1993 WLNR 1726814.
83.
David S. Hilzenrath, Miscalculations, Lobby Effort Doomed BTU Tax
Plan, WASH. POST, June 11, 1993, at D1; Timothy Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a
Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993,
at A18 [hereinafter, Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem
Able to Write Own Exemptions].
84.
Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra
note 61.
85.
See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb.
25, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1731982.
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Johnston (D-Louisiana) expressed his strong opposition to the proposal.86
The Republican committee members all opposed the BTU tax.87 The Clinton
Administration failed to provide a witness to defend the tax, and no other
members of the committee came to its defense.88 In late March, Senator
Johnston expressed a willingness to support a BTU tax, so long as it was
collected by electric utility companies directly from consumers—something
that Administration officials opposed because they feared it would
precipitate a consumer revolt.89
In early April, the Treasury Department circulated a draft of a
modified BTU tax that changed the point of collection for natural gas from
the wellhead to the local distribution companies and for coal from the coal
producer to the utility companies that burned the coal.90 The natural gas
industry remained unhappy with the change because it still did not place the
burden of payment on the ultimate consumer of the gas.91 The petroleum and
electric utility industries remained adamantly opposed to the tax.92 The coal
industry was pleased with the changes, but it continued to oppose the Bill
because of the disproportionate negative economic impact it would have on
the industry as a whole.93 The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners and consumer and environmental groups strongly opposed
the shift in the collection point.94
Capitulating to industry pressure once again, President Clinton
agreed to allow the tax to be collected by utility companies without the
86.
Craig S. Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to
Implementing BTU Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 29, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Cano, While
Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU Tax], available at 1993 WLNR
1716991; Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85.
87.
See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85.
88.
Id.
89.
Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU
Tax, supra note 86.
90.
Treasury Unveils Modified BTU Tax Proposal, CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 1,
1993.
91.
Bill Loveless, AGA’s Baly Says Details of BTU Tax Are ‘Major Blow’ to
Gas Industry, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 5, available at 1993 WLNR 1726625;
James Risen, Lobbyists Win Changes in Energy Tax Proposal Revenue: Administration Says
Some Industries Would Get Exemptions. Burden Would Shift Closer to Consumers, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at 1.
92.
Patrick Crow, U.S. BTU Tax Plan Revised; Industry Wary of Results, OIL
& GAS J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 21, 21; Loveless, supra note 91.
93.
See Industry Reacts to BTU Tax Modifications, COAL & SYNFUELS TECH.,
Apr. 19, 1993, at 1.
94.
Jackie Calmes & David Wessel, Clinton Changes Course on Part of
Energy Tax: Agreement Would Ease Restrictions on Utilities to Pass Along the Levy, WALL
ST. J., May 11, 1993, at A2; States Try to Blunt BTU Tax Impact, PLATTS OILGRAM PRICE
REP., Apr. 23, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1727380.
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approval of state public utility commissions.95 The House Ways and Means
Committee in mid-May approved a bill that contained this compromise,
along with a number of exemptions for the aluminum and chlor-alkyl
industries and farming interests.96 The House, in late May, narrowly
approved (219-213) the stimulus bill with the BTU provision intact.97 It was
the first time that either house of Congress had passed legislation aimed at
reducing GHG emissions.98
The battle then shifted to the Senate Finance Committee, where the
CoC and the energy industry hoped to kill it.99 Because Senator David Boren
(D-Oklahoma) was one of the senators who made up the eleven to nine
Democratic majority on the committee, he became the target of an intensive
campaign to influence his vote.100 The Affordable Energy Alliance and CSE,
a grassroots organization devoted to less government regulation created in
1984 by the David H. Koch Foundation,101 convened taxpayer rallies in
Oklahoma, commissioned polls demonstrating strong opposition to the tax in
Oklahoma, and generated letters and phone calls from his constituents urging
him to oppose the tax.102 Newspaper ads proclaiming that Senator Boren
could stop a BTU bill that stood for Big Time Unemployment were part of
CSE’s $100,000 advertising campaign.103 A direct-mail blitz to more than
nine thousand Oklahoma community leaders and a corresponding
telemarketing campaign generated a huge number of pre-written letters and
calls to Boren’s offices.104 In addition, a study commissioned by several
95.
Calmes & Wessel, supra note 94.
96.
House Ways and Means Approves Tax Plan With Modified Energy Tax,
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), May 17, 1993; Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways
and Means Reports Bill, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 17, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR
1746071.
97.
In Close Vote, House Sends Energy Tax and Budget Plan on to Senate,
PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 31, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1711901.
98.
John M. Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, House Leaders Gained
a Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20 [hereinafter Broder, Adding Something for
Everyone].
99.
Patrick Crow, BTU Tax Battle Hits Capitol Hill, OIL & GAS J., May 10,
1993, at 25, 25; Patrick Crow, Clinton’s BTU Tax Starting to Fall Apart, OIL & GAS J., May
17, 1993, at 24, 24; New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint Effort,
supra note 82.
100.
Michael Weisskopf, Fanning a Prairie Fire; Capital Lobbies Stirred
Oklahomans’ Tax Revolt, WASH. POST, May 21, 1993, at A1; Richard S. Dunham, With
Friends Like David Boren…, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 6, 1993), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/1993-06-06/with-friends-like-david-boren-dot-dot-dot.
101.
Parry, supra note 14, at 13; Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30; Weisskopf,
supra note 100.
102.
Weisskopf, supra note 100.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
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energy companies from economists at the University of Oklahoma predicted
that the tax would destroy eleven thousand Oklahoma jobs, devalue farmland
by $1 billion, and add $180 per year to household energy bills.105 The effort
paid off when Senator Boren appeared at a rally on Capitol Hill sponsored by
the Independent Petroleum Association of America to urge the attendees to
help him kill the tax.106 Senator Boren then assembled a bipartisan group of
senators to offer an alternative stimulus bill that did not include an energy
tax.107
Once it became clear that well placed political pressure could turn
the President around, it was katy-bar-the-door as lobbyists insisted that their
clients should not have to pay the tax.108 The NAM maintained that it
contained so many loopholes that it was unfair to the industries that did not
have one.109 Then, in late June, Clinton agreed to a giant exemption for the
entire manufacturing and agricultural sectors of the economy.110 Still,
Senator Boren refused to vote for any change that included any form of tax
based on the heat content of fuel.111 The Finance Committee ultimately
approved a bill with a 4.3¢ per gallon gasoline tax and a number of
additional spending cuts, but no BTU tax.112 The Senate barely approved a
deficit reduction bill that contained the modest gasoline tax in late June after
Vice President Gore broke a fourty-nine to fourty-nine tie vote in which all
of the Republicans voted against the Bill.113
Worried that the conference committee might restore the BTU tax,
both the AEA and CSE launched new advertising campaigns in the districts

105.
Id.
106.
Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways and Means Reports Bill,
supra note 96.
107.
Sonali Paul, Boren Offers BTU Tax Alternative, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS,
May 21, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1753024.
108.
See Jackie Calmes, President’s Call for ‘Shared Sacrifice’ Turns Into
Scramble Among Lobbyists, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1993, at A3; Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying
Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, supra note 83;
William Neikirk, Dealing with Reality, CHI. TRIB. (June 20, 1993), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1993-06-20/news/9306200083_1_special-interests-bill-clinton-mining.
109.
Hilzenrath, supra note 83.
110.
Clinton Expects Senate to Pass Budget Reconciliation Bill This Week,
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), June 22, 1993.
111.
Id.
112.
Patrick Crow, U.S. Senate Deficit Bill Shifts Focus to Transport Fuels
Taxes, Spending Cuts, OIL & GAS J., June 21, 1993, at 19, 19; EEI Concerned That Energy
Tax May Be Resurrected in Final Budget Package, UTIL. ENV’T REP., June 25, 1993, available
at 1993 WLNR 1760031.
113.
Eric Pianin & David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Approves Budget Plan, 50-49;
Vice President Gore Casts Deciding Vote, WASH. POST, June 25, 1993, at A1.
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of members of committee they deemed to be swing votes.114 The conference
committee voted out a Bill with the Senate’s gasoline tax, and it passed both
houses of Congress.115 The trade associations for the energy industry were,
to say the least, pleasantly surprised by the outcome.116 In a thoughtful
postmortem gesture, the AEA spent some of its remaining cash on
newspaper ads thanking the Democratic Senators who had come to the
industry’s aid.117
Congress’ failure to pass a BTU tax left President Clinton’s April
1993 promise to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 in tatters.118
And the ease with which the business community’s influence infrastructure
forced the President to abandon the tax did not bode well for legislative
efforts to address climate change during the remainder of his
administration.119 Having prevailed in a face-to-face confrontation with the
new President on his signature climate change initiative, energy industry
lobbyists correctly predicted that climate change legislation would be a nonstarter for the remainder of the Clinton Administration.120
B.

The Jeffords Cap-and-Trade Bill in the 107th Congress

Any hope that Congress would enact legislation requiring GHG
reduction measures appeared dead with the Supreme Court of the United
States’s declaration that George W. Bush had won the 2000 presidential
election.121 The Bush Administration was far more concerned with
increasing domestic energy production than in protecting the environment
from global warming.122 Indeed, the Administration was not convinced that
114.
Timothy Noah, Energy Tax Compromise Presents Major Challenge for
White House, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1993, at A8; Second Anti-Tax Group Targets Legislators
in Ads, CONGRESS DAILY, July 16, 1993.
115.
Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes
Less Likely, supra note 3.
116.
See Sonali Paul, Against All Odds: The Big BTU Victory, PLATTS
OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Paul, Against All Odds], available at 1993
WLNR 1754024 (quoting an unnamed lobbyist for the oil industry).
117.
Id.
118.
See O’Leary: Losing BTU Tax Would Make U.S. Greenhouse Goal Hard
to Meet, UTIL. ENV’T REP., June 11, 1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
119.
Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; Death of Energy Tax Makes
Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less Likely, supra note 3.
120.
Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; Death of Energy Tax Makes
Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less Likely, supra note 3.
121.
See Tim Dickinson, Six Years of Deceit, ROLLING STONE, June 28, 2007,
at 54.
122.
See Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Bush Plans on Global Warming Alter
Little; Voluntary Programs Attract Few Firms, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A1.
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anthropogenic emissions of GHGs did in fact increase global temperatures.123
Instead of legislation, the Bush Administration preferred voluntary programs
with vague and unenforceable targets.124 Nevertheless, President Bush
recognized the need to place additional controls on grandfathered power
plants to protect downwind states from long-range transport of nitrogen
oxides (“NOx”), sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), and mercury emissions; it looked
for some time like newly appointed EPA Administrator Christine Todd
Whitman would persuade the President to include GHGs in the Clear Skies
Bill that the Administration was drafting to address the continuing problem
of interstate transport.125
Reports of a possible four-pollutant Clear Skies Bill sent energy
industry lobbyists and conservative think tanks back into battle mode.126 A
spokesperson for the CEI called the four-pollutant Bill a colossal mistake.127
The coal industry and most of the electric utility industry undertook a
massive lobbying campaign to convince the Administration to take GHG
emissions out of the Bill.128 One focal point of the lobbying efforts was the
Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group, a task force
made up of high level governmental officials charged with recommending a
national energy policy.129 The Cheney Task Force went out of its way to
meet with lobbyists from the coal, petroleum, and utilities industries to solicit
their views on what should be included in its report.130 The EEI put together

123.
Dickinson, supra note 121; Amy Goldstein & Eric Pianin, Hill Pressure
Fueled Bush’s Emissions Shift, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1.
124.
Manimoli Dinesh, Bush Administration Rolls Out Voluntary Plan to Cut
Pollution, OIL DAILY, Feb. 12, 2003, at 1; Gugliotta & Pianin, supra note 122.
125.
John Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, Bush Clean-Air Plan Born in Gore’s
Kyoto Playbook, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at A24 [hereinafter Fialka & Cummings, Bush
Clean-Air Plan in Gore’s Kyoto Playbook]; Eric Pianin, EPA Mulls Limits for Power Plant
Emissions; Environmentalists Laud White House Effort on Pollution, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2001, at A13.
126.
Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel Jr., How Power Lobby Won Battle
of Pollution Control at E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A1; Fialka & Cummings, Bush
Clean-Air Plan Born in Gore’s Kyoto Playbook, supra note 125.
127.
Andrew C. Revkin, New Alliance Forms to Cut Plants’ CO(-2) Emissions
Bush, Key Lawmakers, Industry Join Crusade, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2001, at 9.
128.
Elizabeth Shogren, U-Turn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout;
Policy: White House Downplays Any Damage to EPA Chief Caused by Bush’s Reversal on
Carbon Dioxide Output from Power Plants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter
Shogren, U-Turn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout].
129.
Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, at
38, 44; NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y DEV. GRP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001), available at
http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf.
130.
Drew & Oppel, supra note 126; Judy Pasternak, Bush’s Energy Plan
Bares Industry Clout; Cheney-Led Task Force Consulted Extensively with Corporate
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a group of around twenty utility executives to meet personally with Vice
President Cheney.131 Representing several electric utility companies, former
Republican National Committee chairman, Haley Barbour, sent a
memorandum to Vice President Cheney urging the Administration to
abandon the president’s campaign promise to regulate GHG emissions from
power plants.132
Presidential Economic Advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, “then
convene[d] a series of meetings” at which officials from the EPA, the DOE,
and the White House debated whether the administration’s Clear Skies Bill
should include GHGs.133 At the same time, industry lobbyists focused a lastminute barrage on the White House and sympathetic members of Congress in
the hope that they would in turn put pressure on the President.134 Participants
in the lobbying effort were later singled out for special praise for the efforts
that Thomas Kuhn, the president of the EEI and a former Yale classmate of
President Bush, had played in pleading the energy industry’s case.135
Pressure also came from conservative think tanks and advocacy
organizations.136 Grover Norquist, the head of Americans for Tax Reform,
and Fred Smith, head of the CEI, complained directly to Bush’s political
advisor Karl Rove.137
In mid-March, the President announced that he would not support
legislation mandating reductions in GHG emissions.138 The announcement

Executives. Its Findings Boosted Their Interests. Environmental Groups Had Little Voice,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at A1.
131.
Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Cheney’s Role Offers Strengths and
Liabilities, WASH. POST, May 17, 2001, at A1. The Vice President also met with
environmental groups, but only after the Task Force’s report was essentially completed.
Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s Energy
Report, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at A1.
132.
Drew & Oppel, supra note 126; Pasternak, supra note 130.
133.
John J. Fialka & Jeanne Cummings, How the President Changed His
Mind on Carbon Dioxide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at A20 [hereinafter Fialka &
Cummings, How the President Changed His Mind on Carbon Dioxide].
134.
Shogren, U-Turn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout, supra note 128.
135.
Michael Isikoff & T. Trent Gegax, Where There’s Smoke . . . ,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2001, at 34; Douglas Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance: Ties His
About-Face on Carbon Dioxide to an ‘Energy Crisis,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A23
[hereinafter Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance].
136.
See Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance, supra note 135; Shogren, UTurn on Emissions Shows Big Energy Clout, supra note 128.
137.
Letter from Fred L. Smith, Jr., Founder & Dir., Ctr. for Advancing
Capitalism, Competitive Enter. Inst., to George W. Bush, President of the U.S. (June 7, 2002),
available at http://cei.org/print/17808.
138.
Compare Goldstein & Pianin, supra note 123, and Douglas Jehl &
Andrew C. Revkin, Bush, in Reversal, Won’t Seek Cut in Emissions of Carbon Dioxide, N.Y.
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came as a surprise to EPA Administrator Whitman, who was busily assuring
both the American public and European allies, that the United States would
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.139 Environmental
activists accused the Bush Administration of yielding to industry pressure
and criticized Whitman for failing to resign after her public humiliation.140
Whitman gamely defended the President’s decision.141 Denying “that the
president had ‘pulled the rug out’ from under her,”142 she promised to pursue
alternative approaches to greenhouse gas reduction that would emphasize
technology development, nuclear power, and voluntary approaches to
reducing GHG emissions.143 The CoC and most of the energy industry
praised the administration for adopting a more balanced approach to climate
change.144 The greatest benefactors of the decision were coal producers and
utilities that burned mostly coal in their plants.145
Prospects for climate change legislation brightened somewhat in
May 2001 when Senator James Jeffords of Vermont abandoned the
Republican Party to become an independent who caucused with the
Democrats.146 A primary reason for the move was Jeffords’ growing
discomfort with the position of the Bush White House on environmental
issues.147 In gratitude for returning the Senate to Democratic control, the
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1, with Andrew C. Revkin, Despite Opposition in Party, Bush to
Seek Emissions Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A1.
139.
Fialka & Cummings, How the President Changed His Mind on Carbon
Dioxide, supra note 133; Douglas Jehl, Whitman Calls for Patience on Environmental
Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A16 [hereinafter Jehl, Whitman Calls for Patience on
Environmental Policies]; Eric Pianin & Amy Goldstein, Bush Drops a Call for Emissions
Cuts; Energy Firms Opposed Carbon Dioxide Pledge, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1.
140.
Jehl, Whitman Calls for Patience on Environmental Policies, supra note
139; Jehl & Revkin, supra note 138; Bill McKibben, Commentary, When Courage Was
Called for, She Punted; Ex-EPA Leader Whitman Caved in to Bush Instead of Doing the
Brave Thing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at M5; Pianin & Goldstein, supra note 139.
141.
Jehl, Whitman Calls for Patience on Environmental Policies, supra note
139.
142.
Eric Pianin, EPA Chief Lobbied on Warming Before Bush’s Emissions
Switch; Memo Details Whitman’s Plea for Presidential Commitment, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2001, at A7.
143.
Mike Ferullo, EPA: Whitman Supports Voluntary Programs, Without
‘Backing Away from Compliance,’ 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 1200 (June 15, 2001);
Jehl, Whitman Calls for Patience on Environmental Policies, supra note 139.
144.
Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance, supra note 135; Pianin & Goldstein,
supra note 139.
145.
Jehl, Bush Defends Emissions Stance, supra note 135.
146.
Sen. Jeffords’ Jump from Republican Party Derails Coal Industry’s
Agenda in Congress, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, May 28, 2001, at 6, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
147.
Steve Cook, General Policy: Power Plant Pollution, Climate Change Top
Priorities for Jeffords in Senate Panel, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 1425 (July 20, 2001).
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leadership appointed Jeffords to chair the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works.148 Jeffords had already introduced a four-pollutant bill
that was modeled on the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program.149 The Bill
would have required every covered source of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)—a
greenhouse gas—to acquire an allowance for every ton of CO2 that it
emitted.150 The allowances could come from many sources, including
purchases at annual government auctions, gifts from the government to ease
transitions, and purchases from other companies that held extra
allowances.151 The total number of allowances available in any given year
would be limited—or capped—by statute, and the caps would gradually
decrease in accordance with specified statutory benchmarks.152 For example,
the bill provided for reducing CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2012.153
At this point, however, noticeable fracture lines were beginning to
appear in the energy industry’s approach to climate change.154 The natural
gas industry was disappointed with the Bush Administration’s disavowal of
the president’s campaign promise, as were a few companies in the electric
utility industry that had already invested heavily in nuclear power and natural
gas-fired power plants and had begun to implement energy conservation
measures, sometimes in response to state GHG reduction initiatives.155
Concluding that GHG controls were inevitable, they valued the certainty of
knowing what the rules would be as they planned future projects.156 In June,
“a coalition of seven electric [power] companies” calling itself the Clean
148.
Sen. Jeffords’ Jump from Republican Party Derails Coal Industry’s
Agenda in Congress, supra note 146.
149.
Senate Bill Would Crack Down on Power Plant Emissions, PLATTS COAL
OUTLOOK, Mar. 19, 2001, at 6, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. The bill would also
have set up a separate technology-based regulatory regime for mercury emissions. Id.
150.
S. 556, 107th Cong. (2001).
151.
Id.
152.
See Senate Bill Would Crack Down on Power Plant Emissions, supra note
149; Sen. Jeffords’ Jump from Republican Party Derails Coal Industry’s Agenda in Congress,
supra note 146.
153.
Senate Bill Would Crack Down on Power Plant Emissions, supra note
149; Sen. Jeffords’ Jump from Republican Party Derails Coal Industry’s Agenda in Congress,
supra note 146.
154.
See Andrew C. Revkin & Neela Banerjee, Some Energy Executives Urge
U.S. Shift on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C1; Industry Mulls over Bush’s
Broken CO2 Promise, PLATTS GAS DAILY, Mar. 15, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR
12174434.
155.
Pamela Najor, Climate Change: Whitman Supports Bush View That
Utilities Need Not Be Required to Cut Carbon Dioxide, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No.12, at 525
(Mar. 23, 2001); Dan Morgan & Peter Behr, Developing Energy Bill Ignites Power Scramble,
WASH. POST, May 20, 2011, at A1; Revkin & Banerjee, supra note 154; Industry Mulls over
Bush’s Broken CO2 Promise, supra note 154.
156.
See Revkin & Banerjee, supra note 154.
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Energy Group drafted a four-pollutant bill that would have cut CO2
emissions to 2000 levels by 2008 and to 1990 levels by 2012.157 Utility
companies more heavily invested in coal generating capacity and nearly all
coal companies, however, remained steadfastly against any form of
mandatory restrictions on GHG emissions.158 Eight coal-dependent utility
companies created a new group called the National Electric Reliability
Coordinating Council to lobby against climate change legislation.159
To no one’s surprise, the proposed limitations on power plant
emissions in the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Bill did not reach
GHGs.160 Despite strong support from the energy industry, however, the
proposal got a lukewarm reception in Congress.161 Instead, the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee marked up the Jeffords Bill.162
No electric utility companies supported the Bill.163 An umbrella group
purporting to represent “‘more than 75,000 businesses and millions of
workers and energy consumers’” called the Coalition for Affordable and
Reliable Energy (“CARE”) predicted that the Bill would cause “escalating
energy prices and significant risk of electricity shortages for American
consumers and businesses.”164 Despite President Bush’s threat to veto any
bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG emissions,165 the Committee,
after a bitter debate, voted largely along party lines to approve the Jeffords
157.
Regina P. Cline, Utilities: Seven Power Companies Draft Bill to Control
Four Pollutants, Including CO2, 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No.27, at 1310 (July 6, 2001).
158.
See Morgan & Behr, supra note 155; Revkin & Banerjee, supra note 154.
159.
Jeff Goodell, Blasts from the Past, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22, 2001, at
6.31; Pasternak, supra note 130; Katharine Q. Seelye, Utilities Hire Ex-Chairman of G.O.P. to
Fight Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at A20.
160.
Eric Pianin, Senate Panel Backs Bill to Curb Power Plant Pollution,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A5 [hereinafter Pianin, Senate Panel Backs Bill to Curb Power
Plant Pollution]; Elizabeth Shogren, Warming Up to Reducing Greenhouse Gases: Some Big
Businesses, States and Cities are Taking Market-Based Steps to Curb the Emissions Thought
to Cause Climate Change, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at A15.
161.
Margaret Kriz, A Pro-Industry Tilt, NAT’L J., Apr. 3, 2004; see Eric
Pianin, Democrats Decry EPA Ads on Bill; Lawmakers Cite Anti-Lobbying Laws, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at A10 (EPA advertising campaign).
162.
Steve Cook, Utilities: Inclusion of Carbon in Power Plant Bill Splits
Senate Environment Committee, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 1316 (June 14, 2002).
163.
Senate Panel Approves Emissions Bill with Carbon Cap, PLATTS INSIDE
ENERGY, July 1, 2002, at 7, available at 2002 WLNR 2374708 (citing Senator Thomas Carper
(D-Delaware)).
164.
Clean Power Act, with Tough Coal Limits, Passes Committee, PLATTS
COAL OUTLOOK, July 1, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.Lexisnexis.com (describing
CARE); Industry, Environmentalists Spar over Emissions Legislation, PLATTS MEGAWATT
DAILY, June 26, 2002, at 7, available at 2002 WLNR 2379609.
165.
Multipollutant Bill in Trouble, ENR, July 8, 2002, at 13, available at 2002
WLNR 2388113 (veto threat).
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Bill in late June.166 Jeffords offered to work with the Bush Administration to
come up with a consensus bill, but EPA Administrator Whitman replied that
“‘the door [was] closed’” on any negotiations that included a cap on CO2
emissions.167 With a presidential veto assured, the Senate leadership decided
not to take the Jeffords Bill to the floor.168 That turned out to be the death
knell for climate change legislation for the next four years because the
Republicans regained control of the Senate in the 2002 elections.169
C.

The McCain-Warner-Boxer Bill in the 110th Congress

With both the House and the Senate controlled by the Democrats
after the 2006 elections, the prospects for climate change seemed as bright as
they had been in years.170 The new chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works was Barbara Boxer (D-California), an
outspoken proponent of climate change legislation, who characterized the
Bush Administration’s record on climate change as worse than dismal.171
Sensing a groundswell of public opinion in support of legislation,172 she
hoped to make climate disruption a bipartisan issue.173 Boxer was joined in
her enthusiasm by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico), the incoming

166.
John J. Fialka, Senate Committee Votes to Limit CO2 Emissions by Power
Plants, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2002, at A4 (bitter debate); David Hess, Senate EPW Panel
Approves Four Pollutant Emission Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), June 27, 2002; Pianin,
Senate Panel Backs Bill to Curb Power Plant Pollution, supra note 160.
167.
Multipollutant Bill in Trouble, supra note 165 (veto threat).
168.
See Hess, supra note 166; Karen Lee Scrivo, Clean Air Bills Likely to Be
Lost in End-of-Session Smog, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), Sept. 3, 2002.
169.
See Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Retakes Control of the Senate in a Show of
Presidential Influence; Pataki, Jeb Bush and Lautenberg Win, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at
A1; Gerald Karey, Regulation & the Environment, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 27, 2007, at
8 [hereinafter Karey, Regulation & the Environment], available at www.lexisnexis.com.
170.
Karey, Regulation & the Environment, supra note 169.
171.
Steven D. Cook, Climate Change: Boxer Pledges Action on Global
Warming, Close Oversight of Bush Administration, 37 ENV’T. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 2477
(Dec. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Cook, Climate Change: Boxer Pledges Action on Global
Warming]; Manimoli Dinesh, Green Democrats to Take over Key Senate Committees, OIL
DAILY, Nov. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Dinesh, Green Democrats to Take over Key Senate
Committees].
172.
Cook, Climate Change: Boxer Pledges Action on Global Warming, supra
note 171; accord Charles Babington, Party Shift May Make Warming a Hill Priority, WASH.
POST, Nov. 18, 2006, at A6.
173.
Cook, Climate Change: Boxer Pledges Action on Global Warming, supra
note 171; see Brian Hansen, With Calif. Law as Her Model, Boxer Asserts Intent to Pass
Warming Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 11, 2006, at 4, available at 2006 WLNR
22500134.
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chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee.174 And some
former skeptics in Congress––like Senators Ted Stevens and Lisa
Murkowski of Alaska––were persuaded by the growing evidence of
shrinking glaciers and disappearing permafrost that global warming was
real.175
The picture was not entirely rosy for proponents of climate change
legislation, however, because a large number of Democratic members
represented rust belt and energy-producing states that could be adversely
affected by climate disruption legislation.176 Moreover, the election had
taken a huge toll on moderate Republicans from the Northeast, thereby
dimming the prospects for truly bipartisan legislation.177 In the House,
Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan) replaced climate change denier
Joe Barton (R-Texas) as chairperson of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, but Dingell was wary of any environmental legislation that
affected the automobile manufacturers in his district.178 Finally, President
Bush retained his veto power,179 and the Administration remained deeply
opposed to any legislation providing for mandatory GHG emissions
reductions.180
Most of the climate disruption bills introduced at the outset of the
110th Congress employed some variation of a cap-and-trade regime, but they
presented a bewildering array of options on many critical issues.181 One
issue was whether to apply the cap-and-trade regime to all sectors of the
economy or just to power plants.182 Another was whether to allocate
allowances to sources free of charge during the early years or auction them
off to the highest bidders.183 Of those allowances given away to power
174.

Dinesh, Green Democrats to Take over Key Senate Committees, supra

note 171.
175.
Karey, Regulation & the Environment, supra note 169.
176.
Despite Election Gains, Environmentalists Face Limits in New Congress,
RISK POL’Y REP., Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary
Materials”; search and select “Risk Policy Report”; search “Despite Election”).
177.
Id.
178.
Babington, supra note 172; Manimoli Dinesh, Barton Skeptical
Democrats Can Advance Climate Change Bill, OIL DAILY, Dec. 4, 2006, at 1.
179.
Babington, supra note 172.
180.
Cathy Cash, Bush Administration Still Opposes CO2 Mandate; Key
Lawmakers Are Still Determined to Pursue It, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Dec. 18, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 22789552.
181.
Craig Gannett et al., Carbon Management: The Bumpy Road to Federal
Carbon Dioxide Caps, POWER, July 2007, at 43.
182.
Id.
183.
Steven D. Cook, Air Quality Standards: Carper, Alexander Offer
Separate Bills to Cut Power Plants’ Greenhouse, Other Emissions, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No.
17, at 952 (Apr. 27, 2007).
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plants, another issue was whether to do so on the basis of the amount of
electricity the plant produced—an option that would favor companies that
relied on renewable energy and natural gas because they would have excess
allowances to sell to coal-burning plants that produced much more CO2 per
unit of electricity produced—or on the heat input of the fuels burned in the
plant—an option that would favor coal-burning plants because it would
prevent renewable energy and natural gas-burning plants from getting credit
for the fact that they produced fewer CO2 emissions per unit of heat input.184
Still another issue was whether or not the cap-and-trade program should
contain a safety valve guaranteeing an upper price for allowances by
requiring the EPA to sell all allowances demanded above the safety valve
price, even though that would have the effect of raising the cap.185 A final
issue was whether or not to preempt state GHG emissions reduction
programs.186
Sensing that the political winds were changing, some electric utilities
began to shift their position from adamant opposition to any mandatory
climate change legislation to grudging acceptance of the need for limits on
GHG emissions.187 They were not opposed to a cap-and-trade program for
GHG emissions so long as it did not single out the electric utility industry,
allocated a substantial proportion for allowances free of charge in the early
years, began auctioning allowances only after carbon control and
sequestration (“CCS”) technologies were commercially available—most
likely ten to twenty years in the future—, required little upfront expenditure,
pushed the deadlines far into the future, and provided generous safety valves
that ensured stable prices at some level.188 Beset by internal division, the
EEI maintained a position of studied neutrality on the desirability of a capand-trade regime for GHG emissions.189 The oil and gas industry continued
to oppose mandatory climate change legislation, but indicated its willingness
to support a properly designed cap-and-trade regime that also preempted all

184.
Id.
185.
Gannett et al., supra note 181.
186.
Id.
187.
See Cathy Cash, Building a Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More
from Utilities About Challenges, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Mar. 26, 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Cash,
Building a Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More from Utilities About Challenges],
available at 2007 WLNR 6759407.
188.
Id. at 1–2, 4.
189.
Id. at 3.
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state climate change laws.190 The coal industry maintained its strong
opposition to any climate change legislation whatsoever.191
Senator Boxer kicked off congressional consideration of climate
change legislation with an ambitious series of nine hearings on climate
change over three months.192 As the hearings progressed, it became apparent
that some Republicans could support a cap-and-trade bill, if it would meet
the electric utility industry’s demands and would eliminate the EPA’s highly
successful new source review program under which the Justice Department
was seeking very large penalties from most of the nation’s prominent electric
utility companies.193 Others, like Senator James Inhofe and Representative
Joe Barton remained skeptical of both the scientific basis for global warming
claims and cap-and-trade as a tool for reducing GHG emissions.194
As the hearings were wrapping up in April 2007, the Supreme Court
of the United States delivered a landmark opinion that dramatically changed
the political calculus.195 The Court held GHGs were pollutants and EPA
therefore had authority to regulate GHG emissions from autos and—by
implication—from other sources such as power plants and refineries.196 This
meant that if EPA found that GHGs endangered public health or the
environment, it could begin regulating GHG emissions from new sources and
modifications of existing sources.197 If Congress did not enact legislation
saying otherwise, EPA could proceed ahead with stringent technology-based
standards that would have no trading opportunities and no blow-softening
provisions like free allocations of allowances and safety valves.198 The fact
190.
Brian Hansen, Dingell Releases Climate Bill Advice Solicited from
Industry, Green Groups, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 23, 2007, at 9, available at 2007
WLNR 8625530.
191.
Cathy Cash, House Panel Examines Climate Bills, but No Movement
Expected This Year, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, June 23, 2008, at 4, available at
http://www.Lexisnexis.com.
192.
Dawn Reeves & Jenny Johnson, Activists Rally Around Boxer After Early
Breach on Climate Change, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., May 18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
9292612; see also Jessica Brady, Hearing on Global Warming Attracts Like-Minded Senators,
CONGRESS DAILY, Jan. 30, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1871899.
193.
See Cash, Building a Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More from
Utilities About Challenges, supra note 187, at 2–3.
194.
Anthony Lacey, Bipartisan Senate Plan May Sidestep Deadlock over
Carbon Price Limits, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., July 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
14296375; House Committee Members Study Merits of Setting Up CO2 Cap-and-Trade
Program, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 2, 2007, at 8, available at 2007 WLNR 7208828.
195.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007); Daniel Whitten, Court
Ruling Seen Feeding Movement for Carbon Controls in Congress, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY,
Apr. 9, 2007, at 3, available at 2007 WLNR 7651996.
196.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 500; Whitten, supra note 195.
197.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
198.
See id.
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that the Bush Administration remained strongly opposed to mandatory
measures, however, ensured that EPA was not likely to act in the immediate
future.199
Sensing no movement on any of the pending Democratic bills,
several senators began to work on bipartisan alternatives.200 Senators Joe
Lieberman (I-Connecticut) and John Warner (R-Virginia) unveiled a
proposal for a more stringent bill that called for a cap-and-trade regime
applicable to all sectors of the economy that would have capped GHG
emissions at the 2005 level by 2012, 15% below the 2005 level by 2020, and
70% below the 2005 level by 2050.201 Of the initial allowances, 24% would
have been auctioned, 20% would have been given to the power sector, 20%
would have been given to the industrial sector, and 2.5% to the transportation
sector.202 The proportion of allowances auctioned would gradually increase
to 52% in 2035.203 Revenues from the auctions would be channeled to lowand moderate-income consumers and technology development projects.204
The proposal included a novel cost containment provision that would have
created an administrative board that could authorize cost relief measures to
companies presented with unexpected economic hardship.205 The electric
utility industry presented a nearly united front in opposition to the
Lieberman-Warner Bill.206 Only Exelon and Pacific Gas & Electric,
companies that relied heavily on nuclear power and natural gas respectively,
supported the Bill.207
As it became clear that a climate change bill containing mandatory
caps was likely to reach the Senate floor, utility company executives huddled
199.
Whitten, supra note 195.
200.
See Robert Dillon, Democrats Unveil Details of Climate Change
Legislation in Senate, OIL DAILY, Oct. 18, 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Dillon, Democrats Unveil
Details of Climate Change Legislation in Senate].
201.
Id.; Darren Goode, Lieberman, Warner Tighten Rules in Their Warming
Bill, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20400383.
202.
Patricia Ware, Lieberman, Warner Release Draft Proposal for Industry
Trading of Greenhouse Gases, 38 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1713 (Aug. 10, 2007).
203.
Id.
204.
Dillon, Democrats Unveil Details of Climate Change Legislation in
Senate, supra note 200.
205.
Ware, supra note 202; Lacey, supra note 194.
206.
See Dillon, Democrats Unveil Details of Climate Change Legislation in
Senate, supra note 200.
207.
Cathy Cash, Lieberman-Warner Bill Sets Stage for Climate Action; Big
Coal Users Identify Fixes They Seek, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “Electric Utility
Week”; search “Lieberman-Warner Bill Sets Stage”); Kathleen Hart, Lieberman, Warner
Detail Allowance Allocation for Carbon Cap-and-Trade Bill, SNL ENERGY DAILY GAS REP.,
Aug. 3, 2007.
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“behind closed doors with White House [aides] and administration officials”
to come up with a legislative approach to a cap-and-trade program that more
closely reflected what the industry had in mind.208 The favored approach
would have preempted state climate change laws and replaced EPA’s new
source review program.209 The authority to regulate GHG emissions would
have been delegated to the DOE, rather than EPA.210 And, GHG reductions
would have been required only when proven technologies were available.211
The Environment and Public Works Committee passed the
Lieberman-Warner Bill with only a few minor amendments by a vote of
eleven to eight.212 Only one Republican—Senator Warner—voted yes.213
The Bill now had to clear the sixty vote hurdle necessary to halt the
Republicans’ promised filibuster.214 The Bill’s sponsors began a lengthy
process of negotiating the concessions that would be necessary to persuade
ten to tweleve Republicans and nearly all coal-state Democrats to vote to cut
off debate.215 By the time that the negotiations were nearing completion in
January 2008, a persistently sluggish economy had dimmed enthusiasm for
comprehensive climate change legislation.216 Nevertheless, the Democratic
leadership assured the Bill’s supporters that it would go to the floor in early
2008.217
In the meantime, climate change legislation was moving at a snail’s
pace in the House.218 At the outset of the 110th Congress, Majority Leader
Pelosi created a special committee to address climate change issues and
appointed long-time climate change activist Representative Edward Markey
(D-Massachusetts) to head it, but the committee lacked the jurisdiction over

208.
Utility Execs’ Plan for GHG Capture Proposes Federal Control, No
Caps, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Nov. 5, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
See id.
212.
See Alexander Duncan, Panel Sends Global-Warming Bill to Senate
Floor, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 10, 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Duncan, Panel Sends GlobalWarming Bill to Senate Floor], available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
213.
Id.; Doug Obey, Senate Markup Defines Scope of Future Talks on Climate
Change Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Dec. 14, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24596728.
214.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Senate Cap-and-Trade Bill Gains Momentum,
but Delayed House Bill Complicates Passage, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) (SPECIAL ISSUE) No. 3, at
S-9 (Jan. 18, 2008); Duncan, Panel Sends Global-Warming Bill to Senate Floor, supra note
212.
215.
Scott, supra note 214; Obey, supra note 213.
216.
Scott, supra note 214; see also Cathy Cash, House Preparing for Climate
Bill This Year Despite Gloomy Economic Forecasts, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 21, 2008, at 8.
217.
Scott, supra note 214.
218.
See id.
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any actual legislation.219 The Energy and Commerce Committee, which had
jurisdiction over climate disruption legislation, was preoccupied with the
Bush Administration’s energy bill.220 In sharp contrast to Senator Boxer’s
committee, it failed to hold a single hearing on climate change legislation
during 2007.221 The chairperson of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over
the climate disruption legislation was Rick Boucher (D-Virginia), a moderate
Democrat who represented a coal-producing district in Virginia.222 Although
Boucher had been a global warming skeptic, he now believed that legislation
was necessary to forestall EPA action.223 Convinced that coal should play a
major role in electricity generation for the foreseeable future, he insisted that
the rate at which GHG reduction technologies became available to coal-fired
power plants should determine how rapidly the government required GHG
emissions reductions.224
In mid-January 2008, representatives of a new group, called the
Climate Action Partnership—consisting of environmental groups and more
than thirty companies concerned about global warming—urged Congress to
enact mandatory climate change legislation “on a fast-track basis.”225 They
called for a 60% to 80% reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by
2050 and for a 10% to 30% reduction during the first fifteen years.226
219.
Darren Goode, Dingell, Boucher Call for Cap-and-Trade on Emissions,
CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 3, 2007 [hereinafter Goode, Dingell, Boucher Call for Cap-and-Trade
on Emissions], available at 2007 WLNR 19383063; Kathleen Hart, Pelosi to Reauthorize
House Global Warming Committee, SNL Power Daily N.E., Nov. 25, 2008 [hereinafter Hart,
Pelosi to Reauthorize House Global Warming Committee], available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
220.
Scott, supra note 214.
221.
Id.
222.
Kathleen Hart, Boucher Says Chances Dim for Climate Change
Legislation This Year, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Sept. 24, 2007 [hereinafter Hart, Boucher
Says Chances Dim for Climate Change Legislation This Year], available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Boucher Says Chances”); Michael Niven, House Energy Committee
Targeting Early 2008 to Introduce CO2 Legislation, Says Boucher, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP.,
Nov. 19, 2007 [hereinafter Niven, House Energy Committee Targeting Early 2008 to
Introduce CO2 Legislation, Says Boucher], available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (select
“Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric Utility Report”; search “House
Energy Committee Targeting”).
223.
Hart, Boucher Says Chances Dim for Climate Change Legislation This
Year, supra note 222.
224.
Id.; Niven, House Energy Committee Targeting Early 2008 to Introduce
CO2 Legislation, Says Boucher, supra note 222.
225.
Leora Falk, Emissions Trading: Climate Action Coalition Seeks Swift
Action on Legislation Implementing Emissions Cuts, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 155 (Jan.
25, 2008).
226.
Id.
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Before drafting a bill, Boucher took the unusual step of having the
subcommittee staff draft a series of public position papers on issues that were
likely to arise when the committee considered a bill.227 As the position
papers trickled out through the spring of 2008,228 it became clear that the bill
that Representative Boucher had in mind was considerably less stringent than
the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the Senate.229
When the Lieberman-Warner Bill came to the floor of the Senate
during the first week of June 2008, the lobbyists for the affected interests
were out in force.230 The CoC joined with oil and gas and mining interests to
create the Alliance for Energy and Economic Growth to send Congress the
message that the Lieberman-Warner Bill would harm the economy with little
resulting impact on global warming so long as China and India failed to
reduce GHG emissions.231 The NAM opposed the Bill on many grounds.232
Another advocacy organization for the business community, the Club for
Growth, launched “a radio and [television] ad[vertising] campaign against
the bill in states [with] senators [who were] potential[ly] swing votes.”233
Even the natural gas industry opposed the legislation because it required
natural gas processors to purchase allowances instead of end users.234
Environmental groups had reservations about the Bill and favored more

227.
Goode, Dingell, Boucher Call for Cap-and-Trade on Emissions, supra
note 219; Hart, Boucher Says Chances Dim for Climate Change Legislation This Year, supra
note 222.
228.
See Darren Goode, Suggestion of State Preemption Sets Off Warning
Bells, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 26, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 3698026.
229.
See Steven D. Cook, Legislation: Climate Change Bill Must Preserve
Coal As Fuel for Electric Power, Boucher Says, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 497 (Mar.
14, 2008).
230.
See Political Wrangling Locks Up Senate’s Debate of Climate Change
Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to the New Version of LiebermanWarner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would Cost Private Sector “Tens of
Billions,” FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., June 6, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 11194068.
231.
See Williamson, supra note 21.
232.
Political Wrangling Locks Up Senate’s Debate of Climate Change
Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to the New Version of LiebermanWarner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would Cost Private Sector “Tens of
Billions,” supra note 230.
233.
Leila Abboud & Stephen Power, U.S. News: U.S. Aims to Skirt Flaws in
Europe’s Carbon Limits; Cap-and-Trade Bill to Stress Auctions, Balance for Permits, WALL
ST. J., May 30, 2008, at A4.
234.
See Dean Scott, Climate Change: Talks on Cap-and-Trade Bill
Accelerate As Concerns Raised over Cost, Other Issues, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 631
(Mar. 28, 2008); Catherine Cash et al., Senate to Take Next Step on Climate Change Bill;
Energy Group Sees ‘Fatal Flaw,’ PLATTS INSIDE FERC, June 2, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.lexis.nexis.com.
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stringent requirements in several regards, but they united behind the Bill
after the sponsors made several changes designed to meet their objections.235
On the day before the scheduled cloture vote, President Bush
threatened to veto any bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG
emissions.236 With such formidable opposition lined up against the Bill, it
was clear to the Bill’s sponsors that it would be impossible to line up the
sixty votes necessary to prevent a filibuster without making major
concessions that would be opposed by environmental groups and could cause
progressive Democrats to abandon the effort.237 Despite its poor prospects,
Democratic strategists believed that the party would benefit in the upcoming
elections by forcing Republicans to vote against climate change
legislation.238 Recognizing the political risks involved, the Republican
leadership shifted its strategy away from outright refusal to acknowledge the
reality of global warming to an insistence that the Lieberman-Warner Bill
intruded too deeply into the American economy.239 Reflecting the laissez
faire minimalist view espoused by the conservative think tanks, they argued
that the Bill amounted to little more than a stealth tax on American
consumers.240
235.
See Cathy Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate Landmark Greenhouse Gas
Bill, with Price Tag Estimated at $7 Trillion, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 26, 2008, at 1
[hereinafter Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate Landmark Greenhouse Gas Bill, with Price Tag
Estimated at $7 Trillion], available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary
Materials”; search and select “Electric Utility Week”; search “Senate Gears up to Debate”);
Peter Haldis & Joanna Franco, Lieberman-Warner Climate Change Bill Fails to Overcome
Filibuster, WORLD REFINING & FUELS TODAY, June 9, 2008; Political Wrangling Locks Up
Senate’s Debate of Climate Change Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to
the New Version of Lieberman-Warner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would
Cost Private Sector “Tens of Billions,” supra note 230.
236.
Darren Goode, White House Threatens Veto Against Global Warming Bill,
CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), June 7, 2008.
237.
Scott, Climate Change: Talks on Cap-and-Trade Bill Accelerate As
Concerns Raised over Cost, Other Issues, supra note 234; Cash, Senate Gears Up to Debate
Landmark Greenhouse Gas Bill, with Price Tag Estimated at $7 Trillion, supra note 235;
Kathleen Hart, Nuclear Power Amendment Seen As Potential Key to Passing Carbon Capand-Trade Bill, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Apr. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Nuclear Power Amendment”).
238.
Scott, Climate Change: Talks on Cap-and-Trade Bill Accelerate As
Concerns Raised over Cost, Other Issues, supra note 234.
239.
Stephen Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up;
Senators Stake Out Stances in Debate of ‘Cap-and-Trade,’ WALL ST. J., June 3, 2008, at A6
[hereinafter Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up].
240.
Robert Dillon, US Senate Takes Up Landmark Climate Change
Legislation, OIL DAILY, June 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25595641 (quoting Senator
Christopher Bond (R-Missouri)); Power, Washington Battle over Climate Change Heats Up,
supra note 239.
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As expected, the 48-36 vote in favor of cloture did not reach the
sixty-vote majority necessary to end the filibuster.241 The full Senate never
debated the merits of the Bill.242 After the vote, Senate Majority Leader Reid
pulled the Bill and announced that it would not be taken up again during the
110th Congress.243
D.

The Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th Congress

The 2008 elections appeared to mark a major shift in the politics of
climate disruption.244 Both houses of Congress remained under the control
of the Democratic Party, and the Democratic majority in the Senate had
reached the magic number of sixty.245 The voters also sent to the White
House a charismatic young Democrat who had promised during the
campaign to make climate change legislation one of his top priorities.246
President Obama featured climate disruption in his inaugural address, and he
promised to “‘work tirelessly to . . . roll back the specter of a warming
planet.’”247 To demonstrate his commitment to climate change legislation,
he hired former EPA Administrator Carol Browner as a White House
Advisor and charged her with directing the Administration’s legislative
efforts on matters relating to energy and the environment.248 At the same
241.
Political Wrangling Locks Up Senate’s Debate of Climate Change
Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to the New Version of LiebermanWarner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would Cost Private Sector “Tens of
Billions,” supra note 230.
242.
See Darren Goode, House Dems Take More Measured Approach to
Warming Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 10, 2008.
243.
Political Wrangling Locks Up Senate’s Debate of Climate Change
Legislation; Industrial User Groups React Negatively to the New Version of LiebermanWarner; Congressional Budget Office Estimates Bill Would Cost Private Sector “Tens of
Billions,” supra note 230.
244.
See, e.g., id.
245.
Cathy Cash, Obama Election Steers Industry Straight to Cap on Carbon,
but How and When Remain Unknown, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 10, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter
Cash, Obama Election Steers Industry Straight to Cap on Carbon], available at 2008 WLNR
22425719.
246.
See JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE: PRESIDENT OBAMA, YEAR ONE 59–
60 (2010); Michael Hirsh, The Lioness in Spring: A Kinder, Gentler Carol Browner Is
Backing Obama’s Green Agenda, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 2009, at 46, available at 2009 WLNR
6449538; Margaret Kriz, Carol Browner: Power Player, NAT’L J., Jan. 28, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 27497270.
247.
Alexander Duncan, Obama Takes Charge, Citing Energy as Priority and
Halting Bush Rules, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Jan. 26, 2009, at 3, available at 2009 WLNR
2544711.
248.
Steven D. Cook, U.S. Policy: Obama’s Energy, Environment Team Seen
Bringing Cohesion to Administration Response on Warming, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA)

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1

48

: Nova Law Review 38, #3

424

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

time, many states were already putting climate change regulatory programs
into effect, and the EPA was rapidly proceeding ahead with an endangerment
finding and associated regulatory programs.249
In the House, Speaker Pelosi re-authorized the Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming and re-appointed Representative
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) to head it.250 In an audacious move,
Representative Henry Waxman (D-California) challenged Representative
John Dingell (D-Michigan) for the chairmanship of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce,251 and he prevailed by a vote of 137–122 in the
Democratic caucus.252 The CEI proclaimed that the Waxman election
provided “a loud wake-up call to American business leaders that the 111th
Congress is not going to play nicely with them on energy rationing
policies.”253
Having wrested control of the committee from Representative
Dingell, Chairman Waxman announced that the 111th Congress had “‘an
opportunity that comes only once in a generation’” to enact landmark climate
change legislation.254 He and Speaker Nancy Pelosi hoped to move a bill out
of his committee by Memorial Day with an eye toward enactment by the end
of the year.255 But Waxman first had to patch up the wounded feelings of
Dingell’s supporters and reach an accommodation with Democrats from
No. 244 (Dec. 15, 2008); Paul Merolli, Obama Selects ‘Green Team’ for Energy Posts, OIL
DAILY, Dec. 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25939868.
249.
See Cash, Obama Election Steers Industry Straight to Cap on Carbon,
supra note 245.
250.
Hart, Pelosi to Reauthorize House Global Warming Committee, supra
note 219.
251.
Cash, Obama Election Steers Industry Straight to Cap on Carbon, supra
note 245 (longest serving member); Kathleen Hart, Waxman Mounting Challenge to Dingell
to Lead House Energy Committee, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Nov. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Wanman Mounting Challenge”).
252.
Cathy Cash, Shift from Dingell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy
Interests; Climate Agenda Toughens, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 24, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter
Cash, Shift from Dingell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy Interests], available at 2008
WLRN 23557519.
253.
Kathleen Hart, Waxman’s Rise in Congress Signals Potential New Course
for Climate Change Policy, SNL POWER WK. S.E., Nov. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Power
Week Southeast”; search “Waxman’s Rise”).
254.
Cash, Shift from Dingell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy
Interests, supra note 252.
255.
Cash, Shift from Dingell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy
Interests, supra note 252; Hearings Draw Out the Climate Change, Clean Coal, Practical
Sides of Appointees, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Jan. 19, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR
1963512.
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coal-dependent states who were already banding together to defend their
states’ economic interests.256
If anyone was capable of steering the climate change bill through the
treacherous waters of the House of Representatives, it was the energetic
Henry Waxman.257 He was in an excellent position to work with the White
House because his former aide of more than twenty years, Philip Schiliro,
was President Obama’s liaison to Congress.258 But Waxman’s committee
had a full plate of important bills, including the president’s health care
reform bill, which taxed even his formidable capacity for hard work.259 He
therefore delegated to Representative Markey, who replaced Representative
Boucher as chairperson of the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, the
responsibility for drafting the initial bill.260
As Waxman’s committee began a series of hearings on climate
disruption, the Reality Coalition, an umbrella organization composed of
several of the nation’s largest environmental groups, sponsored an
advertising campaign featuring a yeti and a mermaid holding lumps of coal
to make their point that coal could not play a major role in America’s energy
future.261 At the committee’s first hearing in mid-January, it received
testimony on the Blueprint for Legislative Action that the Climate Action
Partnership had drafted.262 The blueprint’s goal was to achieve a 42%
reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 and an 80% reduction by
2050.263 It allocated a substantial portion of the allowances on the basis of
historical emissions and contained cost containment measures to act as a
safety valve.264 The blueprint allowed companies to purchase offsets from
256.
John M. Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats over Energy, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats over
Energy]; see also Cash, Shift from Dingell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy Interests,
supra note 252.
257.
See Charles Homans, Marathon Man, WASH. MONTHLY, May–June 2009,
at 10, 12–13.
258.
Id. at 11.
259.
Id.
260.
Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats over Energy, supra note 256;
Cash, Shift from Dingbell to Waxman Signals New Era for Energy Interests, supra note 252.
261.
Hearings Draw Out the Climate Change, Clean Coal, Practical Sides of
Appointees, supra note 255.
262.
Id.
263.
Margaret Kriz, Changed Climate for Global Warming Law, NAT’L J., Feb.
4, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 27497260; Steven Mufson, Coalition Agrees on Emissions
Cuts; Businesses, Environmentalists Set Plans on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2009, at D1.
264.
Cathy Cash et al., Obama Sets Pace for Congress on Carbon: Budget
Includes $79 Billion in 2012 Revenue, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Mar. 2, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter
Cash et al., Obama Sets Pace for Congress on Carbon], available at 2009 WLNR 4987023;
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companies that agreed to improve the efficiency of their operations or
farmers who agreed to plant more carbon absorbing vegetation.265 Despite
the substantial industry support for the blueprint, the Republican members of
the committee rejected the cap-and-trade proposal and argued that Congress
should consider a carbon tax instead.266
President Obama signaled his support for a cap-and-trade regime
with auctioned allowances in February 2009 when he included in his fiscal
year 2010 budget request a surprisingly detailed description of what the
President wanted to see in a climate change bill, including a GHG emissions
cap of 14% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by
2050,267 with 100% of the allowances to be auctioned to prevent the dirtiest
emitters from reaping windfall profits.268 The coal industry and coaldependent electric utility companies strongly objected to the President’s
suggestion that 100% of allowances should be auctioned.269 If that
happened, executives from American Electric Power and Duke Energy
predicted electricity rates in some states—like Indiana—would go up by as
much as 40%.270
In mid-March, Senator Boxer and Representatives Waxman and
Markey met with the White House staff to come up with a strategy for
passing climate change legislation.271 They agreed on the broad contours of
a comprehensive energy and climate change bill that would create an
economy-wide cap-and-trade regime.272 Since Boxer had the votes in her
committee to report out a bill at any time, they decided that the House Bill

Kara Sissell, USCAP Offers Congress a Blueprint for Climate Action, CHEMICAL WK., Jan. 19,
2009, at 6.
265.
NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, REDUCING POLLUTION OUTSIDE OF THE
CARBON CAP: THE ROLE OF OFFSETS AND COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES 3 (2009), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/cap2.0/files/uncapped.pdf; U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P’SHIP,
A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION: CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. CLIMATE
PROTECTION LEGISLATION 9 (2009), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/USCAPlegislative-blueprint.pdf.
266.
Doug Obey, Backers of CO2 Cap See Immediate Financing from Future
Trading, INSIDE EPA, WKLY. REP., Jan. 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 790578.
267.
Jim Tankersley, Obama’s Budget: Elements of the Plan/Energy; What
His Priorities Reveal; Climate Plan Centers on Cap-and-Trade, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at
A18.
268.
Cash et al., Obama Sets Pace for Congress on Carbon, supra note 264.
269.
See Cassandra Sweet, Coal-Burning Utilities Want Time on CO2 Rules,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009; Hearings Draw Out the Climate Change, Clean Coal, Practical
Sides of Appointees, supra note 255.
270.
Sweet, supra note 269.
271.
Darren Goode, Climate Discussions Intensify Across Capitol, CONGRESS
DAILY, Mar. 20, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 5333544.
272.
See id.
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should move forward first to give the Senate sponsors some idea of what was
possible.273
In late March 2009, Representatives Waxman and Markey
introduced a 648-page discussion draft to serve as a starting point for the
Energy and Commerce Committee’s consideration of climate change
legislation.274 Based on the Climate Action Partnership blueprint,275 the Bill
would have established an economy-wide cap-and-trade regime that capped
GHG emissions at 20% below 2005 levels by 2020, at 42% below 2005
emissions in 2030, and at 83% below 2005 levels by 2050.276 The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) would have managed the primary
allowance market.277 The draft did not specify the percentages of allowances
that would have been given away and auctioned; nor did it specify how the
revenues from the auctions would have been spent.278 The draft would have
allowed emitters to increase emissions over their allowances if every four
tons of emissions were offset by five tons of emissions reductions from other
domestic or international sources.279 It would have “create[d] a ‘strategic
reserve’ of . . . 2.5 billion allowances” for EPA to auction to emitters in times
of price volatility to stabilize allowance prices.280 To further increase
flexibility, it would have allowed a source to borrow allowances from next
year for this year’s emissions.281 The draft also contained a renewable
energy portfolio standard that would have required electrical generators to
derive at least 25% of their production from renewable energy by 2025.282

273.
Id.
274.
Joanna Franco, House Committee Unveils Broad Climate Change Draft
Legislation, OCTANE WK., Apr. 6, 2009; Kathleen Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill
Cuts Carbon Emissions 20% by 2020, SNL ENERGY COAL REP., Apr. 6, 2009 [hereinafter
Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon Emissions 20% by 2020].
275.
Esther Whieldon & Cathy Cash, House Bill to Extend FERC Jurisdiction
to Carbon Markets May Trigger Turf Battle, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Apr. 6, 2009, at 1,
available at 2009 WLNR 7327778.
276.
Franco, supra note 274; Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts
Carbon Emissions 20% by 2020, supra note 274.
277.
Whieldon & Cash, supra note 275.
278.
John M. Broder, 2 Democrats Introduce Far-Reaching Bill on Energy and
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A19 [hereinafter Broder, 2 Democrats Introduce FarReaching Bill on Energy and Warming]; Ian Talley & Stephen Power, House Emissions Bill
Postpones Decisions on Cost, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2009, at A4.
279.
Whieldon & Cash, supra note 275.
280.
Id.; see also Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon
Emissions 20% by 2020, supra note 274.
281.
Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon Emissions 20% by
2020, supra note 274.
282.
Broder, 2 Democrats Introduce Far-Reaching Bill on Energy and
Warming, supra note 278; Talley & Power, supra note 278.
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The Waxman-Markey draft also contained a number of provisions to
reduce predictable opposition; to make the coal industry happy, the Bill
created a $10 billion pool to finance carbon capture and storage and related
technologies.283 To mollify the electric utility industry, the Bill prohibited
the EPA from regulating GHGs under its existing Clean Air Act authorities
and suspended state climate change programs for five years until the federal
program got underway.284 To please environmental groups, a citizen suit
provision would have empowered private citizens to sue the federal
government for failing to enforce the Bill’s requirements.285
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and the Secretaries of Energy and
Transportation praised many aspects of the draft without giving it the
Administration’s formal endorsement.286
In response to anticipated
complaints from the “no we can’t” crowd that the proposal would cause huge
increases in electric bills, Jackson cited an EPA analysis of the draft
concluding that it would have only a modest effect on consumers—27¢ to
38¢ per day—if it retained its generous offset program and if most of the
revenues from the auctions of allowances went to regulated local distribution
companies.287 The Climate Action Partnership applauded the Bill as a strong
starting point for a bill, but said it would insist that a substantial number of
allowances be awarded for free to emitters.288 Environmental groups and
clean energy companies also supported the draft, but they were somewhat
taken aback by Waxman’s decision to limit EPA’s Clean Air Act authority to
283.
Broder, 2 Democrats Introduce Far-Reaching Bill on Energy and
Warming, supra note 278.
284.
Jean Chemnick, Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their
Stringent Climate-Change Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 20, 2009, at 8 [hereinafter
Chemnick, Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their Stringent Climate-Change Bill],
available at 2009 WLNR 8452639; Doug Obey, Draft House Climate Bill Includes New
Concessions to Industry, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 3, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
6162435.
285.
Jean Chemnick & Brian Hansen, Bill Allows People to Sue the
Government over Alleged Harms from Climate Change, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 20,
2009, at 9, available at 2009 WLNR 8452640.
286.
The American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong.
102 (2009) (Statement of Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency) [hereinafter Jackson Statement]; Dean Scott, Legislation: Jackson, Chu Give
Climate Bill High Marks; Republicans Criticize Lack of Cost Analyses, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA)
No.17, at 912 (Apr. 24, 2009).
287.
Steven D. Cook, Legislation: EPA Says Impact of Draft Bill Modest, Use
of Offsets Would Cut Cost of Program, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 914 (Apr. 24, 2009);
Stephen Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2009, at A6
[hereinafter Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact].
288.
Broder, 2 Democrats Introduce Far-Reaching Bill on Energy and
Warming, supra note 278.
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regulate GHG emissions and to preempt state climate change laws for five
years without demanding any concessions from industry in return.289
Democratic committee members from coal-producing states did not support
the draft as written.290 Among other things, they believed the 20% by 2020
goal was highly unrealistic.291 Republicans were unified in opposition
against the draft bill.292
Coal-dependent electric utility companies and the EEI supported the
cap-and-trade concept, but they refused to support a bill that did not
distribute free allowances to emitters.293 They strongly opposed the
renewable portfolio requirement, arguing that states were in a better position
to impose such measures.294 The CoC and several conservative think tanks
objected to all of the measures in the draft.295 The Heritage Foundation
predicted that the Bill would impose a cost of $1600 a year on the average
household and kill as many as three million manufacturing jobs.296 The head
of the CEI promised that his organization would “‘work to see that it dies as
quickly as possible.’”297

289.
See Chemnick, Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their Stringent
Climate-Change Bill, supra note 284 (quoting Doug Kendell, Constitutional Accountability
Center); Juliet Eilperin, House Panel Begins Debate on Climate Bill; Both Sides Press Their
Cases as Lawmakers Weigh Limits on Carbon Emissions, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2009, at A3
[hereinafter Eilperin, House Panel Begins Debate on Climate Bill] (clean energy companies).
290.
Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact, supra note 287;
Waxman/Markey Climate Draft Draws GOP Alternative, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Apr. 27,
2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 8941484.
291.
Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact, supra note 287.
292.
Cathy Cash, US Energy Leaders Weigh GHG Compromise, PLATTS
OILGRAM NEWS, Apr. 27, 2009, at 7 [hereinafter Cash, US Energy Leaders Weigh GHG
Compromise], available at 2009 WLNR 8942940.
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Cathy Cash, Moderates Try to Tone Down Stringent Climate Bill, PLATTS
INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 27, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Cash, Moderates Try to Tone Down Stringent
Climate Bill], available at 2009 WLNR 8941907; Eilperin, House Panel Begins Debate on
Climate Bill, supra note 289 (quoting David Ratcliffe, Southern Company).
294.
Cash, Moderates Try to Tone Down Stringent Climate Bill, supra note 293
(quoting Jim Rogers, Duke Energy).
295.
Michael Gerson, Cap & Traitors: 8 Republicans Stand Tall on Climate
Change, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A21; Anne C. Mulkern, Coal Industry Sees Life or
Death in Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009 [hereinafter Mulkern, Coal
Industry Sees Life or Death in Senate Climate Debate]; Industry Fractures on Climate Policy,
supra note 23, at 1, 5–6; Ben Lieberman, Proposed Global Warming Bills and Regulations
Will Do More Harm Than Good, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2009/10/proposed-global-warming-bills-and-regulations-will-do-more-harmthan-good.
296.
Billy House & Michael Posner, Republicans Lash Out at Dems’ ‘National
Energy Tax,’ CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), May 5, 2009.
297.
Whieldon & Cash, supra note 275.
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The CoC’s adamant opposition to any climate change legislation
caused three electric companies, PG&E, PNM Resources, and Exelon, to
terminate their memberships in protest.298 The companies preferred to live
with the limited restrictions of a cap-and-trade program than with the
uncertainties of no legislation or the strictures of EPA regulation under the
Clean Air Act.299 The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity
(“ACCCE”)—which included mining companies and electric utility
companies—also lost members over its opposition to climate disruption
legislation.300 Duke Energy, Alstom Power, and Alcoa no longer wanted to
be associated with a group that did not acknowledge the reality of climate
disruption and the need for legislation to deal with it.301
President Obama dealt climate disruption legislation a minor setback
when he decided to make health care reform his top legislative priority, after
which the White House became absorbed in lengthy—but ultimately
unproductive—negotiations with House and Senate Republican leaders over
the content of the health care bill.302 Pressed by the need to take up President
Obama’s health care legislation, Chairman Waxman decided to skip the
subcommittee markup of the Waxman-Markey Bill and move directly to
markup by the full committee.303 But that required him to reach an accord
with the committee’s coal-state, oil-patch, and rust-belt Democrats and the
lobbyists for the coal, oil refining, and manufacturing industries that were
pressuring them.304 Hoping to move the issue along, President Obama met
with all of the Democratic committee members at the White House, at which
time he indicated that he was willing to compromise on key issues.305 As an
298.
Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 5–6; see also
Williamson, supra note 231.
299.
See Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 5–6.
300.
Steven Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate
Change, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A18 [hereinafter Mufson, New Groups Revive the
Debate over Causes of Climate Change]; Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note
23, at 6.
301.
Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 6.
302.
See ALTER, supra note 246, at 115–16.
303.
Darren Goode, Waxman, Checking Clock, Sticks to Memorial Day Goal,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), May 7, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Waxman, Checking Clock,
Sticks to Memorial Day Goal]; see also ALTER, supra note 246, at 260.
304.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on
Key Issues, Setting Stage for Markup, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 1103 (May 15, 2009)
[hereinafter Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key Issues];
Steven Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition; Legislation Would Cap Greenhouse
Gases, Hand Out Billions to Utilities, WASH. POST, May 16, 2009, at A9 [hereinafter Mufson,
Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition]; see also Goode, Waxman, Checking Clock, Sticks to
Memorial Day Goal, supra note 303.
305.
See Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key
Issues, supra note 304.
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example, he dropped his opposition to giving free allowances to emitters
during the first years of the program.306
Soon thereafter, on May 12, 2009, Waxman announced that the
Democratic committee members had reached an agreement on a 932-page
bill that they all could support.307 Waxman agreed to lower the 2020 target
for GHG emissions reductions from 20% below 2005 emissions to 17%.308
He also agreed to give away more than half of the allowances to emitters and
local distribution companies during the early years.309 The largest portion—
35%—would go to local distribution companies and would cover 90% of the
current emissions of the electric utilities that provided their electricity.310
The formula for dividing up allowances within the electric utility industry
was derived from a consensus agreement arrived at by the EEI after two
years of internal negotiations and was based on a fifty-fifty formula under
which half of a plant’s allowances would be based on emissions and half on
energy output.311 The agreement, however, left coal-dependent rural
electrical cooperatives out in the cold.312 In order to win the support of oilpatch and rust-belt Democrats, billions of dollars worth of free allowances
would go to energy-intensive manufacturing industries (15%), gas utility
companies (9%), refineries (2%), and automobile manufacturers (3%).313

306.
Id.
307.
Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key
Issues, supra note 304; Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, supra note 304
(referencing a 932-page bill); Stephen Power & Siobhan Hughes, House Democrats Reach
Accord on a Climate Bill, WALL ST. J., (May 13, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB124215189512211567.
308.
Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key
Issues, supra note 304; Power & Hughes, supra note 307.
309.
See Power & Hughes, supra note 307.
310.
Energy Industry Holds Breath, if Not Nose, as Climate Legislation
Recently Passed by House Committee Awaits Senate Response, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., June
5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 11307619.
311.
Cathy Cash, Carbon Cap Bill Jumps Hurdle with House Panel Approval;
‘It’s Out of the Starting Gate,’ ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 25, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Cash,
Carbon Cap Bill Jumps Hurdle with House Panel Approval], available at 2009 WLNR
10954153; Cathy Cash & Lisa Weinzimer, House Leaders Make Dozens of Deals to Draw
Votes for Groundbreaking Climate-Energy Bill, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 29, 2009, at 1,
available at 2009 WLNR 13308032 (providing the fifty-fifty explanation).
312.
See Cash, Carbon Cap Bill Jumps Hurdle with House Panel Approval,
supra note 311.
313.
Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrates Reach Deal on Key
Issues, supra note 304; Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, supra note 304.
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And the renewable energy mandate would drop from 25% by 2025 to 20%,
with up to 8% coming from state efforts to enhance efficiency.314
Republican members of the committee prepared more than four
hundred proposed amendments to the Bill in an effort to slow it down and
hone their message that the Bill would kill jobs, harm consumers, and have
little beneficial effect on the environment.315 As the Republican members
rallied against the astronomical costs of the Bill and the threat of
environmental socialism, Democratic members chastised them for failing to
negotiate in good faith over possible bipartisan amendments.316 After a week
of late-night markup sessions, the full committee voted out a bill that did not
differ in any important way from the Democrat’s compromise bill.317 Four
Democrats from Utah and the South voted against the Bill, and only one
Republican from California voted for it.318
As the Energy and Commerce Committee was completing its work,
trouble loomed on the horizon in the form of a request by Representative
Collin Peterson (D-Minnesota) to have the Bill referred to the Agriculture
Committee that he chaired.319 Frequently at odds with environmental groups,
Peterson had made light of global warming by stating that it would allow
Minnesota farmers to grow more corn.320 Peterson had a long list of issues
that would have to be addressed to his satisfaction before he would be
314.
Scott, Legislation: Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key
Issues, supra note 304; Darren Goode with Billy House, Groups Step Up Climate Campaigns,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 9, 2009.
315.
See Cathy Cash & Jean Chemnick, Waxman Touts US Democrats’ Energy
Bill, PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS, May 19, 2009, at 9, available at 2009 WLNR 10538640 (400
amendments); Kathleen Hart, Waxman Opens Weeklong Debate of Landmark House Capand-Trade Bill, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., May 25, 2009, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Waxman Opens Weeklong Debate”); see also Power & Hughes,
supra note 307.
316.
Hart, supra note 315 (environmental socialism); see Darren Goode, EPA:
Revised Panel Draft Less Costly to Firms, Consumers, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), May 19,
2009.
317.
David A. Fahrenthold, House Panel Passes Limit on Greenhouse-Gas
Emissions, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, at A2 [hereinafter Fahrenthold, House Panel Passes
Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions]; see Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition,
supra note 304.
318.
Darren Goode, Panel Completes Climate Marathon, CONGRESS DAILY
(AM ED.), May 22, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Panel Completes Climate Marathon].
319.
Fahrenthold, House Panel Passes Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions,
supra note 317; Jerry Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About House Climate Measure,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), May 20, 2009 [hereinafter Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns
About House Climate Measure].
320.
Stephen Power, In the House, It’s Peterson vs. Climate Bill, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 2009, at A4 [hereinafter Power, In the House, It’s Peterson vs. Climate Bill].
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willing to support the Bill.321 Among other things, he wanted to protect
United States farmers from international competition in the market for
offsets, increase the allowances given to rural electrical coops and municipal
power plants, and prohibit Wall Street banks from trading in the allowance
markets.322 He reported that forty-five additional Democrats shared his
concerns.323
Lobbyists for farming and forestry interests stepped up their efforts
to influence members of the House Agriculture Committee.324 Constituents
in the districts of all of the Democratic members of the House Agriculture
Committee received emails and robocalls from the National Republican
Congressional Committee and other opponents of the Bill characterizing it as
a “job-killing climate bill.”325 Six organizations representing farmers and
ranchers demanded that the Bill be amended to allow unlimited offsets from
domestic, but not foreign, agriculture and forestry; notwithstanding the fact
that GHG emissions from cattle—approximately one-quarter of United
States methane emissions—and tilling soil on farms had been excluded from
the Bill.326 Another farmer alliance called for amending the Bill to provide
for a list of pre-approved farming practices, such as planting trees, preserving
forests, and no-till farming practices that would offset GHG emissions.327
Both groups agreed with Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack’s

321.
Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About House Climate Measure,
supra note 319.
322.
Jean Chemnick, Corn-Ethanol Spat Could Derail Major Climate Bill,
PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, June 1, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 11440851; Fahrenthold,
House Panel Passes Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, supra note 317; Goode, Panel
Completes Climate Marathon, supra note 318; Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About
House Climate Measure, supra note 319.
323.
Goode, Panel Completes Climate Marathon, supra note 318; see also
Chemnick, Corn-Ethanol Spat Could Derail Major Climate Bill, supra note 322.
324.
Agriculture Groups Seek to Limit EPA Offset Role Under Climate Bill,
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., June 5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 10694952.
325.
Darren Goode, House Dem Leaders Reach Out to Disparate Caucuses,
CONGRESS DAILY, June 10, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, House Dem Leaders Reach Out to
Disparate Caucuses], available at 2009 WLNR 11126252.
326.
Steven D. Cook, Legislation: Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation to
Allow Unlimited Agricultural Offsets, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 1286 (June 5, 2009)
[hereinafter Cook, Legislation: Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation]; Dina Cappiello,
Mythical Tax Has Farmers Defending Cow Gas; Powerful Lobby Ensures That Agriculture Is
Exempt from Methane Regulation, WASH. POST, June 28, 2009, at A2; For the Farm Lobby,
Too Much Is Never Enough, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A18.
327.
Cook, Legislation: Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation, supra note
326.
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recommendation that Congress give the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) the authority to manage the offsets program.328
Waxman hoped to work out a deal with Peterson to avoid a nasty
fight over amendments to the Bill in the Agriculture Committee.329 Peterson
was especially miffed by the fact that rural electric cooperatives received so
few allowances in comparison to those awarded to utilities on the East and
West Coasts.330 Peterson also insisted on the transfer to USDA as a
condition to going forward with the bill.331 Waxman then met with the heads
of the EEI and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(“NRECA”) to iron out a compromise on the allocation issue that would be
acceptable to the rural cooperatives.332 Two days before the June 26th floor
debates, Waxman and Peterson struck a deal in which Waxman effectively
capitulated to the demands of farm-state Democrats.333 USDA would
oversee the offsets markets.334 The Bill required non-coal-dependent
companies to surrender some of their allowances to coal-dependent rural
cooperatives, allocating 0.5% of allowances specifically to small utility
companies that generated “less than [four] million megawatt hours.”335 The
net effect of the changes was to channel billions of dollars worth of
allowances to the agricultural sector and to lodge a critical piece of the

328.
Cook, Legislation: Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation, supra note
326; Jerry Hagstrom, Vilsack Makes a Bid to Oversee Climate Change Efforts,
CONGRESSDAILY, June 3, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 10638586; Agriculture Groups Seek
to Limit EPA Offset Role Under Climate Bill, supra note 324.
329.
Goode, House Dem Leaders Reach Out to Disparate Caucuses, supra
note 325.
330.
Darren Goode, Peterson Concerned About Emissions Allocation Formula,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 17, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Peterson Concerned About
Emissions Allocation Formula].
331.
See Steven D. Cook, Legislation: Vilsack Defends Cap-and-Trade
System, Says Agriculture, Forestry Must Play Role, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1419
(June 19, 2009).
332.
Cathy Cash, Co-ops Make the Coal-State Allowance Issue a Key One in
Climate Bill’s Push to House Vote, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 22, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 12846014; see Goode, Peterson Concerned About Emissions Allocation Formula,
supra note 330.
333.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote;
Waxman, Other Chairmen Reach Agreements, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 1489 (June
26, 2009) [hereinafter Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote]; Darren
Goode, Waxman, Peterson Have Climate Deal, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 24, 2009
[hereinafter Goode, Waxman, Peterson Have Climate Deal].
334.
Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote, supra note
333; Goode, Waxman, Peterson Have Climate Deal, supra note 333.
335.
Goode, Waxman, Peterson Have Climate Deal, supra note 333.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

59

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION

435

regulatory program in a department that had historically placed agricultural
interests over environmental concerns.336
As the Bill neared consideration by the full House at the end of June,
however, President Obama began to vigorously lobby Democratic members
to vote for it.337 EPA released an analysis of the most recent version that
concluded that the average annual household cost of compliance with its
provisions would be somewhere between $80 and $111, or 22¢ and 30¢ per
day.338 In other words, the Bill was quite affordable. Despite EPA’s
assessment, the National Republican Congressional Committee aired
advertisements featuring its claim that the Bill would add $1800 to the
average annual electric bills of middle-class families.339
The bill that the House took up on June 26 had expanded to more
than 1200 pages, reflecting dozens of deals that Waxman and Markey had
made with wavering Democrats.340 Nevertheless, the major environmental
and consumer groups held their collective noses and supported the
compromise bill with all of its warts.341 Several groups, including EEI,342 the
AGA,343 and the NRECA,344 supported the Bill, but planned to demand
changes in the Senate.345 The trade associations for farming interests and
rural electric cooperatives were pleased with the changes, but divided on
336.
Reap What We Sow; the Agriculture Lobby’s Fingerprints are All over a
Crucial Bill to Fight Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A32; see Power, In the
House, It’s Peterson vs. Climate Bill, supra note 320.
337.
Paul West, Obama Lobbies for Climate Bill; He Says It Would Help Save
as Much as the U.S. Imports from the Persian Gulf. Figures are Conflicting, L.A. TIMES,
June 25, 2009, at A16; see Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote, supra
note 333; Ian Talley & Siobhan Hughes, Climate Bill Set for Vote After Deal Is Reached,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2009, at A6.
338.
Darren Goode with Billy House, EPA Sees Low Annual Cost For Waxman
Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), June 23, 2009.
339.
House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., July 3, 2009, at 1,
available at 2009 WLNR 13182676.
340.
Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote, supra note
333; see also Cash & Weinzimer, supra note 311.
341.
Dawn Reeves, To Move House Climate Bill, Activists Soften Push for
GHG Standards, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., June 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12136952.
342.
Greg Hitt & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Wary of Tariff Provision—Trade
Proposal in Climate Bill a Potential Problem as Action Moves to Senate, WALL ST. J., June
29, 2009, at A3; Michael Lusti, Utility Industry Leaders Declare Waxman-Markey Bill ‘Greatly
Improved,’ SNL ENERGY POWER WK. CAN., June 29, 2009.
343.
House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339.
344.
Cash & Weinzimer, supra note 311.
345.
See id.
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whether to support the overall Bill.346 The CoC, the NAM, the Independent
Petroleum Association of America, and the ACCCE all opposed the Bill.347
The Bill passed by a narrow 219–212 margin.348 Forty-four House
Democrats—nearly 20%—voted against the Bill, and eight Republicans
voted for it.349 The fact that the Climate Action Partnership supported the
Bill made it easier for some Democrats to vote favorably.350 The final Bill
established a multi-sector cap-and-trade regime that capped GHG emissions
at 17% below 2005 emissions by 2020, 42% by 2040, and 83% by 2050.351
The allowance markets were overseen by the FERC and the allowance
derivatives markets by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”).352 The Bill set aside allowances for the EPA to distribute to
various public and private beneficiaries in accordance with formulas
provided for in the statute.353 Beginning in 2026, the allowance gifts would
be gradually phased out until they ended in 2035, at which point all
allowances would be allocated by auction.354 The allowances set aside for
the electric utility industry would be allocated to local distribution companies
so that state public utility commissions would have the power to ensure that
retail consumers received their economic benefit.355

346.
Jerry Hagstrom, Mixed Reactions from Farm Groups on House Climate
Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 26, 2009; Jerry Hagstrom & Darren Goode, Lobbyists
Lukewarm on House Climate Change Package, CONGRESS DAILY, June 25, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 12172796.
347.
Hitt & Bendavid, supra note 342; House-Passed Climate Bill Will
Promote Renewable Energy and Create Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National
Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339;
Waxman-Markey, Characterized As ‘A Pile of (Bleep)’ by One Lawmaker, U.S. COAL REV.,
July 6, 2009.
348.
Hitt & Bendavid, supra note 342.
349.
House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339; Waxman-Markey, Characterized
As ‘A Pile of (Bleep)’ by One Lawmaker, supra note 347.
350.
Darren Goode, House Democrats Near Impasse as Climate Talks
Intensify, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 11, 2009.
351.
Hitt & Bendavid, supra note 342.
352.
Cathy Cash et al., Tackling Climate Change, Senate Immediately Delays
Action, Identifies Tough Issues for Debate, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 13, 2009, at 1, available
at 2009 WLNR 14401949.
353.
Tom Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, No Clear Path
for Impact on Utility Customers, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 6, 2009, at 3 [hereinafter Tiernan,
Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations], available at 2009 WLNR 13824309.
354.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. § 764(a)(1)(B) (2009); Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra
note 353.
355.
Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra note 353.
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Instead of reducing emissions, emitters could purchase offset credits
on a one-to-one basis—not the five-to-four basis of the original Bill.356 Each
offset credit would represent one ton of CO2 emissions removed from the
atmosphere by declining to engage in activities that would otherwise result in
CO2 emissions; planting vegetation to take CO2 out of the atmosphere,
capturing methane emissions from cow manure, or other forms of permanent
carbon sequestration.357 The USDA would oversee the offset markets.358
The Bill established an overall limit of two billion tons of offset credits per
year, only half of which could come from international sources.359 The Bill
also contained a renewable energy portfolio mandate under which utilities
would be required to generate 15% of their electricity from renewable
sources and save 5% from energy efficiency by 2020.360 This was far less
ambitious than many existing state renewable energy standards.361 To
provide a safety valve, the bill established a $25 per megawatt–hour
alternative compliance payment that a utility company could pay in lieu of a
renewable energy credit.362 Finally, the Bill retained a technology-based
requirement—new power plants would have to emit 50% fewer GHGs and
plants built after 2020 would have to emit 65% fewer GHGs than existing
plants.363

356.
Stephen Power, Impact of ‘Offsets’ to Limit Emissions Is Uncertain—Tool
for Firms to Avoid Cutting Output Through ‘Green’ Investments Elsewhere Involves Political,
Practical Hurdles, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2009, at A2; How Offset Credits Will Work Under
Waxman-Markey Climate Bill, OIL DAILY, July 22, 2009. International offsets purchased after
2017 would have remained subject to the five-to-four restriction. Moving America Toward a
Clean Energy Economy and Reducing Global Warming Pollution: Legislative Tools:
Hearing Before the Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm., 111th Cong. 29–30 (2009)
(testimony of David G. Hawkins, Director of Climate Programs, Natural Resources Defense
Counsel) [hereinafter Hawkins Testimony].
357.
How Offset Credits Will Work Under Waxman-Markey Climate Bill, supra
note 356.
358.
Id.
359.
Id.
360.
House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339.
361.
See Jennifer Zajac, Federal RECs in Waxman-Markey Bill Raise
Questions on Fate of State RECs, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., July 13, 2009, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Federal RECs”).
362.
Id.
363.
Wayne Barber, Waxman-Markey Targets New Coal Plant Performance,
SNL ENERGY COAL REP., July 13, 2009; David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson,
Deconstructing the Climate Bill; Q&A on the Mammoth House Measure, WASH. POST, July 6,
2009, at A6.
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In anticipation of Senate consideration of the House-passed bill, a
number of governmental and private sector entities produced analyses of the
House bill.364 In late July, the USDA released a study concluding that the
Waxman-Markey Bill would impose very little short-run cost in the form of
increased prices for fuel and fertilizer on farms, and in the long run, farmers
would come out ahead because of the ability to sell offsets to GHG emitting
companies.365 An analysis prepared by the DOE’s Energy Information
Administration concluded that the Bill would probably increase average
household energy costs by $114 in 2020 and $288 in 2030.366 A study
prepared for NAM by Science Applications International Corporation, by
contrast, concluded that the Bill would reduce the gross domestic product by
a minimum of 1.8% by 2030, reduce household income by at least $730, and
bring about the loss of at least 1.7 million jobs.367 The Heritage Foundation
warned that the Bill could cause gasoline prices to go up 74% by 2035.368
E.

The Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bill in the 111th Congress

The lobbyists for the various interest groups now turned their
attention to the Senate, where things were moving with far less dispatch than
in the House.369 As in the House, the CoC and many coal and oil companies
joined the CEI and the Heritage Foundation in opposing all climate change
legislation.370 Many groups that had supported the final House Bill now
hoped to persuade the Senate to include provisions that had been deleted
from the House Bill or remove provisions from the House Bill that they had
failed to defeat.371 The electric utility industry came together to lobby for
lower targets for the caps, less ambitious deadlines, more allowances for
electric utilities, and a price collar that would set a minimum and a
364.
See, e.g., Dean Scott, Legislation: USDA Study Estimates Little Cost to
Farms from House Bill, but Senators Are Skeptical, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1755
(July 24, 2009).
365.
Id.
366.
Ari Natter, Legislation: Report Says House Climate Bill Increases
Household Energy Costs by $114 in 2020, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1882 (Aug. 7,
2009).
367.
Leora Falk, Legislation: Waxman-Markey Bill Would Lead to Job Loss,
Slower Growth, Manufacturing Group Says, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1939 (Aug. 14,
2009).
368.
House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339.
369.
Id.
370.
See Lieberman, supra note 295; Mulkern, Coal Industry Sees Life or
Death in Senate Climate Debate, supra note 295.
371.
Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra note 353.
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maximum price on allowances.372 The high end of the price collar would act
as a safety valve to ensure against disruptive price spikes, and the low end
would provide assurance to a company and its bankers that the price of
allowances would not drop below the statutory price, as it was comparing the
purchase of allowances to investing in GHG emissions reductions
technologies.373 The NRECA wanted the Senate to distribute all allowances
based on the carbon content of the fuel used, rather than using the EEI
formula that distributed half on the basis of electrical output.374 A new group
of coal-dependent power companies called Generators for Affordable Power
was formed specifically with the goal of ensuring that unregulated merchant
generators received their fair share of allowances in any cap-and-trade
legislation.375
Environmental groups wanted the Senate to set the 2020 cap at 20%
below 2005 emissions and to require all allowance trading to be conducted on
regulated public exchanges.376 They strongly objected to giving the USDA
authority over offsets and allowance trading.377 In addition, they urged the
Senate to prohibit any source that was out of compliance with the Clean Air
Act’s requirements for conventional pollutants from receiving free allowances
and from purchasing offsets in the climate change program.378 They also

372.
See Cathy Cash, Allowance Game Continues; PG&E’s Darbee Tries to
Persuade Against Utility ‘Balkanization,’ ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Sept. 28, 2009, at 1
[hereinafter Cash, Allowance Game Continues], available at 2009 WLNR 20114210; Cathy
Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as Utilities Target Carbon Allowances, PLATTS
INSIDE FERC, July 6, 2009 [hereinafter Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as
Utilities Target Carbon Allowances], available at 2009 WLNR 13823963; Cathy Cash et al.,
Senators Mull Provision to Block EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions, PLATTS
INSIDE ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2010, at 3 [hereinafter Cash et al., Senators Mull Provision to Block
EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions], available at 2010 WLNR 7051518.
373.
See Cathy Cash, Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators
Contemplate GHG Bill, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, May 24, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Cash,
Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators Contemplate GHG Bill], available at
2010 WLNR 11605741.
374.
Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as Utilities Target Carbon
Allowances, supra note 372; Kathleen Hart, Rural Cooperatives Push Boxer to Make Senate
Cap-and-Trade Bill Affordable, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Aug. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; search “Rural Cooperatives Push Boxer”); Tom Tiernan, Allocations to
Merchants Reveal Fault Lines in Industry Support for Climate Change Bill, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WK., July 20, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Tiernan, Allocations to Merchants Reveal Fault Lines],
available at 2009 WLNR 14961067.
375.
Tiernan, Allocations to Merchants Reveal Fault Lines, supra note 374.
376.
Hawkins Testimony, supra note 356, at 4–6.
377.
Id. at 31–32.
378.
Id. at 6–7.
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urged the senators to refrain from preempting EPA and state regulation of
GHG emissions under their existing authorities.379
Senator Barbara Boxer, who remained chairperson of the
Environment and Public Works Committee, decided to proceed cautiously
until she was confident that she had sixty votes lined up to end the
guaranteed Republican filibuster.380 To accomplish this, she had to seek an
accommodation with a group of sixteen Democratic senators from coaldependent states that had coalesced during the defeat of climate change
legislation in the 110th Congress.381 The committee kicked off its work on
the climate disruption Bill with a hearing on July 7th featuring EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Secretary
of Energy Steven Chu, and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar;382 all four of
whom urged the committee to report out a bill similar to the House Bill.383
At the same time, Senator Boxer and Senator John Kerry (DMassachusetts)—a strong supporter of stringent climate change legislation—
met with coal-state, farm-belt, and rust-belt Democrats to address their
concerns and to negotiate over potential changes to the Bill.384
Agricultural interests dominated the hearing that the Senate
Agriculture Committee held in late July 2009.385 They argued that up to 5%
of the allowances should go directly to farmers to offset the higher prices
they would probably have to pay for fuel and fertilizer after cap-and-trade
provisions went into effect.386 The American Farm Bureau Federation
(“AFBF”) continued to oppose the Bill in its entirety.387 The Democrats on
the Committee were sympathetic to the pleas for more allowances, while the
Republicans tended to take the AFBF position that no bill was necessary.388
379.
Id. at 23–24.
380.
Darren Goode & Peter Cohn with Billy House, Rangel, Pelosi Get Wires
Crossed a Bit on Climate Change, Health Care Order, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 3,
2009.
381.
Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats over Energy, supra note 256.
382.
Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat Up as Utilities Target Carbon
Allowances, supra note 372; Jean Chemnick, Panel Set to Kick off US Senate Climate Bill
Action, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, July 3, 2009, at 8, available at 2009 WLNR 13671023;
Senate Gets to Grips with Climate Change Bill, OIL DAILY, July 8, 2009.
383.
Darren Goode, Top Officials Pitch Climate Bill to Senators, CONGRESS
DAILY (PM ED.), July 7, 2009; Senate Gets to Grips with Climate Change Bill, supra note 382.
384.
Doug Obey & Nick Juliano, Senate Democrats Take Steps to Build Support
for Climate Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., July 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 13563377.
385.
See Dean Scott, Legislation: Farm Group Wants Free Allowances in Bill
to Offset Expected Higher Cost of Materials, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1756 (July 24,
2009).
386.
Id.
387.
Id.
388.
Id.
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Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) expressed support for an off
ramp that would allow the United States to abandon the cap-and-trade
program if China and India declined to implement equivalent programs in the
near future.389
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Montana) also
claimed jurisdiction over both the allowance allocation and the international
trade aspects of any cap-and-trade bill.390 Baucus represented Montana, a
major coal-producing state with a large number of rural cooperatives, and he
was determined to protect the interests of both industries.391 He sided with
the coal-dependent utility companies who believed that free allocations to
electric companies should be based on historical emissions alone and not on
the EEI’s 50–50 formula that also relied on energy output.392 The Finance
Committee heard from economists from across the political spectrum who
urged the Senate to abandon the idea of allocating allowances for free and to
distribute allowances through a more efficient auction.393 An economist for
the Environmental Defense Fund testified in support of the House Bill,
which, in his view, channeled 43% of the value of the allowances to
consumers.394 But Baucus made it clear that he was not sold on the
allocation arrangements in the House Bill.395
While Congress took its August recess, a river of money flowed into
grassroots efforts to build support for and against climate disruption
legislation.396 The NAM and the National Federation of Independent
389.
David Bennett, Cap and Trade—Tough Questions, DELTA FARM PRESS
(July 30, 2009), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/management/cap-and-trade-tough-questions.
390.
See Cathy Cash, Baucus Claims Key Aspect of Senate Climate Bill,
PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, July 27, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 15448965.
391.
Id.
392.
See id.
393.
Climate Change Legislation: Allowance and Revenue Distribution:
Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Dallas
Burtraw, Senior Fellow, Resource for the Future, Washington, District of Columbia)
[hereinafter Burtraw Testimony]; Climate Change Legislation: Allowance and Revenue
Distribution: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
(testimony of Alan D. Viard, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) [hereinafter
Viard Testimony].
394.
Climate Change Legislation: Allowance and Revenue Distribution:
Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of Nathaniel
O. Keohane, Director of Economic Policy and Analysis Environmental Defense Fund)
[hereinafter Keohane Testimony].
395.
Cathy Cash, Price ‘Collar’ on Carbon Gains Traction in Senate as
Lawmakers Strive for Vote-getting Measure, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 10, 2009, at 1,
available at 2009 WLNR 16499886.
396.
Darren Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28
States, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Sept. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Climate Bill Backers
Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28 States].
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Businesses spent several million dollars on television ads in thirteen swing
states characterizing such legislation as anti-jobs and anti-energy.397
Americans for Prosperity, an offshoot of Citizens for a Sound Economy that
was likewise funded by the Koch brothers—whose petroleum interests were
directly affected by the proposals—hosted eighty grassroots events at which
speakers asserted—erroneously—that backyard barbeques would be taxed if
Congress enacted the House Bill.398
The AEA arranged a bus tour through coal-producing and
manufacturing states to stir up public opposition to any climate change
bill.399 The CoC staged its own road show demanding that EPA hold a
modern “Scopes Monkey Trial” to debunk the evidence that GHG emissions
caused global warming.400 Another industry-funded grassroots group called
Energy Citizens sponsored rallies featuring ready-made signs for members of
the crowds to display to local media and a video of a country western star
bemoaning the higher energy costs that would follow the enactment of a
climate change bill.401 Still another industry-funded group called CO2 is
Green, which was created in 2009 for the purpose of influencing the climate
disruption debate, began running advertisements in Montana and New
Mexico aimed at Senators Max Baucus and Jeff Bingaman, arguing that
increasing GHG emissions would help the planet’s ecosystems and that
reducing them would kill jobs.402 Several thousands of oil industry
employees were bussed to a rally against climate disruption legislation in
397.
Cathy Cash, EPA’s ‘Endangerment Finding’ Could Spur Senate to Act on
Climate Legislation, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Aug. 31, 2009, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Cash, EPA’s
‘Endangerment Finding’ Could Spur Senate to Act on Climate Legislation]; David A.
Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate; Opponents Seize Initiative
as Senate Bill Nears, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Fahrenthold,
Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate]; Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil
Large-Scale Effort for 28 States, supra note 396.
398.
Jane Mayer, The Billionare Brothers Who Are Waging War Against
Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/30/
100830fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=all.
399.
Cathy Cash, Unions, Enviros Pressure Congress on Climate Bill, PLATTS
COAL OUTLOOK, Aug. 24, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 17597644; see also Juliet
Eilperin, Climate Bill Faces Hurdles in Senate; Democrats Deeply Split Deal on Nuclear
Plants Offered to Court Republicans, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Eilperin,
Climate Bill Faces Hurdles in Senate] (industry funding).
400.
Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra
note 397.
401.
See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate,
supra note 397; Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change,
supra note 300.
402.
Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change,
supra note 300. One of the group’s founders was Corbin J. Robertson, Jr.—perhaps the
largest private owner of coal resources in the country. See id.
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downtown Houston, where they enjoyed hamburgers and hot dogs, heard a
local high school band, and received free t-shirts saying, “I’ll pass on $4
gas.”403
To rally support for climate change legislation, environmental
groups purchased television ads, operated phone banks, and sponsored public
events.404 The Alliance for Climate Protection, a group assembled by former
Vice President Al Gore, and the Blue-Green Alliance, an umbrella
organization of environmental groups and labor unions, undertook a twentytwo-state, Made in America Jobs Tour to demonstrate how such legislation
would create good jobs.405 In September, a coalition of sixty-eight
environmental, labor, civil rights, and consumer groups calling itself the
Clean Energy Works Campaign, launched a $20 million advertising
campaign, run by a former top media advisor to the Obama presidential
campaign to support the enactment of climate change legislation.406 A major
grassroots effort to generate calls, letters, and emails to key members of
Congress accompanied the ad campaign.407
Flanked by military veterans, clean energy entrepreneurs, and state
and local lawmakers, Senators Boxer and Kerry, in late September, unveiled
an eight hundred-page draft climate disruption bill.408 The Bill established a
cap-and-trade regime for all facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of
GHGs per year that reduced GHG emissions by 20% below 2005 levels—
higher than the House bill’s 17%—by 2020, 41% by 2030, and 83% percent
by 2050.409 Although the draft resembled the House Bill on many critical
403.
404.

Paul Burka, Cap and Tirade, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 2009, at 14, 14.
Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra

note 397.
405.
Id.; Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28 States,
supra note 396; Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Made in America Job Tour Stops in
Gary,
Highlighs
Clean
Energy
in
Indiana
(Sept.
2,
2009),
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2009/090902.asp.
406.
Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28 States,
supra note 396.
407.
See id.
408.
Christine Cordner, Draft Legislation Punts on Oversight, Collar, PLATTS
MEGAWATT DAILY, Sept. 30, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 20275098; Juliet Eilperin,
EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases; Biggest Polluters Are in Cross Hairs, WASH.
POST, Oct. 1, 2009, at A3 [hereinafter Eilperin, EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases].
409.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, EPA Authority,
Leaves Negotiating Room for Senate Debate, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 2282 (Oct. 2,
2009) [hereineafter Scott, Legislation: Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts]; Eilperin, House Panel
Begins Debate on Climate Bill, supra note 289; Jay Hodgkins, Analyst: Senate Climate Bill
Slightly Tougher than House’s; EPA Option Likely Toughest, SNL RENEWABLE ENERGY
WKLY., Oct. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Hodgkins, Analyst: Senate Climate Bill Slightly Tougher
than House’s]; Gerald Karey & Cathy Cash, EPA Unveils First-Time GHG Regulation Plan,
PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 20343953.
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issues, it contained some important differences.410 For example, it
established a soft price collar that set a minimum price for auctioned
allowances of $10 per ton and created a strategic reserve of allocations to be
sold at a minimum price of $28 per ton at first and increasing 5% plus
inflation per year for five years and by 7% plus inflation per year
thereafter.411 Unlike the House bill, the Bill would have preserved EPA’s
authority to apply the new source review and new source performance
standards of the Clean Air Act to GHG emissions.412 The draft left some
critical questions unanswered because they came under the jurisdiction of
other committees.413 Although 25% of the allowances would be auctioned in
the early years—more than the 15% in the House bill—the Bill did not
address how the remaining allowances would be allocated among the
targeted recipients.414 The Finance Committee would have to resolve those
issues.415 It also failed to specify which agency would oversee the allowance
and allowance derivatives markets.416
The draft was an immediate flop with the audience that mattered
most—Democratic senators from coal-producing, oil-patch, and rust-belt
states.417 Senators Ben Nelson (D-Nebraska) and Mary Landrieu (DLouisiana) said they would not vote for the Bill because it adopted a capand-trade approach.418 Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) called the
Bill a “‘disappointing step in the wrong direction’” because it did not give
electric utilities sufficient time to develop and deploy CCS technology.419
Senators Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) and Kent Conrad (D-North
Dakota) thought the 20% by 2020 emissions reduction target was too

410.
Cordner, Draft Legislation Punts on Oversight, Collar, supra note 408.
411.
Id.; Christine Cordner, Senate Bill to Set Floor on Auctioned Allowances,
PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY, Oct. 1, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 20343286; Eilperin,
EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases, supra note 408.
412.
Scott, Legislation: Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, supra note 409;
Hodgkins, Analyst: Senate Climate Bill Slightly Tougher than House’s, supra note 409.
413.
See Hodgkins, Analyst: Senate Climate Bill Slightly Tougher than
House’s, supra note 409.
414.
Eilperin, EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases, supra note 408;
Hodgkins, Analyst: Senate Climate Bill Slightly Tougher than House’s, supra note 409.
415.
See Karey & Cash, supra note 409.
416.
See Cathy Cash et al., Senate Climate Change Bill Punts on Market
Oversight, Would Set Carbon Emissions Cap, PLATT’S INSIDE FERC, Oct. 5, 2009, at 7,
available at 2009 WLNR 20647813.
417.
Id.; Darren Goode, Senate Climate Bill Sets Higher Reduction Targets
than House, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Sept. 30, 2009.
418.
Goode, supra note 417.
419.
Darren Goode & Dan Friedman, Senate Democrats Have Uncertain Path
for Climate Measure, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Oct. 1, 2009.
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ambitious.420 Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) was also concerned
about the Bill’s aggressive deadlines.421 When not a single Republican
senator ventured out of the fold to support the Bill, it became clear that
supporters did not have nearly enough votes to overcome a promised
Republican filibuster.422
Unwilling to concede failure, Senator Kerry made an overture to
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) to come up with a bill that
could attract bipartisan support.423 In a New York Times editorial, on October
11th, Senators Kerry and Graham announced that they had come up with a
framework for climate disruption legislation that would attract the necessary
sixty votes.424 In support of their framework, they argued that sending “$800
million a day to sometimes-hostile oil-producing countries threaten[ed]
[national] security.”425 They warned opponents of the legislation that failure
to act would leave climate change regulation to EPA and the clumsy tools
available to it under the Clean Air Act.426 President Obama immediately
jumped on the bandwagon.427 In a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the President praised Kerry for reaching out to Republicans, and
he attacked “the naysayers” who pretended that global warming was not an
issue.428
While Senators Kerry and Graham drafted their Bill, Kerry and
Senator Boxer filled in some missing details of the Kerry-Boxer Bill, made
some minor adjustments, and added some allowance giveaways to make it
more palatable to affected industries.429 At that point, the Bill had blossomed

420.
Scott, Legislation: Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, supra note 409.
421.
Kerry-Boxer Climate Bill Poses New Challenge to Environmental Groups,
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Oct. 2, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 19327749.
422.
Cathy Cash, Utilities Take Long View on Cap-and-Trade Bill, PLATTS
MEGAWATT DAILY, Oct. 27, 2009 [hereinafter Cash, Utilities Take Long View on Cap-and
Trade Bill], available at 2009 WLNR 22505882; Juliet Eilperin & Michael D. Shear, Obama
Urged to Intensify Push for Climate Measure; Backers Fear Administration Is Giving Issue
Short Shrift, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2009, at A3.
423.
John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass Climate Change
Legislation), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at WK11.
424.
Id.
425.
Id.
426.
See id.
427.
Darren Goode & George E. Condon, Jr., Obama Praises Bipartisan
Climate Efforts, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), Oct. 23, 2009.
428.
Id.
429.
See John M. Broder, Senate Global Warming Bill Is Seeking to Cushion
the Impact on Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at 16; Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin,
Senate’s Climate Bill a Bit More Ambitious; Early Version Would Cap Carbon Allowance
Prices—and Deficit, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2009, at A3.
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to 923 pages.430 EPA predicted that the Bill would cost consumers $79 to
$80 each year per household in increased prices for energy and consumer
products, about the same as the House Bill.431 The Environment and Public
Works Committee held a quick series of three hearings on the Kerry-Boxer
Bill,432 and it went straight to committee markup over the strenuous
objections of Republican committee members who boycotted the markup
sessions.433 In the absence of the Republican members, the committee
quickly voted out the Bill.434 Although it was highly unlikely that the Bill
would attract sixty votes, the Senate leadership now had a vehicle to take to
the floor where it could be amended or even replaced with a completely
different bill at the appropriate time.435
As hopes for the Kerry-Boxer Bill faded, the efforts of Senators
Kerry and Graham to craft a bipartisan bill assumed greater importance.436
Soon after their editorial appeared, Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut)
joined the effort.437 They met with Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior
Secretary Ken Salazar, and Energy Czar Carol Browner at the White House
to ascertain the Administration’s position on the elements—like expediting
nuclear power plant licensing and opening offshore areas to oil and gas
drilling—that some Republicans deemed critical to supporting a cap-andtrade bill.438 In early November, the CoC suggested that it might support a
430.
Darren Goode, Dem Divisions Show During Climate Hearing, CONGRESS
DAILY (PM ED.), Oct. 27, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Dem Divisions Show During Climate
Hearing].
431.
Darren Goode, EPA: Kerry-Lieberman’s Costs ‘Modest’, CONGRESS
DAILY (PM ED.), June 15, 2010 [hereinafter Goode, EPA: Kerry-Liberman’s Costs ‘Modest’].
432.
See Goode, Dem Divisions Show During Climate Hearing, supra note
430.
433.
Kent Garber, Climate Change Bill’s Murky Battleground: Assumptions
and Statistics, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/news/energy/
articles/2009/11/11/climate-change-bills-murky-battleground-assumptions-and-statistics;
Darren Goode, GOP Sidelines Climate-Change Markup, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), Nov. 3,
2009.
434.
Juliet Eilperin, Democrats Move on Emissions Bill; But Measure
Reaching Floor May Depend on Bipartisan Talks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2009, at A3
[hereinafter Eilperin, Democrats Move on Emissions Bill]; see also Darren Goode, Without
GOP, Panel OKs Climate Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.), Nov. 5, 2009 [hereinafter Goode,
Without GOP, Panel OKs Climate Bill].
435.
See Goode, Without GOP, Panel OKs Climate Bill, supra note 434.
436.
Jean Chemnick, Kerry-Graham-Liberman Talks Form New Power Axis
for Senate Climate Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Nov. 9, 2009, at 3 [hereinafter Chemnick,
Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Talks Form New Power Axis for Senate Climate Bill], available at
2009 WLNR 23615443.
437.
Id.; Mufson & Eilperin, supra note 429.
438.
Eilperin, Democrats Move on Emissions Bill, supra note 434; Darren
Goode, Boxer Mulls Exit Strategy for Moving Bill, CONGRESS DAILY (PM ED.) Nov. 4, 2009.
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bill reflecting the approach outlined in the Kerry-Graham editorial.439
Lieberman called the letter a game changer because it signaled that the three
sponsors might be able to bring a large segment of the business community
to the negotiating table.440 An industry lobbyist acknowledged that “‘KerryGraham-Lieberman is where the game will be decided.’”441
Senator Graham’s attempts to forge a bipartisan bill, however,
attracted the wrath of the AEA, which spent almost $300 thousand on a
series of radio, television, and online advertisements just before Halloween,
warning that one of the “‘scary stories coming out of Washington’” was that
Senator Graham “‘support[ed] . . . a national energy tax called cap-andtrade.’”442 Environmental groups responded with a more modest ad
campaign asking why “‘[o]ut-of-state interests [were] attacking’” Senator
Graham for “‘backing an energy plan that produces more power [for]
America.’”443
In the meantime, the electric utility industry’s compromise over the
allocation of allowances among regulated electric utility companies, as
reflected in the EEI’s 50-50 formula, was unraveling.444 Coal-burning
Midwest utility companies and rural electric cooperativeswhich had not
been involved in the EEI negotiationscomplained that they would have to
purchase offsets or install GHG reduction technologies to meet the steadily
decreasing caps of the House and Senate bills, while non-coal-dependent
utility companies would receive a substantial share of the allowances they
needed without having to do much in the way of reducing emissions or
purchasing credits.445 Representatives of the non-coal-dependent companies
argued that their computer modeling showed that the costs of the Bill were
evenly divided among all utility companies.446
The split was also widening between regulated utility companies and
unregulated merchant companies.447 The regulated companies joined the
439.
Juliet Eilperin, Merkel Urges Congress to Act on Climate; Partisan Divide
That Greeted German Leader Also Seen on Senate Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2009, at A4.
440.
Chemnick, Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Talks Form New Power Axis for
Senate Climate Bill, supra note 436.
441.
Cathy Cash, ‘Art of Compromise’ Now the Focus as Senate Puts
Everything on Table to Win a Climate Bill, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 9, 2009, at 1, available
at 2009 WLNR 23615667.
442.
Eilperin, Climate Bill Faces Hurdles in Senate, supra note 399.
443.
Id.
444.
Margaret Kriz Hobson, Let’s Unmake a Deal, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.),
Oct. 21, 2009 [hereinafter Kriz Hobson, Let’s Unmake a Deal].
445.
Id.
446.
Id.
447.
See Esther Whieldon et al., In Senate Climate Bill Debate, Wellinghoff
Challenges Advocacy Office Proposal, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Nov. 2, 2009, at 1, available at
2009 WLNR 23050407.
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rural electric cooperatives and two associations of public utility commissions
in a letter to senators, arguing that the only way to ensure that the benefits of
the free allowances award to the industry flowed through to consumers was
to limit them to companies subject to state utility commission
requirements.448 Unregulated utility companies, they argued, would just
channel the savings to their shareholders.449 EEI attempted to smooth over
both contentious issues by asking the Senate to allocate more allowances to
all utility companies and to set a price ceiling for allowances as a safety
valve, a solution that was sure to anger environmental groups.450
The efforts to move climate disruption legislation through the Senate
received a bolt from the blue in November 2009, when more than three
thousand purloined emails and documents to and from scientists involved in
preparing a report for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were
leaked to the press.451 The emails, which were taken from East Anglia
University’s Climate Research Unit, revealed that some of the hundreds of
scientists involved in preparing the report had attempted to prevent papers
from climate change skeptics from being published in scientific journals.452
Critics also saw evidence in the emails of attempts to hide scientific data and
to manipulate the data to fit particular theories of global warming.453 As
Senator James Inhofe demanded that the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee conduct a full-scale investigation into the scandal, a
spokesperson for the CEI boasted that “[w]e may be close to having [the
legislation] permanently stymied.”454
The revelations did not undermine the integrity of the science
underlying the report.455
Several re-examinations of the scientific
underpinnings of the report chastised the scientists for belittling fellow
scientists and for poor choices of words in their emails, but otherwise
448.
Id.
449.
See id.
450.
Kriz Hobson, Let’s Unmake a Deal, supra note 444.
451.
Kimberley Strassel, ‘Cap and Trade Is Dead,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
2009, at A19; see also Eli Kintisch, Stolen E-Mails Turn up Heat on Climate Change
Rhetoric, 326 SCIENCE 1329, 1329 (2009).
452.
Keith Johnson & Gautam Naik, Lawmakers Probe Climate Emails, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, at A8.
453.
Strassel, supra note 451.
454.
Johnson & Naik, supra note 452; Strassel, supra note 451 (quoting Myron
Ebell, CEI).
455.
Climate Science and EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Regulations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th
Cong. 40 (2011) (testimony of Richard C.J. Somerville, Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
University of California, San Diego); see also Eli Kintisch, Panel Faults IPCC Leadership but
Praises Its Conclusions, 329 SCIENCE 1135, 1135 (2010) [hereinafter Kintisch, Panel Faults
IPCC Leadership but Praises Its Conclusions].
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supported the conclusions reached in the report.456 The scandal did,
however, arrest the forward momentum of climate disruption legislation.457
If nothing else, the need to investigate the incident gave wavering Democrats
a reason to urge the leadership to slow down the process until after the 2010
elections.458
As the prospect for climate change legislation faded and it began to
look like the Republican Party might regain control of the House in the
upcoming elections, British Petroleum, ConocoPhillips, and Caterpillar, Inc.
announced that they would not be renewing their memberships in the
Climate Action Partnership.459 A spokesperson for ConocoPhillips said that
passing a bill had become such a high priority for the group that it was no
longer attempting to ensure that the substance of the bill was workable for all
companies in the coalition.460 Since it did not appear that Congress would be
enacting climate change legislation, the companies decided to pursue what
was in the best interest of their shareholders and consumers.461 More than
twenty other large companies, however, remained in the coalition.462
As the Senate was wrapping up its work on the President’s health
care legislation in early March, Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham held
a series of meetings with senators from both parties to attract their support
for the Bill that they were still in the process of drafting.463 They made it
clear that they would consider alternatives that were less stringent than the
House Bill to bring more senators into the fold.464 At the same time,
President Obama and high-level administration environmental officials met
with thirteen senators to try to hammer out a compromise that could be
featured in the Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bill.465 At the meeting, the
456.
Somerville Testimony, supra note 455, at 40; see also Kintisch, Panel
Faults IPCC Leadership but Praises Its Conclusions, supra note 455, at 1135 (report not
undermined).
457.
See Coral Davenport, EPA’s Power Struggle, NAT’L J., Sept. 24, 2010;
Strassel, supra note 451.
458.
Strassel, supra note 451.
459.
Stephen Power & Ben Casselman, Defections Shake Up Climate
Coalition, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2010, at A1.
460.
Id.
461.
Obama Forced to Dial Down Ambitions for Climate Initiative,
ELECTRICITY CURRENTS, Apr. 2010, at 1, 2.
462.
Power & Casselman, supra note 459.
463.
Swing-Vote Senators Show Interest in Narrower, Sector-Based Climate
Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Mar. 10, 2010, available at http://insideepa.com/EnvironmentalPolicy-Alert/Environmental-Policy-Alert-03/10/2010/swing-vote-senators-show-interest-innarrower-sector-based-climate-bill/menu-id-1095.html.
464.
See id.
465.
Darren Goode, Senate Trio Taps Obama’s Support On Deal, CONGRESS
DAILY (PM ED.), Mar. 9, 2010 [hereinafter Goode, Senate Trio Taps Obama’s Support on
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President seemed open to the possibility of implementing a cap-and-trade
regime quickly for the electric utility industry, but taking a more deliberate
approach to reducing emissions from the manufacturing sector.466 Although
a consensus position did not emerge from the meeting,467 it did clarify that a
multi-sector cap-and-trade bill like the House and Kerry-Boxer Bills was not
a serious option.468 At Kerry’s request, former President Bill Clinton began
lobbying wavering senators, explaining to them that climate disruption
legislation would create thousands of jobs and make the nation more
competitive.469 The constant refrains of climategate, war on coal, and cap
and tax at Tea Party rallies and in the conservative media echo chamber had
found their way into the mainstream media, and the public was souring on
the idea of climate disruption legislation.470
Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham concluded that they could win the
votes of oil-patch, rust-belt, and coal-state Democrats, as well as a few
persuadable Republicans if they could soften the resistance of the CoC, the
API, and coal-dependent electric utilities.471 Over the course of two weeks in
late March, they met the CoC, more than a dozen trade associations, and
various other industry groups to solicit their input on the measures the
senators were considering to make their bill more attractive to industry.472
The Bill “would regulate power plants beginning in 2012,” but would not
extend to other industrial sectors until 2016.473 The Bill would establish a
cap-and-trade regime with a hard price collar limiting the amount paid
allowance to between $10 and $30 per ton, as adjusted for inflation.474 The
Deal]; Ian Talley, Obama Presses Senators to Revive Climate Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2010
[hereinafter Talley, Obama Presses Senators to Revive Climate Bill].
466.
Goode, Senate Trio Taps Obama’s Support on Deal, supra note 465.
467.
Talley, Obama Presses Senators to Revive Climate Bill, supra note 465.
468.
Obama Meeting Lifts Climate Negotiators, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Mar.
15, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 6516264.
469.
Darren Goode, As Clinton Rallies Troops, Reid Says Climate Options
Open, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Mar. 17, 2010.
470.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 248; John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses
Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A13; Margaret Kriz
Hobson, Skies Still Cloudy for Climate Bill, NAT’L J., Mar. 5, 2010.
471.
Senators Seek Oil Industry, Chamber ‘Cease Fire’ on Climate/Energy
Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 2, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 6754644.
472.
See Darren Goode & Amy Harder, Senate Trio Gives Industry First Peek
at Contours of Deal, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Mar. 18, 2010 [hereinafter Goode & Harder,
Senate Trio Gives Industry First Peek at Contours of Deal].
473.
Id.
474.
Cathy Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, PLATTS
OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 19, 2010, at 7 [hereinafter Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in
2012], available at 2010 WLNR 7922104; Goode & Harder, Senate Trio Gives Industry First
Peek at Contours of Deal, supra note 472; Kathleen Hart, Senators Outline New Climate
Change Legislation to Electric Utility Groups, Industry, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Mar. 29,
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targets for the caps would be 17% of 2005 emissions by 2020 and 80% by
2050—lower than the House bill.475 The cap-and-trade regime would
preempt EPA and state regulation of GHGs.476 For the transportation sector,
the Bill would levy a tax on fuel at the pump—not at the refinery where the
oil companies would most likely bear some of the cost.477 The Bill would
also encourage faster permitting of nuclear power plants and open up more
offshore areas for oil and gas development.478 The industry groups were
delighted that the senators had gone to such lengths to allow them to
participate in the drafting process.479
The direction in which the three senators were moving deeply
concerned their progressive colleagues.480 Senator Bernie Sanders objected
to the provisions preempting EPA and the states, the support for nuclear
power, and the decision to open up more offshore areas to oil and gas
development.481 A group of senators led by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida
urged the trio not to include offshore oil and gas drilling in the Bill.482
Several state attorney generals joined the National Association of Clean Air
Agencies in complaining about the trio’s position on preempting EPA
2010 [hereinafter Hart, Senators Outline New Climate Change Legislation to Electric Utility
Groups, Industry], available at http://www.LexisNexis.com (Select “Secondary Materials”;
Search and Select “SNL Electric Utility Report”; Search “Senators Outline New Climate
Change”).
475.
Hart, Senators Outline New Climate Change Legislation to Electric Utility
Groups, Industry, supra note 474.
476.
Cathy Cash & Jean Chemnick, Senators Seek Business-Friendly Carbon
Price, PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY, Mar. 26, 2010, at 7 [hereinafter Cash & Chemnick,
Senators Seek Business-Friendly Carbon Price], available at 2010 WL 7385304.
477.
Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, supra note 474;
Goode & Harder, Senate Trio Gives Industry First Peek at Contours of Deal, supra note 472.
478.
Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, supra note 474; see
also Senators Seek Oil Industry, Chamber ‘Cease Fire’ on Climate/Energy Bill, supra note
471.
479.
See Cash & Chemnick, Senators Seek Business-Friendly Carbon Price,
supra note 476.
480.
Jean Chemnick, Senate Liberals Tell Kerry to Jettison Preemption,
Drilling Measures from Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 5, 2010, at 6 [hereinafter
Chemnick, Senate Liberals Tell Kerry to Jettison Preemption, Drilling Measures from Bill],
available at 2010 WLNR 8074009.
481.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Sanders Wants Bill Supporting State Efforts,
Wants Less Nuclear Power, Offshore Drilling, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 14, at 729 (Apr. 2,
2010); Chemnick, Senate Liberals Tell Kerry to Jettison Preemption, Drilling Measures from
Bill, supra note 480 ; Kathleen Hart, Direction of New Senate Climate Change Bill Draws
Fire from Sanders, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Apr. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (Select “Secondary Materials”; Search and Select “SNL Electric
Report”; Search “Direction of New Senate Climate”).
482.
Chemnick, Senate Liberals Tell Kerry to Jettison Preemption, Drilling
Measures from Bill, supra note 480.
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regulation and state law.483 Environmental groups were also deeply
concerned about the concessions.484 With the 2010 off-year election
campaigns not going well for the Democrats, the groups realized that if
Congress did not enact a bill, however compromised, by the end of the year,
the prospects for climate change legislation in the next Congress were quite
grim.485 Most were willing to hold their noses and acquiesce in the changes
contemplated by the three senators, but others were less inclined to
compromise.486
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham scheduled a press
conference for Monday, April 26, 2010 to roll out their long-awaited Bill.487
Six days before the rollout, however, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid told
the Democratic leadership that he was moving immigration reform ahead of
climate disruption legislation on the legislative agenda.488 The move
infuriated Senator Graham, who viewed the move as “‘nothing more than a
cynical political ploy’” to attract Hispanic votes in the upcoming election.489
He announced that he was no longer willing to support the Bill if

483.
Dean Scott, Legislation: Senators Urged to Resist State Preemption in
Crafting Compromise Climate, Energy Bill, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 781 (Apr. 9,
2010); Kathleen Hart, Air Agencies Want Senate Climate Bill to Let States Enact Tougher
Emissions Standards, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Apr. 19, 2010 [hereinafter Hart, Air Agencies
Want Senate Climate Bill to Let States Enact Tougher Emissions Standards], available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (Select “Secondary Materials”; Search and Select “SNL Electric
Report”; Search “Air Agencies Want Senate”); Coastal States Oppose EPA Pre-Emption,
CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 7, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7210291.
484.
Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, supra note 474
(quoting Timothy Wirth, United Nations Foundation); Cash et al., Senators Mull Provision to
Block EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions, supra note 372 (quoting Center for
Biological Diversity).
485.
Darren Goode et al., Outlines of Climate Bill Emerging, NAT’L J., Apr. 14,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 26395437.
486.
Margaret Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction, NAT’L J., Apr. 14,
2010 [hereinafter Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction], available at 2010 WLNR
26395432; Doug Obey, EPA Seeks to Quell Fears over Likely Loss of Climate Powers in
Senate Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 23, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8290617.
487.
Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction, supra note 486; see Juliet
Eilperin, EEI, Three Oil Companies to Back Climate Bill; Top 10 Highlights of Kerry
Proposal, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://views.washingtonpost.com/climatechange/post-carbon/2010/04/by_juliet_eilpern_the_nations.html.
488.
Laura Meckler, Democrats Revive Immigration Push—Pelosi, Reid Agree
to Put Issue Ahead of Energy Bill as Hispanics, a Key Voting Bloc, Grow Frustrated About
Inaction, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, at A5.
489.
Jim Tankersley, Dispute Leaves Climate Bill Stuck on Hold; a Republican
Senator Pulls His Support in Anger over a Separate Immigration Measure, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2010, at A12.
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immigration reform remained on the Senate’s agenda.490 Senator Reid
quickly backtracked,491 but Senator Graham was not mollified.492 Under
attack in his home state from Tea Party activists, he may have welcomed the
opportunity to separate himself from climate disruption legislation.493
If Graham’s departure was not enough to sink the Bill, the
Deepwater Horizon blowout, which began on April 20, 2010 and continued
throughout the summer, ensured that the Bill’s provisions for opening up
more offshore areas to deepwater drilling was no longer viable.494 In
addition, Senator Bill Nelson (D-Florida) promised to filibuster any bill that
contained such a provision.495 Taking that provision out of the Bill,
however, would cause the oil and gas industry to oppose it with the
consequent loss of support from oil-patch senators.496
Senators Kerry and Lieberman introduced their 987-page Bill
without Senator Graham on May 12, 2010 to little fanfare, because the
Senate was absorbed in the Deepwater Horizon spill.497 Not a single

490.
Darren Goode & Chris Strohm, Graham Wants Immigration off Table for
Year or He Bolts, CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 27, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8700591;
Tankersley, surpra note 489.
491.
See Dean Scott, Legislation: Climate Bill Suffers Setback as Sen. Graham
Withdraws Support over Scheduling Dispute, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 18, at 928 (Apr. 30,
2010).
492.
John M. Broder, Graham Calls for ‘Pause’ in Pursuing Energy Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, (May 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/08/us/politics/08climate.html.
493.
See Jim Tankersley & Richard Simon, Graham’s Bipartisan Efforts Bog
Down; the Republican is Backing off His Push to Cooperate on Issues Including Immigration,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A9.
494.
See John M. Broder, Companies, Crews and Regulators Share Blame in
Coast Guard Report on Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at A9 [hereinafter Broder,
Companies, Crews and Regulators Share Blame in Coast Guard Report on Oil Spill]; Jay
Hodgkins, Hopes Diminish for Climate Bill as Oil Spill, Coal State Dems Pose Hurdles, SNL
MARKETWEEK, May 7, 2010 [hereinafter Hodgkins, Hopes Diminish for Climate Bill as Oil
Spill],
available
at
http://www.jayhodgkins.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/snlpolitics_
climate.pdf.
495.
Bill Kaczor, Nelson Promises Filibuster over Drilling Bill, LEDGER.COM
(June 27, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.theledger.com/article/20060627/NEWS/606270330.
496.
See Hodgkins, Hope Diminish for Climate Bill as Oil Spill, supra note
494.
497.
Energy and Climate Bill in Congress Would Add Some Barriers to
Offshore Drilling, Greatly Expand Market for Natural Gas as Transportation Fuel, FOSTER
NAT. GAS REP., May 14, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 10547851; see also Broder,
Companies, Crews and Regulators Share Blame in Coast Guard on Oil Spill, supra note 494;
Darren Goode & Amy Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work to Keep Together Fragile Coalition,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED), May 13, 2010 [hereinafter Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman
Work to Keep Together Fragile Coalition].
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Republican supported the Bill.498 The Bill resembled the outline that the
three senators had described earlier in the year, but with some important
details filled in and many additional giveaways.499 It would have established
a cap-and-trade regime with a 2020 cap 17% reduction from 2005 emissions
and a 2050 cap of 83% reduction.500 The program would take effect in 2013
for power plants, but would not kick in for the manufacturing and natural gas
distributing companies until 2016.501 The Bill provided such generous
allowances that many sources would not have to purchase allowances—or
reduce GHG emissions—for several years.502 Allowances would be
allocated to unregulated merchant generators in an amount equal to half of
their emissions, but the percentage would diminish to zero by 2029.503 The
formula for allowances for the electric power industry allocated 75% on the
basis of emissions and 25% on the basis of retail sales, rather than the 50–50
split of the House Bill.504 Two-thirds of the proceeds from the auctions
would go immediately back to consumers through their local electricity
distributors.505
The Bill allowed emitters to purchase offsets, but at least 75% of all
offsets had to be produced domestically, unless sufficient domestic offsets
were unavailable.506 Trading of allowances, derivatives, and offsets would

498.
Cash, Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators Contemplate
GHG Bill, supra note 373.
499.
Id.; Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, supra note 474;
Goode & Harder, Senate Trio Gives Industry First Peek at Contours of Deal, supra note 472;
Tankersley & Simon, supra note 493.
500.
Cathy Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 17, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Cash,
Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility Backing, but Big Hurdles
Remain], available at 2010 WLNR 11022011.
501.
Jay Hodgkins, Analyst Goes In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman
Climate Bill, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., May 24, 2010 [hereinafter Hodgkins, Analyst Goes
In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman Climate Bill], available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com (Select “Secondary Material”; Search and Select “SNL Electric
Utility Report”; Search “Analyst Goes In-Depth”).
502.
Senate Climate Bill Retains Key EPA Authorities Despite Broad
Preemption, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., May 14, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 9871895.
503.
Hodgkins, Analyst Goes In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman
Climate Bill, supra note 501.
504.
Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, supra note 500.
505.
Senate Climate Bill Retains Key EPA Authorities Despite Broad
Preemption, supra note 502.
506.
Hodgkins, Analyst Goes In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman
Climate Bill, supra note 501.
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be overseen by the CFTC.507 The Bill contained a hard price collar with a
floor of $12 and a ceiling of $25.508 It required the EPA to write technologybased standards requiring new coal-fired power plants to reduce GHG
emissions by 50% and by 65% after 2020, and it preserved the EPA’s
authority to require states to write technology-based standards for existing
power plants for non-criteria pollutants.509 To please coal-fired power plant
owners and the coal industry, the Bill contained a line charge on sales of
electricity to finance research on CCS technology.510 To make natural gas
producers happy, it included tax incentives and faster environmental
permitting for existing plants that converted from coal to cleaner fuels.511
For the nuclear power industry, the Bill contained $2 billion to $6 billion in
direct support and an increase from $18.5 billion to $54 billion in loan
guarantees.512 The Bill contained a provision giving states a veto over
offshore oil and gas drilling in adjacent waters, but it preempted state and
regional GHG emissions programs.513
The EEI and most investor owned electric companies and
representatives of environmental groups were present at the unveiling to
express their support for the Bill.514 The CoC and the API remained
neutral.515 The Midwestern Climate Coalition and the NRECA said that it

507.
Esther Whieldon, Senate Climate Bill Would Establish Consumer
Advocacy Office Within FERC, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 17, 2010, at 1, available at 2010
WLNR 11021741.
508.
Senate Climate Bill Retains Key EPA Authorities Despite Broad
Preemption, supra note 502.
509.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006); Senate Climate Bill Retains Key EPA
Authorities Despite Broad Preemption, supra note 502.
510.
Hodgkins, Analyst Goes In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman
Climate Bill, supra note 501.
511.
Michael Niven, Kerry-Lieberman Bill Calls for Utilities to Foot Bill for
Carbon Capture Deployment, SNL GENERATIONS MARKETS WK., May 18, 2010, available at
http://lexisnexis.com.
512.
Hodgkins, Analyst Goes In-Depth on Provisions of Kerry-Lieberman
Climate Bill, supra note 501.
513.
Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, supra note 500; Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work
to Keep Together Fragile Coalition, supra note 497; Amanda Luhavalja, Senate Climate Bill
Would Halt State Cap-and-Trade Programs, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., May 24, 2010,
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (Select “Secondary Materials”; Search and Select
“SNL Electric Utility Report”; Search “Senate Climate Bill Would Halt”).
514.
Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, supra note 500; Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work
to Keep Together Fragile Coalition, supra note 497.
515.
Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work to Keep Together Fragile
Coalition, supra note 497.
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would withhold judgment until they saw EPA’s cost analysis of the Bill.516
The American Public Power Association complained that the price cap was
too high and that it provided too many allowances to unregulated merchant
generators.517 Although some major oil and gas producers supported the
Bill, the natural gas industry’s umbrella group, America’s Natural Gas
Alliance, was not high on the Bill, because it did not provide sufficient direct
incentives to use natural gas over coal.518
Environmental groups were concerned about the provisions
preempting the states’ power to regulate GHG emissions, providing
incentives for nuclear power plants, and allowing offshore drilling, even with
the state veto power.519 Despite those concerns, a group of environmental,
labor, and military veterans groups spent $11 million on a series of television
advertisements and an associated online campaign in states of wavering
senators, suggesting that viewers urge their senators to support broad climate
disruption and energy legislation.520 Other environmental groups opposed
the Bill; Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch criticized Kerry and
Lieberman for following an inside-the-beltway strategy that ultimately failed
to attract a single Republican supporter.521 The National Association of
Clean Air Agencies also opposed the Bill because it preempted state
regulation of GHG emissions.522
Supporters of cap-and-trade legislation got a minor boost in midJune when EPA’s analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman Bill concluded that it
would have a relatively modest impact on consumers.523 The average annual
cost per household would be between $79 and $146, compared with the $80–
516.
Cash, Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators Contemplate
GHG Bill, supra note 373; Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work to Keep Together
Fragile Coalition, supra note 497.
517.
Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, supra note 500.
518.
See Bill Holland, Industry Says Climate Bill Falls Short in Promoting Gas
as Clean-Burning Fuel, PLATTS GAS MARKET REP., May 14, 2010, at 17, available at 2010
WLNR 11014089; Whieldon, supra note 507.
519.
See Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work to Keep Together Fragile
Coalition, supra note 497 (discussing statements made by David Hawkins, NRDC).
520.
Groups Plan Ad Campaign Targeting Senators, CONGRESS DAILY (PM
ED.), June 24, 2010.
521.
Sens. John F. Kerry and Joseph I. Lieberman, WASH. POST, May 16,
2010, at A15.
522.
Hart, Air Agencies Want Senate Climate Bill to Let States Enact Tougher
Emissions Standards, supra note 483; Senate Climate Bill Retains Key EPA Authorities
Despite Broad Preemption, supra note 502.
523.
Goode, EPA: Kerry-Lieberman’s Costs ‘Modest,’ supra note 431;
Senators Refute Climate Bill Costs While Obama Open to Alternative Plans, INSIDE EPA WKLY.
REP., June 18, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 12285482.
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$111 cost that EPA attributed to the House bill.524 In early July, the
Congressional Budget Office released a report concluding that complying
with the Kerry-Lieberman Bill would be slightly less expensive than
complying with the House bill.525 In addition, public opinion polls taken
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill showed that two-thirds of the public
supported mandatory limits on GHG emissions.526
As the oil continued to spew from the Deepwater Horizon well,
President Obama met with a group of Democratic and Republican senators to
discuss the possibility of linking a legislative response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill with a cap-and-trade bill that would be limited to the
electric utility industry.527 Most of the Republican senators were unwilling
to consider any form of cap-and-trade bill and they urged the President
instead to pour federal dollars into research on GHG emission reduction
technologies.528 The meeting ended with no agreement on a framework for
moving forward.529
In late July, Senator Reid announced that neither the Democratic
leadership nor the President had been able to cobble together sixty votes for a
climate disruption bill of any size or shape.530 They had therefore called a
halt to their efforts.531 Climate disruption was now in the hands of the EPA,
which was exercising its limited power under the Clean Air Act, and states
that were willing to take on that controversial topic.532 The conservative
think tanks turned their attention to enacting legislation calling a halt to those
climate change initiatives.533
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Goode, EPA: Kerry-Lieberman’s Costs ‘Modest,’ supra note 431.
525.
Geoffrey Craig, Bill Yields Lower Carbon Prices than Prior Studies,
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526.
Jason Dick, Poll: Strong Public Support for Mandatory Carbon
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[hereinafter Eilperin, Senators Predict a Narrower Climate Bill]; Laura Meckler & Stephen
Power, Democrats Step Back on Carbon Cap, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2010, at A6.
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Amy Harder, Pending EPA Emission Regulations Move Front and Center,
CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), July 23, 2010; Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap Emissions,
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See Obama Could Fall Short on Copenhagen Pledge, OIL DAILY, July 26,
2010.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1

82

: Nova Law Review 38, #3

458

NOVA LAW REVIEW

IV.
A.

[Vol. 38

LESSONS LEARNED

Introduction

What can we learn from these four attempts to enact climate
disruption legislation over the past twenty years? Some lessons are obvious
and bear little analysis. Thus, one lesson to take away from the fate of
climate change legislation during the 107th Congress is that it is very
difficult to enact legislation that the president strongly opposes when your
party controls only one House of Congress.534 This section of the article will
probe some less obvious lessons that the past failures to enact climate
disruption legislation may have for future attempts to enact similar
legislation or any other environmental legislation that the business
community is likely to oppose.
B.

Powerful Institutions Are Aligned Against Regulatory Legislation

Any attempt to enact domestic policy legislation over the objections
of the business community must contend with the institutions that it has
erected to protect its interests and to advance a laissez faire minimalist
agenda. The idea and influence infrastructures that the business community
put into place over the past thirty-five years were steadfastly opposed to
climate disruption legislation, and they played an important role in
forestalling that legislation. Three think tanks—the Heritage Foundation, the
CEI, and the George C. Marshall Institute—have played prominent roles in
the ideological air wars over climate change.535 Over the years they have
provided a constant stream of laissez faire minimalist critiques of
government regulation that has found its way into the public consciousness
as it resonates through the conservative media echo chamber.536 Industrysponsored climate change skeptics in academia—many of whom are
affiliated with one or more conservative think tanks—have likewise played
an important role in the debates over climate change legislation by instilling
doubt about the reality of climate disruption in the public consciousness.537
Both the think tank scholars and the industry-sponsored scientists have made
themselves freely available to mainstream press reporters who feel duty

534.
535.

See supra Part III.B.
GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 3–4, 52; MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 49–52,

536.
537.
6, at 54–55.

MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 49–55.
GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 3–4, 8–9, 19, 33–34; MCGARITY, supra note

247–48.
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bound to present both sides of public controversies.538 The net result is that
an appreciable segment of the United States population believes that GHG
emissions do not cause climate disruption and that, even if they did,
government regulation is not the right way to go about limiting GHG
emissions.
The business community’s influence infrastructure has had an even
more powerful influence on the progress of climate disruption legislation.
The CoC—the largest and most visible mouthpiece of the business
community—and the NAM have consistently opposed every bill that would
have imposed mandatory restrictions on GHG emitters.539 And they have
invested tens of millions of dollars on advertising campaigns in the districts
of key members of Congress, maintaining websites on climate change issues,
and contributing to the campaigns of sympathetic candidates.540
Over the years, industry trade associations—like the EEI, the API,
and the AGA—have spent millions of dollars hiring lobbyists, financing
studies of the impacts of various bills, hosting briefings, generating calls and
emails from their members to key legislators, participating in meetings with
members and committee staffs, and working with business-supported
grassroots organizations to stir up public opposition to climate disruption
legislation.541 Individual companies have hired their own lobbyists to serve
as soldiers in the ground wars.542 These troops may aim their fire at one
another on narrow issues like the proper allocation formula for free
allowances, but they tend to fall in line with the trade associations and the
broader business community on issues like whether allowances should be
auctioned or given away and whether stringent caps should kick in before
CCS technology becomes easily available to electric utility companies.
The pro-business media echo chamber has provided a robust
opportunity for the public to hear the business community’s position on
controversial issues like climate disruption. Fox News commentators railed
against cap and tax legislation, and its coverage of coal-related issues often
flashed “War on Coal” across the bottom of the screen.543 During the
debates over climate disruption legislation in the 110th and 111th Congress,
Fox News commentator Steven Milloy provided a steady stream of criticism
538.

GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19, 33–34; MCGARITY, supra note 6, at

54–55.
539.
Kriz, Warm-Button Issue, supra note 30, at 322; see also MCGARITY,
supra note 6, at 107–08; Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30.
540.
Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30.
541.
Id. at 1529–31.
542.
Id. at 1529–30.
543.
E.g., Obama’s Energy Policies Hurting the Economy? at 1:12–2:16 (Fox
Business television broadcast May 22, 2012), available at http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/
1651158905001/obamas-energy-policies-hurting-the-economy/#sp=show-clips.
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of advocates of climate disruption legislation and ready access to a national
audience for climate disruption skeptics on his Junk Science show and
blog.544
Finally, the grassroots organizations that the business community
created to stir up public opposition to unwanted legislation have proven very
effective in the battles over climate disruption legislation. CSE was an early
generator of grassroots opposition to the BTU tax, and its successor
organization, Americans for Prosperity, generated targeted opposition to later
climate disruption bills and played critical roles in the Tea Party movement
that has moved the Republican Party even farther away from support for
climate disruption legislation.545 In addition to these relatively longstanding
organizations, the energy industry created a number of ad hoc organizations
like the AEA and Energy Citizens to wage extremely effective grassroots
campaigns against climate change legislation in the districts of likely swing
voters in Congress.546
The BTU tax battle provided an early example of how adept the
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures were at framing
attempts by the energy industry to avoid its environmental responsibilities as
worthy crusades to preserve jobs and enhance economic growth.547 They
argued that a BTU tax was not in the public interest, not because it forced
energy companies to choose between paying the tax or reducing emissions,
but because it would raise prices for consumer goods, reduce economic
activity, and bring about job loss.548 It was much harder on the other side to
characterize a complex tax on the energy content of fuels as a much-needed
tool to protect the planet from a host of maladies that might or might not
flow from global temperatures that might or might not be increasing.549

544.
See Steven Milloy, Al Gore and Venus Envy, FOX NEWS.COM (Jan. 29,
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/01/29/a1-gore-and-venue-envy/; Steven Milloy,
Junk Science:
Time to Retire ‘Denier,’ FOX NEWS.COM (June 5, 2008), http://
www.foxnews.com/story/2008/06/05/junk-science-time-to-retire-denier/.
545.
See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 40, 59, 247.
546.
See Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate
Change, supra note 300; Lobbyists Boast BTU Tax Beaten in the House, supra note 82.
547.
Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116.
548.
Id. (quoting Monica Lovell, Tax Director for the National Association of
Manufacturers, arguing that “[s]upport against the tax was easy to galvanize, . . . because
opponents could make a direct link between the tax, manufacturing costs, and job losses”).
549.
Id. (Treasury Department official argues that the “‘creativity and
complexity’ of the [BTU tax] idea made it easy for critics to undermine”).
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America is Deeply and Widely Fractured Over Climate Disruption

America is a deeply divided nation on many cultural and economic
issues, but climate disruption is an issue that divides us more than most. And
the division is both deep and wide. Participants on both sides of the climate
disruption debates have strongly held beliefs about the role of GHG
emissions in causing climate disruption, the likely cost and availability of
technologies for reducing or sequestering GHG emissions, whether
government regulations or voluntary programs are more effective in reducing
GHG emissions, and whether the United States should unilaterally take steps
to address climate disruption before other major GHG-emitting nations take
action.550 In many cases the gulf between the two sides is so wide that
negotiation and compromise are virtually impossible. A congressperson who
believes that climate disruption is a fraud perpetrated by arrogant scientists
on gullible liberals is unlikely to find common ground with a congressperson
who believes that climate disruption is a real phenomenon, the effects of
which we are currently witnessing in unprecedented hurricanes, typhoons,
and droughts, and the causes of which are corporations that will always put
the bottom line ahead of the public welfare.
Science plays a role in these divisions.551 Despite the embarrassing
East Anglia diversion, the scientific community has come to closure on the
question of whether anthropogenic GHG emissions cause increased global
temperatures.552 Nevertheless, a small, but determined group of scientists—
many of whom have derived financial support from energy companies—have
provided a sufficient degree of doubt to persuade those who want to be
persuaded that climate disruption is a theory that lacks a scientific basis.553
Ideology also plays a significant role in the divisions.554 The
business community’s idea infrastructure and its media echo chamber have
been exceedingly effective in convincing a large segment of the population
that government should not interfere in private economic arrangements.555
550.
See Cash, US Energy Leaders Weigh GHG Compromise, supra note 292;
Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; Shabecoff, Major ‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is
Unavoidable, Experts Say, supra note 24; Talley & Power, supra note 278.
551.
GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9.
552.
See Shabecoff, Major ‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is Unavoidable, Experts Say,
supra note 24; Strassel, supra note 451; Causes: A Blanket Around the Earth, NASA,
http://www.climate.nasa.gov/causes (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
553.
GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19.
554.
John A. Sautter & Christopher A. Sautter, Price, Carbon and Generation
Profiles: How Partisan Differences Make the Future of Climate Change Uncertain,
ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2010, at 72, 72.
555.
See Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate
Change, supra note 300.
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Many Americans are therefore ideologically predisposed to oppose
government-based solutions to the threat of climate disruption.556 Even those
who are convinced that climate disruption is real are not convinced that BTU
taxes or cap-and-trade regimes are the way to go about addressing the
problem.557 On the other side, environmental activists have historically been
inclined ideologically to distrust corporations and to look to the government
to solve environmental problems.558 This has changed somewhat in recent
years with the acceptance by nearly all environmental groups of marketbased approaches to regulations that give companies flexibility to meet
predetermined environmental goals in the most efficient way possible.559
Finally, regional differences play a powerful role in these
divisions.560 In part, these differences stem from the fact that some areas of
the country are rich in coal, some are rich in natural gas, and some are poor
in both resources.561 People from states in which coal plays a large role in
the economy are not predisposed to favor programs that have the effect of
discouraging coal use, just as people from natural gas-producing states are
likely to favor such programs if the result is to induce power plants to switch
from coal to natural gas.562 The differences may also reflect a subtler
economic distinction reflecting the differing cost of electricity in different
states.563 Economists John and Christopher Sautter have demonstrated that
the distinction between Red States that vote mostly Republican and Blue
States that vote mainly Democratic very closely tracks the cost of electricity
in those states.564 The average cost of electricity in Red States is about 2.5¢
per kilowatt-hour lower than in Blue States.565 This suggests that people in
Red States should be more inclined to oppose climate disruption legislation
not just because it may harm local industries and increase unemployment,
but also because it may increase the price they pay for electricity in the
future.566 The business community’s influence infrastructure has proven
very adept at appealing to these regional differences in advertising initiatives
556.
See Mufson, New Groups Revive Debate over Causes of Climate Change,
supra note 300; Sautter & Sautter, supra note 554, at 72, 74.
557.
See Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing
BTU Tax, supra note 86; Gerson, supra note 295.
558.
See Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, supra note 304;
Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change, supra note 300.
559.
See Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, supra note 304.
560.
Sautter & Sautter, supra note 554, at 72.
561.
Id. at 72–73.
562.
See id.
563.
Id. at 73–74.
564.
Id. at 71–73.
565.
Sautter & Sautter, supra note 554, at 73.
566.
See id. at 73–74.
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and grassroots campaigns to generate opposition to climate disruption
legislation.567
As suggested by the Sautters’ study, these deep and wide divisions
are now almost perfectly reflected in our two-party system.568 There was
once a day when Republicans from the Northeast fought with Republicans
from the Midwest over the content of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act.569 In the 1970s, some of the most vigorous proponents of environmental
protection were Republicans like Senators Jacob Javits and John Chafee.570
Although there are still vigorous Democratic supporters of the coal and
electric utility industries in the South and Midwest, their numbers have
diminished as the voters replaced them with Republicans.571 Now there are
very few Republican politicians who are willing to advocate strong
governmental intervention to solve environmental problems. And they tend
to vote with their fellow Republicans when it is their votes that really matter.
D.

The Business Community is Fractured on Climate Disruption, but
the Fractures Are Neither Deep Nor Wide

The business community has never been entirely of one mind in the
debates over climate change. In the early 1990s, the National Gas
Association split with the rest of the business community in supporting a
study concluding that GHG emissions could be reduced by moving rapidly to
natural gas and other renewables.572 During the debates over the BTU tax,
two small trade associationsboth of which had an economic interest in
higher energy taxesbroke ranks and supported the Clinton
Administration’s bill.573
Fissures became more apparent in the 110th Congress. A split
developed between electric utility companies that were heavily dependent on
coal and opposed cap-and-trade legislation, companies that were not so
dependent on coal and supported cap-and-trade legislation with stringent
caps and short deadlines, and still other companies that supported cap-and567.
See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate,
supra note 397; Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change,
supra note 300.
568.
Sautter & Sautter, supra note 554, at 72–73.
569.
See Amy Harder, A Stalled Movement, NAT’L J., Apr. 14, 2011.
570.
Id.; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, About EPA: The Guardian: Origins of
the EPA, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa (last updated Mar. 16,
2014).
571.
See Sautter & Sautter, supra note 554, at 73–74.
572.
Dillon, Democrats Unveil Details of Climate Change Legislation in
Senate, supra note 200.
573.
Industry Reacts to BTU Tax Modifications, supra note 93.
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trade legislation in principle, but opposed legislation that kicked in before the
industry had time to develop CCS technology.574 This period also witnessed
a major split in the business community over the reality of global warming as
several Fortune 500 companies parted company with the CoC on climate
disruption legislation.575 These fractures continued and deepened somewhat
during the debates in the 111th Congress over the Waxman-Markey Bill in
the House and the Kerry-Boxer and Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bills in the
Senate.576
Upon close examination, however, it appears that these fractures are
neither deep nor wide. First, only relatively few companies have parted with
the CoCthe nominal spokesperson for the business community.577 The
breakaway companies are either manufacturers, like the Apple Corporation,
that want to project a clean image, or natural gas distributors and public
utilities that stand to gain economically from climate change legislation.578
The most serious fractures within the energy industry have occurred over
how the free allowances should be allocated among various segments of the
industry.579 On the broader issue of free distribution of allowances versus
auctions, the industry has been united in favoring free distribution.580
Second, the idea and influence infrastructures have lives and minds
of their own. Although the think tanks, media outlets, and grassroots
organizations depend heavily on the business community for financial
support, they are driven by a strong ideological commitment to free markets
and noninterventionist governmental policies.581 Because they also receive
substantial support from conservative foundationsbillionaires like the
Koch brothersand sympathetic individuals, the rift in the business
community is not likely to affect them financially.582 It is therefore unlikely
that they will change their positions on climate change legislation in the

574.
Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 1, 5.
575.
Id. at 56; see also Williamson, supra note 231.
576.
Chemnick, Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Talks Form New Power Axis for
Senate Climate Bill, supra note 436; Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at
6; Kerry-Boxer Climate Bill Poses New Challenge to Environmental Groups, supra note 421.
577.
See Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 56.
578.
Id.; Kate Galbraith, Apple Resigns from Chamber over Climate, INT’L
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2009, 3:39 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/appleresignes-from-chamber-over-climate/.
579.
Amena Saiyid, Positions Evolve on Cap and Trade as Debate Moves from
Acid Rain to CO2, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Aug. 10, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR
16499756.
580.
See Williamson, supra note 231.
581.
See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33–34, 40.
582.
See id.
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foreseeable future, despite the rifts in the business community.583
Consequently, it is unlikely that many Republican senators and
representatives will change their tunes.
Third, to the extent that the support indicated by some companies
and trade associations for climate disruption legislation is strategic, the
strong opposition to the same legislation by the CoC, as well as pro-business
think tanks, grassroots organizations, and media outlets can be very useful.584
There is an inside-the-beltway adage that “‘if you [are] not at the table, you
[are] on the menu.’”585 Companies that would rather not see climate change
legislation enacted may still want to play an influential role in shaping such
legislation as it moves through Congress. If they announce that they support
reasonable legislation so long as it is fair to them, they can actively
participate in the legislative deal-making, comfortable in the knowledge that
the idea and influence infrastructures are carrying on the fight to prevent
Congress from enacting that legislation.
A spokesperson for EEIwhich had opposed climate change during
the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrationsacknowledged in August
2009 that its position had evolved from opposing anything but a voluntary
program to support for “‘well-designed legislation that will reduce GHG
emissions while also containing costs to customers.’”586 Frank O’Donnell,
the head of Clean Air Watch, suggested that the evolution did not represent a
change in position so much as an acknowledgement that the politics of
climate change had changed after the 2008 elections.587 Given the real
possibility that a Democrat-controlled Congress would pass legislation that a
Democratic president would sign, EEI may have decided that it should do
what it could to influence the content of that legislation, even though it
preferred no legislation at all. The strong opposition to any legislation by the
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures gave it an
opportunity to have it both ways.
At the end of the day, the divisions in the business community were
not debilitating. It presented a united front in opposition to any cap-andtrade bill that allocated a significant proportion of the initial allowances
through an auction, the tool preferred by most economists, and that lacked a
bright-line safety valve that effectively removed the cap once the price of

583.
Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 6; see also
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33–34, 40.
584.
See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 40; Power & Casselman, supra note 459.
585.
Power & Casselman, supra note 459.
586.
Saiyid, supra note 579.
587.
See id. (discussing the opinion of Frank O’Donnell, Clean Air Watch).
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allowances exceeded a prescribed level.588 Even on issues on which a few
non-coal-dependent electric utility companies parted company with the EEI,
the energy industry as a whole was capable of devoting considerable
resources to stopping legislation they deemed undesirable.589 The ACCCE,
an umbrella group for the electric utility and coal industry,590 spent almost
$10 million on lobbyists in its short—but successful—campaign to defeat the
Lieberman-Warner Bill.591 Fissures certainly developed in the industry most
affected by climate change legislation, but they disappeared in the face of the
kind of stringent legislation demanded by environmental groups.
E.

On the Question of Climate Disruption, Republicans Are Dogs, and
Democrats Are Cats

Time after time, the Republican leadership in Congress was able to
persuade all but a tiny few members to vote as a pack against mandatory
climate disruption legislation at both the committee level and on those rare
occasions when bills came to the floors of the House and Senate. The threat
of a Republican filibuster in the Senate was so credible that the bills’
sponsors simply assumed that it would take sixty votes to pass them.592 For
the Democratic leadership, by contrast, corralling enough votes to get bills
through committees and past floor votes was like herding cats.
In part, this reflects the geographical fact that few Republican
members come from states that stand to benefit from climate change
legislation beyond the benefits that accrue to all states from reduced climate
disruption.593 But it also reflects a deep ideological commitment to a laissez
faire minimalist approach to the role of government in society. And this in
turn reflects the influence of three decades worth of books, white papers,
issue briefs, op-eds, and conferences undertaken by the conservative think

588.
See Cash, Allowance Game Continues, supra note 372; Cash, Building a
Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More from Utlities About Challenges, supra note 187.
589.
See Ari Berman, The Dirt on Clean Coal: The Coal Industry Presents
Itself as Committed to Environmental Sustainability—But Is It?, NATION, Apr. 13, 2009, at 17,
17–18.
590.
See About Us, AM. COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY, http://
www.cleancoalusa.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
591.
Berman, supra note 589, at 18; Coral Davenport, Coal Industry Digs in
with Lobbying Campaign, CQ WKLY., Mar. 23, 2009, at 652; Anne C. Mulkern, A
‘Propaganda War’ over ‘Clean Coal,’ INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/20/20greenwire-propaganda-war-over-coal-escalatesahead-of-hi-10594.html?pagewanted=all.
592.
See Kerry & Graham, supra note 423.
593.
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 22,601–02 (2009).
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tanks and academic centers, and the business-oriented news and political
commentary of the conservative media echo chamber.
In every serious attempt to enact climate disruption legislation
during the past two decades, Democratic members have divided along lines
that reflected the economic interests of their states.594 In part, this is a
manifestation of the fact that Democratic members come from more
economically diverse regions.595 The fact that a large number of Democratic
members hail from coal-producing states like West Virginia, Virginia,
Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and manufacturing states like Ohio and Michigan,
guarantees that critical issues, like the stringency of the caps and the
allocation of allowances, will be divisive for Democrats.596 And the fact that
many Democratic members represent rural agricultural states in the farm belt
means that fractures are likely to occur on issues like the stringency of the
caps—which arguably cause fuel and fertilizer prices to increase—and the
entity that oversees trading in offsets.597
These divisions had three significant consequences. First, they
prevented the Democrats from voting as a block in favor of climate
disruption legislation.598 Given the thinness of Democratic majorities in both
houses in years in which they were in control, this made it extremely difficult
to hit upon a formula that would secure the majority needed to pass
legislation in the House and the supermajority needed to pass legislation over
the opposition of a unified Republican Party in the Senate.599 Second, they
594.
See 155 CONG. REC. 20,556; Robin Bravender, Rockefeller Backs
Murkowski’s EPA Resolution in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/06/09/09climatewire-rockefeller-backs-murkowskis-epa-resolution-96513.html.
595.
See Alexander E.M. Hess & Michael Sauter, Top States With the Fastest
Growing Economies, USA TODAY (June 15, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2013/06/15/states-with-the-fastest-growing-economies/2416239/;
Election Results 2008: President Map, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/map.html.
596.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2012, 12 tbl.6
(2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf; Alexander E.M. Hess et al.,
10 States Where Manufacturing Still Matters, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2013, 6:19 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/10/10-states-where-manufacturingstill-matters/2638363/; Election Results 2008: President Map, supra note 595.
597.
See Election Results 2008: President Map, supra note 595; 2007 Census
Ag Atlas Maps—Farms, U.S. DEPARTMENT AGRICULTURE, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/
Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Ag_Atlas_Maps/Farms/Agricultural_Chemicals_Used/
07-M104.php (last modified Apr. 19, 2012).
598.
See Bravender, supra note 594.
599.
See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives 1935–Present, U.S.
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/74-Present/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
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guaranteed that any bills that the Democrats were able to move through
Congress would contain many exemptions and giveaways to industries
favored by holdout members.600 Third, they ensured that the bill that
Congress finally passed would probably not meet stringent intermediate
environmental goals.601
Thus, one of the early concessions that
Representative Waxman and Senators Kerry and Lieberman made to coalstate members was a reduction in the 2020 cap from 20% below 2005 levels
to 17%.602
F.

Public Interest Groups Are Outgunned and Outclassed

The major environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council,
vigorously supported strong climate disruption legislation,603 and they
benefitted from the fact that climate disruption legislation was high on the
list of two Democratic presidents and Democratic leaders in both houses of
Congress during the 107th and 111th Congresses.604 But they were clearly
outgunned by the large agglomeration of industries that opposed their
bills.605 Although the environmental organizations devoted unprecedented
sums to lobbying, advertising, and grassroots campaigns, they were no match
for the sophisticated efforts of the professional lobbyists and public relations
operations of the CoC, the NAM, industry trade associations, and individual
companies.606 Except for the Sierra Club, they had no equivalent of the
highly organized grassroots campaigns of Citizens for a Sound Economy,
Americans for Prosperity, and the many ad hoc organizations that industry
created to fight particular battles.607 Perhaps more importantly, they had no
600.
See, e.g., Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98.
601.
See Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70.
602.
See Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon Emissions
20% by 2020, supra note 274; Lizza, supra note 601.
603.
Ben Geman, Green Groups to Obama: Choose Climate over Oil, NAT'L J.
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/green-groups-to-obama-chooseclimate-over-oil-20140117.
604.
See Geman, supra note 603; Clinton Plan: BTU’s Bearing the Brunt,
supra note 58; Overview of Legislative Proposals in the 107th Congress, CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, www.c2es.org/federal/congress/107 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); 111th
Congress Climate Change Legislation, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
605.
See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate,
supra note 397.
606.
See id. (relating lobbying expenses of industry and environmental groups
for the first half of 2009).
607.
See Americans for Prosperity Calls Victorious Defeat of Bridge to
Nowhere a Testament to the Power of Grassroots Activism, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sep. 21, 2007;
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equivalents of Fox News and Rush Limbaugh to spread their message
throughout the country; although in the later years MSNBC and its
commentators Rachel Maddow and Keith Olbermann began to fill that
gap.608
The campaign to enact climate disruption legislation in the 111th
Congress was by far the most expensive campaign ever run by environmental
groups.609 But even with tens of millions of dollars to spend on lobbying,
advertising, and grassroots organizing, their efforts did not match the
sophistication of the industry operations.610 The difference in approach is
well illustrated by the grassroots tours that both the AEA and a coalition of
environmental groups conducted during the critical August recess after the
House had passed the Waxman-Markey Bill.611 People attending an AEA
rally in Athens, Ohio enjoyed free lunches, live concerts, and free T-shirts,
and heard stirring speeches filled with calls to action.612 People attending an
environmental group rally in the same city soon thereafter got to hear a
scholarly panel discuss the issues in a classroom and received free bumper
stickers.613
G.

It Takes a Crisis

In Freedom to Harm, I argue that “[r]egulatory legislation usually
requires a crisis and a resulting groundswell of public opinion.”614 For
example, the crisis brought on by the financial meltdown of September 2008
motivated Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

Hundreds of Activists to Converge on North Carolina Capitol to Demand ‘Less’ on Second
Annual ‘Citizens for Sound Economy’ Day, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 4, 2001, at 1; The Sierra
Club Niagara Group Will Send More Than 100 People to Take Part in the Forward on
Climate Rally in Washington, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 15, 2013.
608.
See JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 16, at 47; Warming Conspiracy
Proceeding as Planned, NEWS GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2009, at C3; Joe Romm, Inhofe's Stunning
Admission to Maddow on Global Warming: ‘I Thought it Must Be True Until I Found Out
What It Cost,’ CLIMATEPROGRESS (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:35AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2012/03/16/446008/inhofe-maddow-global-warming/.
609.
See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate,
supra note 397.
610.
See id.
611.
See id.; Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; The American Clean
Energy & Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111/acesa (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
612.
Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra
note 397.
613.
Id.
614.
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 57.
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Consumer Protection Act of 2010.615 Climate disruption, by contrast, does
not create the sort of extreme crises that lead Congress to enact legislation.616
Thus, Senator James Inhofe scoffed at any suggestion that Congress should
enact climate disruption legislation based “on speculative computer model
predictions of [fifty] to [one hundred] years away of a looming climate
catastrophe.”617 Environmental groups could try to attribute Superstorm
Sandy, Supertyphoon Haiyan, or the sinking Polar Vortex of the winter of
2013–14 to climate disruption. Since few competent scientists are willing to
support that claim, however, the groups have been hesitant to rely on such
events to stir up public support for climate disruption legislation.618 Climate
disruption comes gradually as glaciers melt, sea levels rise, periods of
drought lengthen, and hurricanes worsen in intensity.619 Even in the absence
of powerful idea and influence infrastructures aligned against legislation, it
would have been very difficult for supporters of climate disruption
legislation to persuade Congress to enact a stringent bill without the impetus
of a crisis. And climate disruption is not likely to yield such crises until it is
far too late to do something about it.
H.

Climate Change Legislation Will Not Be Pretty

One very clear lesson of the past attempts to enact climate disruption
legislation is that the end result of any successful attempt in the future is not
likely to be pretty. Economists and policy analysts have created elegant
models of carbon or BTU taxes and cap-and-trade regimes that appear to
achieve GHG emissions reduction goals fairly and efficiently.620 Putting
aside the question whether the models would work as fairly and efficiently in
the real world, supporters of such solutions should understand that if
Congress ever does enact climate disruption legislation, the regulatory
regime that it creates will not adhere to the elegant models. It will reflect
dozens of compromises, concessions, and giveaways that its sponsors will
have to make in order to get the legislation enacted. As Representative
Waxman observed after the House passed the Waxman-Markey Bill,
“Congress has to recognize that there are differing opinions, there are
615.
Id. at 238–40.
616.
See id. at 248.
617.
Kathleen Hart, Boxer Spars with Republicans over Purpose of Cap-andTrade Bill, SNL POWER DAILY N.E., Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
618.
See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate,
supra note 397.
619.
See Louise Gray, Stern Warning on Climate Change, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Apr. 21, 2009, at 27.
620.
See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 247.
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differing interests.”621 To accommodate all of these interests, the Bill’s
sponsors will have to make compromises and look for ways to channel
resources to particular regions of the country or to particular industries.622
Outside observers of this process may not like it, but until this country comes
up with a way to finance political campaigns in a way that does not heavily
depend on contributions from wealthy individuals and corporations, this is
the political world in which we live.
I.

EPA Should Press Ahead with its GHG Regulations

The fact that the EPA was busily promulgating technology-based
regulations for greenhouse gas emissions was an important driver of
reluctant House Democrats to support the Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th
Congress.623 The in terrorem effect of the EPA’s regulatory program was
not, however, an adequate inducement to Senate Democrats to finish the
job.624 The EPA has now promulgated a series of regulations that, when
fully implemented, will reduce emissions from major new facilities and
modify existing facilities, and it has proposed a very ambitious new source
performance standard for GHG emissions from power plants.625 We are still
a very long way from the reductions that scientists tell us are necessary to
slow down climate disruption. But if the EPA had waited until Congress
acted, we would not be as far down the road toward a reduced carbon
footprint as we are.
V.

CONCLUSION

If the Republican Party retains control of the House or gains control
of the Senate in the 2014 elections, the probability that Congress will enact
serious climate change legislation is very low. That party is still heavily
influenced by its Tea Party constituency and the Tea Party is financed by
621.
Alexander Duncan, Waxman: Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted
Members to Pass Climate Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, July 13, 2009, at 7 [hereinafter
Duncan, Waxman: Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members to Pass Climate Bill],
available at 2009 WLNR 14404144.
622.
See Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98.
623.
See Duncan, Waxman: Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members
to Pass Climate Bill, supra note 621; The American Clean Energy & Security Act (WaxmanMarkey Bill), supra note 611.
624.
See Duncan, Waxman: Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members
to Pass Climate Bill, supra note 621.
625.
See Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98; Amy
Royden-Bloom, American Clean Energy and Securities Act of 2009: Analysis and
Discussion, EPA (June 17, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/
pdf/royden-bloom_presentation_fed_leg_6-17-2009.pdf.
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funders who are strongly opposed to any governmental solution to global
warming. After two election cycles in which moderate Republicans have
lost primary elections to Tea Party candidates626 and general elections to
Democratic opponents,627 there are precious few Republican members of
Congress who would support even very modest federal legislation on climate
disruption.628 And there is no reason to suppose that this will change in the
foreseeable future. As long as it takes two houses of Congress to enact
legislation, the adamant opposition of the Republican Party to climate
disruption legislation will ensure that none will be forthcoming from a
Congress in which at least one House is controlled by that party.
Even if the Democratic Party retains control of the White House and
the Senate and gains control of the House in 2014 or 2016, the prospects for
enacting serious climate change legislation remain dim. The myriad of
interest groups that will be affected by serious climate change legislation will
do whatever they can to influence legislators to oppose legislation that might
damage their economic interests. The legislators will, in turn, negotiate for
their votes with those interests in mind. If Congress does enact legislation, it
is likely to be a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions that may or may not
attain the larger GHG emission reduction goals of its sponsors. The result
will not be pretty, but it may be the best that we can expect in an
economically diverse nation that, after a remarkable laissez faire revival,
remains deeply divided on the fundamental question of the propriety of
governmental intervention into private economic arrangements.

626.
See Nate Silver, In House of Representatives, an Arithmetic Problem,
INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/
21/in-house-of-representatives-an-arithmetic-problem/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0;
Congress by the Numbers: The 112th’s New Composition, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/05/congress-numbers-ths-new-composition/.
627.
See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 599.
628.
See Chemnick, Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their Stringent
Climate-Change Bill, supra note 284; Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note
599.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

To hear electric utilities tell the story, the end is nigh.1 Their chief
worry is symbolized by the simple rooftop solar panel. Of course, a
homeowner’s installation of rooftop solar, in and of itself, is little or no cause
for concern. After all, property owners have every legal right to generate
their own power. Rooftop solar, however, is significant for what it
* Joseph P. Tomain Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of
Law University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1.
See Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the
Electric Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. Aug.–Sept. 2012, at 65, 66 [hereinafter Sioshansi,
Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model]; John Slocum, Threat from
Behind the Meter, The Case for Utilities to Compete Directly with Distributed Resources,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2013, at 46, 50.
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represents more broadly—distributed generation (“DG”).2 This broader
concept of DG means that central power stations can lose market share of
their electricity sales by a range of technologies including solar, wind, fuel
cells, micro-grids, and the like.3 Fortunately for electric utilities, at this
point, distributed solar electricity constitutes only one to two percent of the
total electricity load and, therefore, DG is not an immediately significant
contributor to load loss.4 However, the signs on the horizon are not
necessarily rosy for investor owned electric utilities (“IOUs”) that provide
seventy-five percent of the nation’s electricity.5
The reality is that the electricity market is changing.6 The market is
more competitive today than it has been historically and, consequently,
traditionally structured IOUs face real financial challenges as new
technologies with decreasing costs “directly threaten the centralized utility
model.”7 This article argues that the twenty-first century challenge to the

2.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 69. DG is also sometimes referred to as distributed energy
resources—or DER. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID: REALIZING THE
FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 3 (2014), available at
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=3002002733.
3.
See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 2, at 10.
4.
Id.; see also CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES 22, 26
(2013) [hereinafter CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES], available at https://
ir.citi.com/HUpLUJZhzhXsP%2b6OiTTARHAGreyfPZR1UG279bla4pIcwvwwMBlSn6clve
Fs%2bcVQPTaKmIi568s%3d; PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES,
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf (report prepared for the Edison Electric Institute).
5.
Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry
Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/electricutility_
overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
The [United States] electric industry includes over 3,100 electric utilities. Investor
owned electric utilities are privately owned, represent [eight] percent of the total,
approximately [seventy-five] percent of utility generating capability, generation,
sales, and revenue. Historically, most investor owned electric utilities were
operating companies that provide basic services for the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity.

Id.
6.
See, e.g., Charles K. Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Electricity Revolution,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/11/06electricity-revolution-ebinger-banks.
7.
KIND, supra note 4, at 3; see also JOHN STERLING ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TREATMENT OF SOLAR GENERATION IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
RESOURCE PLANNING 1, 4 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy1405ti/60047.pdf.
But see Julie Cart, Solar Power’s Outlook Not as Sunny; Projects Stall Amid Uncertainty
About the Future of Big Tax Breaks and Utilities’ Willingness to Buy the Pricier Electricity,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at A1. Cart refers to utility scale solar in the article, which does
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electric industry is different in kind from previous challenges. Further, past
responses to past challenges are inadequate to meet the convergence of
demands posed on IOUs by new technologies, new markets, and new
regulations.8 Instead, the twenty-first century challenge requires a dramatic
new response as electric utilities face a new economic order and as they seek
revenue protection and assurances of financial stability from their regulators.
Now, what to do? Two responses are readily available. Electric
utilities can either fight or switch.9 The first response is the one given by
incumbents: Stay the course, tweak the regulatory system, and continue
doing business as usual (“BAU”).10 The BAU strategy relies on maintaining
cost-of-service ratemaking as central to the regulatory compact between
utilities and regulators.11 The second—and smarter—is that IOUs must
change their business models in significant—if not dramatic—ways.12 The
country is making a revolutionary transition to a clean energy economy13 and
not threaten traditional utilities as does distributed generation but does affect traditional
transmission. See id.
Of the 365 federal solar applications since 2009, just [twenty] plants are
on track to be built. Only three large-scale solar facilities have gone online, two in
California and one in Nevada. The first auction of public land for solar developers,
an event once highly anticipated by federal planners, failed to draw a single bid last
fall.

Id.
8.
Joseph P. Tomain, Building the iUtility, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2008, at
28, 29 [hereinafter Tomain, Building the iUtility].
9.
Michael T. Burr, Turning Energy Inside Out: Amory Lovins on Negawatts,
Renewables, and Neoclassical Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 28, 31. Amory
Lovins expands on these two basic choices:
There are at least a half-dozen ways an incumbent can respond to such insurgents.
It can ignore them; fight them; try to tax or block them; finance them; buy them;
incorporate their products as its own brand[] offering; become an open-source
integrator for all qualified offerings; or several other possibilities. But among all
responses, playing ostrich [is not] a good one.

Id. Not surprisingly, incumbents tend to fight. See, e.g., Perry Sioshansi, Utility of the Future
or Future of the Utility?, BREAKING ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM),
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/11/13/utility-of-the-future-or-future-of-the-utility/?print=1
(regarding California’s largest gas and electric utilities, “they were rather attached to the status
quo with all the protections, security, and restrictions that comes with operating as a regulated
monopoly”).
10.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 66.
11.
See id.
12.
See, e.g., Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29–30 (arguing
that electric utilities must change their business model from selling as much electricity as they
can to selling energy products and services including electricity generated from renewable
resources and selling energy efficiency).
13.
See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, 2014 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: FACTBOOK 1 (2014), available at
http://www.bcse.org/factbook/pdfs/2014%20sustainable%20energy%20in%20America%20fa
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there are several drivers to that transition, including: (1) a developing policy
consensus;14 (2) positive economic indicators;15 (3) the need to diversify fuel
resources; (4) new financing techniques; and, (5) regulatory proposals at the
state and federal levels.16 Quite simply, electric utilities should behave as
key actors in that transition. Today, however, utility efforts have been
lacking as they seek solace in old ways of doing business.
This article will first explore current industry characteristics and
challenges in Part II. Part III will then discuss the current situation of the
electricity market and IOU participation in that market. Part IV will analyze
the fundamental legal claim available to utilities that the regulatory
environment is devaluing their property and may constitute a constitutional
taking. In Part V, a test case involving solar distributed generation and net
metering will be presented to examine the types of challenges facing IOUs as
well as available responses to those challenges.
Starting with Part VI, the article more broadly discusses the need to
change the current regulatory compact between utilities and their regulators.
Then, Part VII examines new forms of ratemaking that can be employed to
implement the regulatory compact. The article concludes in Part VIII with a
discussion of the shape that the utility of the future ought to take.
II.

INDUSTRY CHALLENGES

The electricity industry has been roiling for over three decades. For
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the industry continued to realize
growth and, with it, increasing sales and profits.17 Utility executives were
aided in their expansion by a cost-of-service rate formula that rewarded them
for their capital investments.18 During that period, as the industry expanded,
economies of scale were realized and consumers enjoyed relatively low and
stable prices while producers reaped their rewards.19
ctbook.pdf (“A revolution is transforming how the [United States] produces, delivers, and
consumes energy. The mix of supply is changing rapidly, with low-carbon sources gaining
share, while consumption is declining, despite overall economic growth.”).
14.
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 92 (2011) [hereinafter TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY].
15.
See, e.g., Joel Makower, The State of Green Business 2014,
GREENBIZ.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/01/21/state-greenbusiness-2014 (discussing growth in clean energy investments).
16.
CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 6.
17.
KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN
THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 17 (2012),
available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/COSR_history_
final.pdf.
18.
See id.
19.
See id.
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By the mid-to-late 1960s, however, things began to change: A
national electricity infrastructure was completed; electric generation plants
reached a technological plateau; and, the cost of electricity from traditionally
structured electric plants began to rise.20 These events, among others, shook
the industry from its complacency and presented real challenges both to
industry actors and to their regulators.
This once staid industry began encountering a series of challenges
beginning in the late 1970s as electricity prices began to rise and as the
financial stability of the industry was threatened by two major events.21 The
first financial shockwave came with the collapse of commercial nuclear
power.22 From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, utilities that had invested
in nuclear power found themselves with excess capacity, canceled plants, or
the costly conversions of nuclear plants to coal-fired plants.23 These nuclear
investments ran into the billions of dollars and those costs had to be
apportioned in some way.24 The question “Who pays?” was a real one for
utilities, for regulators, and for consumers. The response to the question was
generally some form of cost allocation between ratepayers and
shareholders.25
In some instances, regulators simply amortized the
investment and allowed the utilities to recover their principal but did not
allow them to either earn a return on their investment or to recover their costs
of capital.26 In brief, the regulatory response to the nuclear crisis was to
20.
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 11 (1987)
[hereinafter TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION].
21.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 503 (1984).
22.
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–04.
23.
MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–05.
24.
Pierce, supra note 21, at 504.
25.
See TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 3;
Pierce, supra note 21, at 505–06.
26.
See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case, an en banc panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) ruling that allowed Jersey Central to recover a $397 million
investment in a failed nuclear power plant over a fifteen-year period. Id. at 1170–71, 1187–
88. Jersey Central wanted to place the unamortized portion that remained each year into the
rate base. FERC allowed the fifteen-year amortization—i.e., allowed the utility to recover
$26.4 million as an expense for fifteen years—but disallowed including the unamortized
portion in the rate base, and that ruling was upheld by the Circuit Court. Id. at 1171, 1187–88.
Regulators applied other rules as well. Some regulators, for example, applied the
prudent investment test, which held that investments that were prudent when made should be
recovered from ratepayers. See United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R. 4th 252, 267 (Conn. Dept.
Pub. Util. Control Aug. 22, 1983); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 P.U.R. 4th 386, 400 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1982). And others applied a used and useful test that held that ratepayers
were not to be saddled with the cost of an investment that produced no electricity. See
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protect some of a utility’s investment, and to maintain their financial stability
while not overburdening consumers.27
The second financial shockwave came in the 1990s with efforts to
deregulate the electric industry, and when that failed, then to restructure it.28
Complete deregulation failed due to its complexity and the inability to
develop either a policy or political consensus to fully deregulate.29 At the
wholesale level, deregulation looked promising and has occurred to a
significant degree.30 At the retail level, however, the continued natural
monopoly characteristics of the transmission and distribution (“T&D”)
segments prevented across-the-board deregulation from occurring.31 Many
states, however, did attempt retail competition,32 but California’s notable
failure threw two major utilities into financial distress with Pacific Gas and
Electric declaring bankruptcy.33 With that failed experiment, restructuring
effectively ended.34 Still, restructuring efforts threatened the financial
integrity of IOUs.35 The regulatory response to this problem, however, was
to provide some mechanism for utilities to recover any stranded costs that
resulted from (1) prudent investment and (2) reliance on regulatory
requirements.36
The nuclear power collapse and the failure of restructuring were oneoff events. In other words, once an investment in a nuclear plant was
unproductive for any of the reasons cited above, then the financially
threatening event was over and it needed to be resolved in some way.
Similarly, once an investment in a restructured environment was also seen to
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989). In this case, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld a Pennsylvania state statute that mandated that only capital
investments that were used and useful could be recovered through rates. Id.
27.
See Pierce, supra note 21, at 518.
28.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 31.
29.
See id. at 36.
30.
See id. at 28, 31.
31.
See id. at 33; Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly
System, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 89, 104 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Joseph
P. Tomain, Whither Natural Monopoly? The Case of Electricity, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL
MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111, 111
(Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
32.
See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 413 (2d ed. 2011).
33.
Laura M. Holson, California’s Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A1.
34.
Tomain & Cudahy, supra note 32, at 408.
35.
See Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility
Industry Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/
electricutility_overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
36.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6, 31.
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be unproductive, then it too needed resolution. The regulatory responses to
both events were essentially cost-based.37 Regulators looked to the prudence
of a utility’s capital investment and they looked to the overall effect of those
investments on the utility’s financial integrity.38 Regulators then did what
they could to ensure the continued financial existence of the utilities.39 The
current challenge, however, is not one-off. Instead, it is long-term and
developing slowly, and also requires a more creative response than shoring
up past investments.40 Instead, a forward-looking response is needed to
maintain a healthy electric market for IOUs.41
In order to better understand the nature of the twenty-first century
challenge, let’s briefly first look at changes in the market and then examine
some of the reasons for those changes. The electricity market in the twentyfirst century is dramatically different from what it was during the twentieth
century. For most of last century, electric utilities enjoyed a growing market
and, therefore, regularly enjoyed increasing sales. Today, however, things
are different.
Demand for electricity has slowed each decade from the post-World
War II golden age until now.42 In the decade of 1949 to 1959, electric
utilities enjoyed an annual growth of 9.8%.43 That growth has declined to an
annual rate of 0.7% in the first decade of the twenty-first century.44 In fact,
electricity demand has declined every year except two since 1996.45 Further,
for the last two years demand has fallen, and in 2012, demand was down
1.7% compared with 2011.46 According to recent Energy Information
37.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at viii–ix tbl.1, x,
17–40. In addition to nuclear power and restructuring, McDermott notes other periods of
stress including the rise of inflation during the 1970s, excess capacity in the 1980s, and a
current challenge to restore customer and investor confidence in the industry. Id.
38.
Id. at viii, 25–26.
39.
See id. at 33.
40.
See Ebinger & Banks, supra note 6.
41.
See id.
42.
See LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 151 (8th ed. 2005). From 1945 through 1965, electric utilities enjoyed
an annual growth rate of approximately seven percent. Id. “No doubt what helped most was
the dramatic and continuing drop in the real price of electricity, compared to the price of other
fuels.” Id.
43.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2040 71 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2013], available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.
44.
Id.
45.
Amory B. Lovins, Amory’s Angle: Three Major Energy Trends to Watch,
SOLUTIONS J. ONLINE (Summer 2013), http://www.rmi.org/summer_2013_esj_amorys_
angle_three_major_energy_trends_main.
46.
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 2012 STATE OF THE MARKETS
REPORT 43 (2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/reports-analyses/st-
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Administration estimates, demand is scheduled to decline for the third year
in a row and hit the lowest level since 2001.47 Nevertheless, the Department
of Energy projects that for the next three decades, from 2011 to 2040, overall
demand will increase by twenty-eight percent.48 Even with such modest
growth in overall demand, individual consumers are, in fact, consuming less
electricity.49 More problematic for traditional IOUs, however, is that
projected demand for central power station electricity is predicted to fall
“dramatically due to a combination of energy efficiency and competition
from new technologies, which collectively could impact their addressable
markets by 50% over the next two decades.”50 To add to these troubles,
significant investment is needed in the electricity infrastructure, both to
upgrade the current grid and to promote interconnections with renewable
resources, as well as to make investments in new technologies.51
According to the Energy Information Administration, electricity
demand declined due to reduced retail sales and a lack of demand growth in
the commercial and industrial sectors as a result a soft economy.52 A slow
economy, though, is only one reason among many. Technological and
market reasons include increased energy efficiency in appliances and
buildings; smarter meters and temperature controls; smarter consumer
choices about using cheaper off-peak energy; growth of DG so that
consumers can obtain power on-site; and an increase of inexpensive shale
gas for home heating.53 These technological and market changes, however,
did not come about on their own. They were aided by state and federal
regulations that were intentionally designed to increase competition and
change the fuel mix in the electricity sector largely because cleaner, cheaper
mkt-ovr/2012-som-final.pdf; Jonathan Fahey, Home Electricity Use in US Falling to 2001
Levels, AP (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/home-electricity-use-usfalling-2001-levels.
47.
Fahey, supra note 46.
48.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 43, at
71.
49.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 12 fig.1.5
(2012) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011], available at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. Energy consumption per capita has
been relatively flat or declining since roughly 1990. Id.
50.
JASON CHANNELL ET AL., CITI, ENERGY DARWINISM: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 73–75 (2013), available at https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/
ReportSeries.action?recordId=21.
51.
See New Regulatory Frameworks for Electric Infrastructure Investment,
EDISON ELECTRIC INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/altreg_
brochure_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
52.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra
note 43, at 71.
53.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 3, 5, 11.
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power was available than that generated by IOUs.54 Further, these regulatory
demands clearly point to a clean energy future rather than to a continued
expansion of coal-fired—or even nuclear generated—electricity.55
III.

THE NEW NORMAL

The constrained electricity market now represents the new normal
for privately-owned electric utilities.56 This new normal must be recognized
as different in kind from the threats posed by the nuclear collapse and the
restructuring failure. Today’s challenge is structural, long-term, and driven
by multiple events. Consequently, to meet the challenge, structural changes
are necessary on the regulatory side to renegotiate the regulatory compact
and redesign traditional cost-of-service ratemaking.57 Additionally, there
must be structural changes in the business model of utilities as well. The
needed regulatory and business model responses presented by the new
54.
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at ix–x, 33.
55.
Id. at 35. Recently, four nuclear reactors—two each in Georgia and South
Carolina—have been granted combined construction and operating licenses. See Building
New Nuclear Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/NewNuclear-Energy-Facilities/Building-New-Nuclear-Facilities (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
Nevertheless, the economics of high cost nuclear power remain problematic. See John
Mecklin, Introduction: U.S. Nuclear Exit?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 9, 9; The Cost of Nuclear Power: Numbers That Don’t Add Up, UNION
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-and-ourenergy-choices/nuclear-power-costs/ (last revised Oct. 1, 2013).
56.
See Ahmad Faruqui & Eric Shultz, Demand Growth and the New Normal,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 22, 23. Demand side management (“DSM”) is comprised of
“programs and technologies [that] enable consumers to reduce peak demand and electric
energy consumption by providing customers with incentives to buy more energy efficient
technologies and to shift demand from peak hours—where the power grid is stressed due to
high demand—to off-peak hours.” Id. at 24; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 1–2. Among the
factors contributing to the challenge, Kind lists: (1) falling cost of distributed generation; (2)
new technologies; (3) consumer and regulator interest in demand side management; (4)
declining natural gas prices; (5) slow economic growth; (6) rising electricity prices in some
sections of the country; and (7) investment need for system improvements. KIND, supra note
4, at 1–3.
57.
See, e.g., Jim Pierobon, Don’t Hold Your Breath for Any Progress
Stemming from the Joint Statement by NRDC and EEI, THEENEGERYCOLLECTIVE (Feb. 17,
2014), http://www.theenergycollective.com/jimpierobon/341816/don-t-hold-your-breath-anyprogress-stemming-joint-statement-nrdc-and-eei.
[W]e all have to realize that real progress can only be made by state utility
commissions, many of which seemed unwilling to seriously consider moving
beyond regulatory compacts in states that for decades have rewarded utilities only,
or mostly, for selling more kilowatt hours. Now that electricity demand nationally
is flattening and may be declining, the time has come for tradition-bound states to
reengineer the traditional regulatory compact.

Id.
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normal electricity market can be uncovered by first examining the economic
and policy assumptions behind the traditional regulatory model, and then by
examining the regulatory climate that has significantly contributed to the
current market.
A.

Traditional Economic Assumptions

In the early years of utility regulation, the relationship between
utility and regulator was based upon what—in 1898—the infamous Samuel
Insull proposed as “a grand bargain in which local electric companies would
receive exclusive franchise service territories, ‘…coupled with the conditions
of public control, requiring all charges for services fixed by public bodies to
be based on cost plus a reasonable profit.’”58 Nearly one hundred years later,
then Judge Kenneth Starr defined that grand bargain as a regulatory compact
that has been prevailing since electricity regulation began.59 In short, the
regulatory compact was indeed a grand bargain for the utility. As it turns
out, the regulatory compact also served as something of a bargain to
consumers and to regulators for most of last century.
Utilities greatly benefited from the regulatory compact essentially
because by having been granted an exclusive service territory, utilities could
block out competition from new entrants simply because they were now
operating under a government protected monopoly.60 Further, utilities also
benefitted from a ratemaking formula that operated like a cost-plus contract.
Utilities would receive all of their reasonably incurred expenses on a dollarfor-dollar basis and they would be able to earn a return on invested capital.61
58.
DAVID MALKIN & PAUL A. CENTOLELLA, RESULTS-BASED REGULATION: A
MODERN APPROACH TO MODERNIZE THE GRID 7 (2013), available at http://
www.gedigitalenergy.com/regulation/.
59.
See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC.
INST., supra note 17, at 56.
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a
particular geographical areacoupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain
or condemnationis granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive
regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market. Each party to
the compact gets something in the bargain. As a general rule, utility investors are
provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely to be attained in the
unregulated or moderately regulated sector; in turn, ratepayers are afforded universal,
non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits through political
control over an economic enterprise. Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless
to say, not before us.

Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189 (citation omitted).
60.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii; Electric
Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry Overview, supra note 5.
61.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii, 2.
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While it is inaccurate to say that utilities were guaranteed a profit, in effect
though, as long as they operated prudently, profit was assured.62 Consumers
also benefitted to the extent that rates were set at more or less competitive
levels rather than at monopoly levels.63 Regulators benefited as well because
as the industry was expanding and as utilities were realizing economies of
scale, rates stayed relatively flat and in some instances, declined. In other
words, rate hearings followed well-established and well understood rules and
methodologies and the life of a regulator was fairly easy.64
The regulatory compact was implemented through the application of
a traditional cost-of-service ratemaking formula that required regulators to
balance the interests of the utility and its shareholders in earning a reasonable
return on their investments against the interests of ratepayers in not being
charged confiscatory or discriminatory rates.65 The balance was intended to
satisfy the Fifth Amendment constitutional prohibition against takings of
private property without just compensation.66
Cost-of-service ratemaking, quite simply, works well in an
expanding economy. As long as electric demand continues to grow and as
long as utilities continue to make technological improvements and achieve
scale economies, utilities can be rewarded for their prudent capital
investments and customers do not suffer rate increases due to a “virtuous
growth cycle in which increasing electricity consumption was viewed as
synonymous with the public good.”67
The danger in such a formula, however, should be apparent. As long
as utilities received a return on capital expenditures, they had an incentive to
build.68 Again, during a period of economic expansion and growth in
electricity demand, building is a necessary and economically valuable
strategy. Today, however, the industry is experiencing a “‘paradigm shift’
caused by the need for large new capital additions at a time of declining sales
growth and reduced credit worthiness.”69 If the economy slows or demand
falls, capital investments may not be economically valuable because the
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 6.
See id. at 6, 12.
See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATIONS 6 (1983); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 25.
65.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT:
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 223
(1997).
66.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222.
67.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at ix.
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at 41.
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market is saturated and electricity sales flatten, meaning revenues decline for
IOUs. Today, IOUs in fact face just such a slow economy, weak demand,
and nervous regulators.70
B.

Traditional Policy Assumptions

Generally, energy policy—more specifically electricity policy—was
grounded on the central and important idea that the more energy that a
country produces and consumes, then the more vibrant its economy would
be.71 Indeed, the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented economic
growth for the United States as well as any developing country with a robust
energy infrastructure.
There are other policy ideas associated with this belief in the direct
positive relationship between energy and the economy. First, it is more
efficient to use cheaper inputs to produce a product such as electricity than
more expensive ones.72 In this way, then, the electric industry has relied
predominantly on cheap, but dirty, fossil fuels—particularly coal.73 Second,
scale economies could be realized through larger plants and greater
centralization.74 Therefore, the utility industry should capitalize on those
improvements—to a point. Parenthetically, this principle was exactly the
reason that utilities invested in nuclear power—to realize scale economies.
Unfortunately, that strategy often proved to be quite costly. Third, as utilities
moved from local to regional, and, ultimately, to interstate T&D, industry
regulation similarly moved from municipal to state and then to federal
authorities.75 In short, the development and the structure of the industry and
its regulation moved in tandem as industry actors and regulators mimicked
how each conducted its business, thus reinforcing the traditional energy
paradigm.76
As a result of these assumptions, the industry and its regulation
developed a pattern that exists today and is a pattern that has witnessed the
investment of trillions of dollars over the century. Unfortunately, the
traditionally structured industry and its regulation do not fit with current

70.
See id.
71.
See id. at ix, 17.
72.
TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 119.
73.
Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 358 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain, The Dominant Model of United
States Energy Policy].
74.
TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 11.
75.
Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, supra note
73, at 356–57.
76.
See id. at 374.
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economic policy nor are they aligned with contemporary energy policy
assumptions.
Most notably, today we have significant reasons to question the
underlying assumption about the direct relationship between energy and the
economy. Most particularly, even though electricity demand is projected to
increase overall, albeit slowly, individual consumption is declining.77 In
other words, the traditional belief in the direct linkage between energy and
the economy is now experiencing a reversal. Individual consumers can
continue to enjoy the lifestyles they have while consuming less electricity.
Further, industrial and commercial, as well as residential, consumers are less
dependent on the local utility for their electricity. Additionally, energy
policy—more specifically electricity policy—is concerned not only with the
relationship between energy and the economy; it is also concerned about
environmental consequences and about the energy reliability and national
security issues in the realm of geopolitics.78
Consequently, given the dramatic nature of changes in the electricity
market and in energy policy, it is time to reconsider, reevaluate and redesign
both the regulatory compact and the traditional approach to ratemaking—
particularly given the changes that have been made in energy regulation—to
which we now turn.
C.

Regulatory Changes

The regulatory landscape for the electricity industry and its markets
has been undergoing dramatic change for over forty years at both the federal
and state levels.79 It is this regulatory twist that has given IOUs cause for
concern and it is something that they must now confront.
Although, as noted above, the electric market began changing in the
mid-1960s, no major regulatory changes occurred until the passage of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).80 In brief, large
IOUs seemed to reach a technological plateau in the mid-1960s, yet they had
committed capital to expansion projects. In doing so, IOUs overbuilt and, as
a consequence of the traditional ratemaking formula, they were charging
customers for that capital expansion. To inside observers, it was clear that
cheaper electricity was available but could not get to market because T&D
77.
Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, supra note 1, at 65–66.
78.
See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29.
79.
Compare e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012), with Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §
2621).
80.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.
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was privately owned by IOUs. As it turned out, PURPA proved the very
point that cheaper electricity was available.81
As economic dislocations occurred in world energy markets and in
the domestic economy, President Carter proposed, and Congress enacted, the
National Energy Act82 with the intent of stabilizing domestic energy policy
and markets.83 PURPA was intended to encourage states to move away from
electricity rate designs that encouraged consumption and move toward
marginal cost pricing because it would promote more accurate price signals
and achieve greater efficiencies.84
In addition, PURPA promoted
independent power production, co-generation and small power generation.85
Known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”), these non-utility generators were
able to produce electricity that was less expensive than electricity generated
from traditional IOUs and they were more successful than policymakers
imagined.86 QFs demonstrated that non-utility generation could be delivered
safely and reliably and, as it turned out, there were more generating facilities,
sometimes referred to as PURPA-machines, than anticipated.87
Consequently, it was revealed that cheaper power was available for electric
markets.88
QFs had a very attractive economic incentive to generate electricity
up to the maximum amount allowed under law.89 Not only could QFs
generate cheaper power for a firm’s own use, any excess power could be sold
back to the local utility at the “utility’s full avoided costs.”90 The local utility
81.
See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2602).
82.
National Energy Act of 1978 was comprised of five major pieces of
energy legislation: Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3301); Energy
Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat.
3206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 92).
83.
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92
Stat. 3206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8201).
84.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2622).
85.
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210.
86.
See What is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).
87.
Id.; see Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L. J. 419, 423 (1995).
88.
See What is a Qualifying Facility?, supra note 86.
89.
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,
417–18 (1983).
90.
Id. at 404.
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had to allow access to QFs, and it was obligated to purchase their excess
electricity at the local utility’s marginal cost of electricity.91 The local utility
had to pay the cost that it would incur to generate one more kilowatt-hour of
electricity.92 In other words, the utility had to pay the generator not at the
prevailing market value, but at the utility’s own higher cost of producing
electricity.93 Thus, PURPA discovered a new generation market.
In effect, PURPA set the stage for competition. Traditionally
regulated IOUs, following the traditional regulatory structure and rate
formula, earned favorable rates, but they had overbuilt.94 The excess
capacity raised utilities’ fixed costs, which had to be recovered from
ratepayers.95 Consumers were aware of these market developments.96 They
did not want to pay for higher cost electricity and sought lower-cost
options.97 While the existence of lower cost electricity did not surprise large
customers, the market was surprised by how much new non-utility generated
electricity was available, and how eager new generators were to enter the
market. These new unregulated producers were willing to supply the market
with electricity at prices lower than those charged by incumbent IOUs, and
they now provide over one-third of the country’s electricity.98
PURPA opened electricity markets and other state and federal
legislation entered that arena and expanded competition.99 Under the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, Congress created a category of exempt wholesale
generators.100 These entities generated electricity to be sold at wholesale,
and they were exempt from some of the regulatory provisions contained in
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which was later repealed

91.
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, §
210(a), (d), 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3).
92.
See id. § 210(d).
93.
See id.
94.
Joseph P. Tomain, The iUtility, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY
PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 223, 231–33 (Alyson C. Flournoy &
David M. Driesen eds., 2010) [hereinafter Tomain, The iUtility].
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 231.
97.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at X; Tomain, The
iUtility, supra note 94, at 226–27.
98.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA
FOR DECEMBER 2013 tbl.ES1.B (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/
current-year/february2014.pdf.
99.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 421, 423–24; see also Energy Efficiency &
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Metering, GREEN POWER NETWORK http://
apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/netmetering.shtml (last updated May 25, 2011).
100.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79).
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by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.101 That repeal was deemed to be a
significant boost to independent power production because it opened the
electricity market to a wider variety of business activities.102 Also under the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required electric utilities, under certain
restrictions, to offer net metering services to electricity consumers.103 To
date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form
of net metering.104 Additionally, for over three decades federal tax incentives
in the form of production tax credits and investment tax credits, among
others, have spurred production of electricity from renewable resources.105
Finally, federal regulators, pursuant to enacted legislation, are pursuing
methods of pollution control.106 Proposed EPA rules will strengthen Clean
Air Act protections and they will have a negative impact on coal-fired power
plants.107
Federal regulation was a boon to independent power production.
State regulation, however, was more varied and went quite a bit further.
State regulatory actions that contribute to declining electricity demand
include demand side management planning requirements; integrated resource
planning requirements; renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”); and energy
efficiency standards as well as net metering laws.108 Additionally, in an
effort to stimulate non-fossil fuel generation, thirty-seven states and the
101.
See Michael J. Zimmer, Regulation Under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 2005, in 3 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.14 (2013).
102.
See id.
103.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)). “Each electric utility shall make available
upon request net metering service to any electric consumer that the electric utility serves.” Id.
The section contains qualifications that allow Public Utility Commissions (“PUCs”) to fashion
net metering rules: (1) consumer must be an “eligible on-site generating facility” and (2) that
electricity “may be used to offset electric energy provided by the electric utility to the electric
consumer during the applicable billing period.” Id.
104.
Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra
note 99.
105.
See Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States: A
“Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 172 (2013); Mona L. Hymel, The United
States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax
Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43, 50 (2006).
106.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007) (holding that the
EPA does have the authority and the responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions).
107.
See, e.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (forthcoming Federal Register Publication), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014).
108.
See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–28.
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District of Columbia have adopted RPS that impose requirements of varying
strictness on local utilities to sell electricity generated by renewable
resources.109 These standards vary throughout the country but are comprised
of essentially two elements.110 First, a resource such as solar, wind,
hydropower, or geothermal must qualify for inclusion under the terms of the
RPS.111 Second, a percentage goal and timetable is established for each
utility to satisfy the requirement.112 RPS programs have a significant impact
on developing renewable resources over the last decade or so.113
States have also been involved in an array of other regulations that
are aimed at having electricity produced by non-utility generators using
renewable resources.114 Feed-in tariffs, for example, are long-term contracts
109.
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio
Standards, EIA (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have
Renewable Portfolio Standards], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850;
Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIREUSA.ORG (Mar. 2013), http://
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf.
110.
See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107.
111.
See id.; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio
Standards, supra note 109.
112.
See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107; Lincoln L. Davies,
Commentary, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339,
1342 (2010).
113.
See Davies, supra note 112, at 1383; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most
States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 109. One of the open issues
regarding RPS requirements is whether or not they should be left to the states or that national
standard should be adopted. Compare Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1441–43 (2010) [hereinafter Rossi, The Limits of
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard], and Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy
Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 361–
64 [hereinafter Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable
Electricity Requirement], with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. Because each state has a
different energy mix and because regions have different energy resources available to them,
the argument is made that they should be left to the states. Compare Rossi, The Limits of a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky
Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, supra note
113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. However, national standards may
provide more uniformity and may make trading in renewable energy credits more fluid.
Compare Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at
1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable
Electricity Requirement, supra note 113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.
114.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, ZERO NET ENERGY AND
THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE: ADAPTING ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7, 9, 11, (2012) [hereinafter ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY
METERING], available at http:/ /www.rmi.org/Content/Files/RMI_PGE_NEM_ZNE_DER_
Adapting_Utility_Business_Models_for_the_21st__Century.pdf.pdf; U.S. Energy Info.
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that utilities enter into with renewable resource providers, which enable the
providers to have an assured income stream enabling them to provide
renewable energy.115 Energy efficiency standards and zero net building
standards are intended to reduce consumption by capturing energy
efficiencies.116 States also have tax credits available that have made the
installation of photo-voltaic (“PV”) solar and other alternatives more
affordable for more consumers.117
Consequently, an array of federal and state legislation has had two
dramatic consequences for the industry.118 First, competition in the
electricity market has been encouraged.119 Second, regulations have
promoted renewable resources and energy efficiency that have had the effect
of reducing demand for IOU electricity.120 This new regulatory scheme has
caused a reevaluation of regulation at both ends of the fuel cycle.121 At the
generation end, we have seen that the market is more competitive than once
assumed.122 At the consumption end, buyers wanted cheaper electricity.123
Since the late 1970s we have been trying to restructure the electric
industry with only partial success. We continue to struggle with the
problems of: (1) getting cheaper electricity to consumers; (2) continuing to
diversify generation sources; (3) dealing with intermittent sources such as
wind and solar power; (4) redesigning electricity markets; and (5)
encouraging traditional IOUs to rethink their business models. This last
issue—encouraging traditional IOUs to reformulate their business models—
raises a legal question of constitutional dimension. To the extent that a
privately owned firm has invested capital in reliance on government
regulations, is the firm entitled to compensation when those regulations
change? That question will be addressed in the next section and will then be
followed by the test case for the matter of DG that has been promoted

Admin., Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, EIA (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff],
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471.
115.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff, supra note 114.
116.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
11.
117.
See id. at 7, 9.
118.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 423.
119.
Id.
120.
See CHANNELL ET. AL, supra note 50, at 74–75; Cudahy, supra note 87, at
423.
121.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21; Cudahy, supra
note 87, at 425.
122.
Cudahy, supra note 87, at 425.
123.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21.
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through government regulation and that now competes with the IOU market
share.
The electricity market is indeed changing. As the Edison Electric
Institute—the trade association for IOUs—puts the issue: “While every
market-driven business is subject to competitive forces, public policy
programs that provide for subsidized growth of competing technologies
and/or participant economic incentives do not provide a level playing field
upon which generators can compete fairly against new entrants.”124 It is
important to distinguish between technologically driven changes that result
in increased competition and competition that results from regulatory
requirements on incumbent utilities and on regulatory incentives that
promote new entrants. It is equally, if not more, important to realize that the
dividing line between markets and their regulation is fuzzy at best.125
Edison, thus, is partially correct to distinguish between marketdriven technological change and public policies that promote competition.
This distinction, though, fails to recognize that the electric industry has been
a regulated industry and has enjoyed the fruits of that regulation for over a
century. In other words, the divide between market changes and government
regulation is not a particularly neat one. The fact that the electric industry
has been the beneficiary of regulation and is now in a posture of contesting
competition that has come about through regulation reveals that a solution or
response to the industry’s concerns involves political as well as economic
considerations.
IV.

TAKINGS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES

As noted in Part II, the issue of costs from failed nuclear power
investments or from failed restructuring investments can also arise as
regulators adopt rules that increase competition for IOUs. Each of these
issues raises the same constitutional question. Is an IOU entitled to recover
such costs because of regulations that devalue its property? In other words,
has a regulation effectuated a taking of utility property?
Any legal transition generates economic winners and losers.126 In
the energy sector, subsidies and financial supports to wind and solar
providers, for example, reduce their cost of doing business and may open up
clean energy markets. Similarly, the under payment of royalties or tax
incentives and subsidies for fossil fuel companies reduce their cost of doing
124.
125.

KIND, supra note 4, at 4.
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY:
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 137 (2014).
126.
See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 513–14 (1986).
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business, thus giving them a competitive advantage over clean energy
providers.127 In short, any regulation has economic consequences including
reducing the value of an owner’s property. It is generally true, though, that
regulations occur on a regular basis without giving rise to a takings claim.
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law.”128
However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has also said, “[t]he
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a [constitutional]
taking.”129 Holmes’ Delphic pronouncement would seem to settle the matter
that a regulation can constitute a taking necessitating just compensation.130
However, the definition of a taking, let alone a regulatory or a deregulatory
taking,131 remains unsettled and takings jurisprudence has been seen by the
Supreme Court of the United States as essentially ad hoc.132 More
problematically, takings jurisprudence, as a whole, has been said to be in vast
disarray.133
Consequently, takings law is best understood on a case-by-case basis
with three or four general principles.134 First, a court is most likely to find a
taking when a property owner has suffered a permanent physical invasion of

127.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf
(while most energy resources receive some financial incentives “tax preferences for fossil
fuels continued to make up the bulk of all energy-related tax incentives through 2007,
typically accounting for more than two-thirds of the total cost”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE
EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 24 (2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf (undervaluing royalty payments on
public lands); David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1 (“[A]n examination of the American tax code indicates that oil
production is among the most heavily subsidized businesses, with tax breaks available at
virtually every stage of the exploration and extraction process.”).
128.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
129.
Id. at 415.
130.
Id.
131.
See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222–26, 427. Regulatory
takings are discussed at 222–26. Deregulatory takings are discussed at chapter 13.
132.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
133.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012).
134.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
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his or her property.135 Second, a property owner who can demonstrate that a
regulation deprives him or her of all economically beneficial use of his or her
property may successfully assert a takings claim.136 Third, a regulatory
taking may be found when a regulation has frustrated the property owner’s
investment-backed expectations.137 These three reasons are the standard tests
developed by the Court for identifying takings.138 There appears, though,
that a fourth requirement is most often applied.139 Specifically, all of the
cases just cited deal with real property rather than with the value of a
corporate enterprise.140 Thus, “major regulatory initiatives rarely require a
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”141
Nevertheless, the takings argument is far from fanciful for utilities.
Indeed, the constitutional requirement that regulators cannot take property
without just compensation is at the heart of the regulatory compact. As
noted by the Supreme Court:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the
convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments [and] other business undertakings which are attended
by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return
should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its

135.
Id. at 441. The laying of cable TV lines across an owner’s property is a
physical occupation of real property and is, therefore, a taking. Id. at 421–26. “We affirm the
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.” Id. at 441.
136.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

Id.
137.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (“The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”).
138.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
139.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
140.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
141.
Epstein, supra note 133, at 101.
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credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
discharge of its public duties.142

Over ninety years ago, then, the Supreme Court established the principle that
a public utility is entitled to earn a return on its prudently incurred capital
investments at a level sufficient for the utility to be financially sound and to
attract investors.143 The problem for a regulated entity, such as an electric
utility, is that regulations can affect the value of those investments.144
Indeed, electric utilities have raised the takings issue in a number of settings:
Environmental regulations,145 restructuring orders,146 low rates of return,147
and the like,148 have all generated takings claims. None, however, have
resulted in direct monetary damages paid in compensation to a utility
although financial relief from burdensome regulations has been made
available as discussed below.149
Substantive takings jurisprudence appears to provide electric utilities
grounds for claiming that when a regulation goes too far it then becomes a
taking.150 Yet, electric utilities’ regulatory takings claims have not been

142.
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W.
Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1923).
143.
Id.
144.
See id. at 689–90, 693.
145.
See, e.g., Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking Proceeding No. 06-04-009, 2007 WL 2579525 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2007). The regulatory takings claim that GHG regulations may
devalue property or cause a sale of the property is denied. Id. Indeed, the PUC noted that
claimant failed to cite “any cases holding that there is a regulatory taking if a pollution control
requirement causes an owner of a plant to shut it down entirely.” Id.
146.
See, e.g., Provision of Elec. Servs., 175 P.U.R. 4th 1, Docket No. U-000094-165, 1966 WL 787623 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 26, 1996) (utility’s regulatory takings
claim that Arizona’s restructuring orders may result in uncompensated stranded costs denied,
because the rules provided a mechanism for at least some stranded cost recovery).
147.
See PacifiCorp, Case No. PAC-E-10-07, 2011 WL 1525191 (Idaho Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Apr. 18, 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 P.U.R. 4th 401, Case No.
10-E-0050, 2011 WL 286478 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 24, 2011) (9.3% return on equity
not a taking even though it was below the rate set by other PUCs for similarly structured
utilities). PUC’s decision that the 27% of a transmission line that is not used and useful can
be excluded from the rate base is not a taking. PacifiCorp, supra note 147. The PUC also
noted that when the line is fully integrated into the system, it will put it into the rate base. Id.
148.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d 19, 23 (Vt. 2000) (takings
claim denied when the Public Services Board reduced the rate of return from 10.5% to 5.25%
because of the poor management of the utility).
149.
See id. at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of Elec. Servs., supra note 146;
Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, supra note
145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 147.
150.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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successful.151 In part, the lack of success can be attributed to a narrow
application of takings doctrine as revealed by the four substantive law
principles listed above.152
In addition to a narrow reading of substantive takings law, utilities
must also confront procedural challenges to the successful assertion of a
takings claim.153 According to the letter of the law, if property is taken for
public use then compensation is required.154 However, compensation in the
form of damages for regulatory takings is rare if not impossible.155 First, if a
utility asserts that a regulatory taking has occurred as a result of an onerous
regulation, then the most likely remedy will be an invalidation of the
regulation, not damages.156 Second, courts are reluctant to award damages if
a utility asserts a facial claim of an unconstitutional regulation because, most
often, courts require a showing that actual damage has occurred.157
There is another subtlety to takings jurisprudence that electric
utilities must face. Regulation, for example, may very well reduce, even
destroy, a valuable portion of electric utility’s property.158 However, before
a takings claim can be successful, the property as a whole must be evaluated
and not just portion of it.159 A utility, for example, that argues that a portion
of its property was denied a return on investment, cannot successfully claim
that a portion of its property has been taken if, looking at the utility’s total
financial situation, the utility’s property still has value.160 Another way of
characterizing this issue of partial or full evaluation of a utility’s property is
to ask the question: How much damage has the utility suffered?
Utilities, for example, that have claimed that a portion of their
property has been excluded from rate base treatment and, therefore, denied a
return on investment, have not succeeded with their takings claim when the
151.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., supra note 147.
152.
See supra text accompanying notes 134–41.
153.
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005).
154.
Id. at 536–37.
155.
See, e.g., In re Citizens Util. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., supra note 147.
156.
See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 695 (1923).
157.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Customer Billing Arrangements, Case No.
99-M-0631, 2000 WL 33938296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 19, 2000).
158.
See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989).
159.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
160.
See, e.g., Barasch, 488 U.S. at 301–02.
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remaining property is treated as a capital investment for which a return is
due.161 States that have passed legislation requiring that only property that is
used and useful can earn a return on investment have seen that legislation
upheld as constitutional.162 Finally, to the extent that the regulated entity can
take steps to mitigate any damages that might occur as a result of a
regulation, they must do so, and failure to do so will negate the takings
claim.
As the electricity market undergoes its current transformation and as
IOUs confront their current challenges, the issue of costs imposed on IOUs
due to government regulation is ever present as revealed by the test case next
discussed.163
V.

A DG TEST CASE

IOUs have become concerned about the growth of solar power,164
other renewables, and energy efficiency because of the consequent loss of
load attributed to those activities.165 The use of solar power is expanding for
three predominant reasons.166 First, the cost of solar panels is declining
noticeably.167 Second, third party financing options make the installation of
solar panels attractive to individual homeowners.168 And, third, existing state
161.
See, e.g., id.
162
See, e.g., id.
163.
See infra Part V.
164.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3, 31.
165.
See id.
166.
See id.; Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://
www.solarcity.com/residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
167.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3.
168.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114. Thirdparty financing essentially leases solar installations to individual homeowners or businesses
under long term-contracts but retains ownership. Id. at 23–24. The third parties also operate
the solar system. See, e.g., Solar Power for Your Home, supra note 166. These third-party
owners can do so because in exchange for selling solar installation, they receive tax credits
and other financial incentives as the nominal owner. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET
ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 23–24.
The use of third-party financing and third-party ownership has not gone
unchallenged. See, e.g., Ruling on Petition for Judicial Review at 3–4, SZ Enter., LLC v.
Iowa Util. Bd., No. CVCV009166 (Iowa 5th Dist. Mar. 29, 2013). From the perspective of
the regulated utility, to the extent that third parties are financing a number of residential and
commercial installations, those actors are invading the service territories of the incumbent
utilities. See, e.g., id. at 18. The utility’s argument then, is that these third parties should be
regulated as public utilities. See, e.g., id. at 5. This matter is currently under consideration by
the Iowa Supreme Court. Appellate Court Case Details for SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities
Board,
Docket
No.
13-0642,
IOWA
CT.
ONLINE
SEARCH,
https://
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and federal regulations provide financial incentives for solar installations.169
To an incumbent IOU, reduced electricity sales are a financial threat.
On December 3, 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission issued
a ruling that brings together the several issues in this article.170 The Arizona
Public Service Company (“APS”), the local IOU, sought relief from
regulatory obligations and petitioned the Commission to reduce the burdens
imposed upon it by net metering regulations that required the utility to pay
rooftop solar users for their excess electricity.171
Arizona’s net metering law “allows electric utility customers to be
compensated for generating their own electric[ity] . . . from [identified]
renewable [behind-the-meter] resources,” such as solar power.172 “If [a]
customer’s energy production exceeds the energy supplied by the electric
utility during a billing period, [then] the customer’s bill for subsequent
periods is credited for the excess generation.”173 The credit is based upon the
IOU’s avoided cost or the customer’s retail rate.174 The avoided cost rate—
sometimes referred to as a bundled rate—means the marginal cost to the
utility of producing its next unit of electricity.175
To better understand the impact of avoided cost as defined by the
Supreme Court of the United States and in the Arizona Code, it is necessary
www.iowacourts.state.ia.us.ESAWebApp/AppelSimpFrame (search “Appellate Docket
Number” for “13-0642”; then follow “13-0642” hyperlink under the “Docket No.” column;
then follow “Docket” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
169.
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 31.
170.
See generally Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 121, Docket No. E01345A-13-0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. The law does provide a safety valve and limits the size of the
customers distributed generation system to a maximum of 125% of that customer’s total load.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. This limitation is not unproblematic. From a utility
standpoint, this 125% maximum helps limit the amount of revenue loss. Regulators, mindful
of the need to protect the utility’s revenue requirement together with their service obligation,
have adopted such limitations. See generally SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, RATEMAKING,
SOLAR VALUE AND SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING—A PRIMER (2013), available at
http://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51299/sepa-nem-report-0713-print.pdf.
The
problem, however, is that, to the extent that solar rooftop in particular or DG in general is
either a desirable or inevitable direction for the future of the electric industry, the transition is
being delayed. Id.
175.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 10. Arizona more
specifically defines avoided costs as “the incremental costs to an [e]lectric [u]tility for electric
energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the Net Metering Facility, such
utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.” ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-22302 (2013).
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to understand how a utility bill is designed. By way of simplification, a
utility serves basically three types, or classes, of customers—residential,
commercial, and industrial.176 Each class, in turn, has different energy needs
and is charged accordingly.177 By way of example, residential customers
consume less electricity than industrial customers; however, residential
customers, as a class, consume more customer service for their homes in
contrast with a large manufacturing company that requires less customer
service for its plant relative to the amount of electricity consumed.178
In the attempt to even out charges to each class of customers, a
utility bill is generally comprised of three components—a demand charge, an
energy or volumetric charge, and a customer service charge.179 The service
charge represents the costs, such as billing, metering and some investments,
to provide electricity service to each consumer.180 These charges remain flat
relative to the amount of electricity that a user consumes, but the total cost
varies with the number of customers.181 The energy charge represents the
amount of electricity consumed by each user.182 And, finally, the demand
charge represents the utility’s capital investment in plant and equipment that
is allocated to each consumer based on the consumer’s maximum rate of
usage.183 A rough way of differentiating these costs is to say that the energy
charge and the service charge represent a utility’s variable costs while the
demand charge represents the utility’s fixed costs. Usually, residential
consumers do not pay a separate demand charge.184 Instead, the fixed costs
are embedded in the volumetric portion of the bill.185 This embeddedness, or
bundling, gives rise to the problem litigated in this test case.186
In its regulatory filing, APS argues that as participation in DG
grows, it becomes increasingly concerned about the cross-subsidization
between customer classes.187 DG customers, APS argues, are partially
subsidized by non-DG customers because, it asserts, DG customers do not
176.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11.
177.
Id.
178.
See id. at 13.
179.
Id. at 15–17. PUCs often add other charges such as a surcharge for a
specific investment. Nonetheless, these three charges illustrate the distinction between fixed
and variable costs. See, e.g., id.
180.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3, 15.
181.
Id. at 15.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 17.
184.
Id. at 15.
185.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 15.
186.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
28–29.
187.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
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bear their fair share of fixed costs.188 Instead, they offload those costs to
non-DG customers.189 Parenthetically, in addition to an unfair allocation of
fixed costs, DG shows some income bias.190 Quite simply, higher income
consumers have more options available to them, including installing rooftop
solar, than lower income consumers.191 Consequently, rate designs that may
apportion costs across all residential consumers will be regressive and
unfairly burden low-income users.192
The issue of cross-subsidization is problematic.193 The real concerns
of APS, however, are that: (1) Arizona’s net metering obligations became
increasingly costly; (2) it was losing market share even though in its filing it
asserted that revenue loss was not part of its case; (3) that non-DG users are
paying a disproportionate share of the fixed costs; and, (4) most
disconcerting for the utility, the cost increase to non-DG customers will
effectively drive more people to DG thus resulting in greater revenue
losses.194 This phenomenon of losing customers to DG because of increased
costs is sometimes referred to as a death spiral, which is a
situation that prompts/forces more ratepayers to install solar on
their rooftop to avoid rising utility rates as a result of the spreading
out of those fixed costs to a lower base. In the end, the utility
could be left with fewer revenues to support already installed (and
future) infrastructure investments with long useful lives (i.e.
transformers, low and high-voltage transmission lines, distribution
assets).195

To gather information and formulate a proposal to the Commission,
APS held a series of conferences.196 APS then proposed solutions that fell
into two broad classes.197 To simplify, the first option for new DG

188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
See id.
191.
See id. (Burns, Comm’r, dissenting).
192.
See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING
(NEM): DRAFT COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION 110–11 (2013); Sam Sciacca, Smart Grid
Dilemma: Concerned Stakeholders Seek an Equitable Cost-Benefit Ratio for All Ratepayers,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2013, at 32, 33–34.
193.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
30–31.
194.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
195.
CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 11–
12; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model has been
stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”).
196.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
197.
Id.
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customers198 was that net metering could continue to be used; however, new
DG customers would have to pay under a rate schedule that better accounted
for the demand (or fixed) costs of the utility’s service through the imposition
of a “basic service charge, a demand charge, or a standby charge.”199 The
second option entailed a recalibration of the net metering rate.200 New DG
customers would be credited for the market value of the power that they sold
to the utility rather than at the avoided cost.201 Further, the rate at which DG
customers would be reimbursed would be recalibrated.202
APS recognized that by effectively lowering the current net metering
charge, rooftop solar installations may be slowed.203 To address that
problem, APS suggested that the Commission should authorize cash
payments to encourage greater DG penetration.204
Commission staff responded to APS proposals by noting that
Arizona’s net metering policy has been successful, that DG was expanding
as intended, and that it was following the net metering practices of the
majority of states.205 Staff acknowledged that DG customers effectively paid
less of the utility’s fixed costs, and therefore non-DG customers were
saddled with a portion of fixed costs higher than those actually used by
them.206 APS introduced testimony that this cross-subsidization amounted to
between $800 and $1,000 per year per DG customer.207 Consequently, those
costs had to be picked up either through higher rates or other charges such as
APS’s Lost Fixed Cost Recovery mechanism (“LFCR”).208
Staff argued that the APS analysis neglected to address the benefits
to the APS electric system derived from DG customers.209 The staff argued
that there were quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits attributable to
DG.210 The first quantifiable benefit is that APS will avoid paying certain
198.
Existing customers would be grandfathered into the rate schemes in
existence, for twenty years. Id. After that time, however, APS posed that the new rates would
be imposed. Id. The problem with this proposal, however, is that the rates should attach to
the property rather than to the customer. Id.
199.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 17.
207.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
208.
Id. The LFCR is a surcharge allowed by regulators that is intended to
offset the revenue that results from customers who reduce their bills through conservation and
other renewable energy programs. Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
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fuel costs and avoid making certain capital investments in plant transmission
or distribution.211 Non-quantifiable benefits include “increased grid security
and air quality improvements,”212 improved system reliability,213 load
balancing,214 improved forecasting and planning,215 environmental
improvement, and meeting regulatory requirements such as renewable
portfolio mandates.216 To be sure, accurately valuing the benefits of DG is
difficult and—according to one study—most analyses had failed to
comprehensively evaluate the benefits and costs of DG.217 Still, such
benefits may well be accounted for through a smart rate design.218 Not
surprisingly, intervenors representing solar interests, argued that APS should
award a system benefit credit to DG users for the contributions that they
make to the grid.219
Staff concluded that both options offered by APS should be rejected
and that the Commission should open a separate docket to more fully study
the issue, taking into account the benefits, as well as the costs, of DG.220 The
Commission, then, should develop a new rate design to account for DG
penetration.221
The Commission concluded that the proliferation of DG installations
did result in a cost shift from DG customers to non-DG residential
customers; therefore, rate design changes were warranted.222 As an interim
measure, the Commission imposed a seventy-cent per kilowatt monthly
211.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. Because distributed generation is
closer to its end users—sometimes located on exactly the same property—the need for
extensive transmission and distribution lines is mitigated. Id.
212.
Id.
213.
LENA HANSEN & VIRGINIA LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., A REVIEW OF
SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 37 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/
Knowledge-Center%2FLibrary%2F2013-13_eLabDERCostValue. System reliability can be
improved by distributed generation as it reduces congestion, reduces large-scale outages, and
can provide backup power during outages. Id.
214.
Id. at 15; see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra
note 114, at 32–33.
215.
See, e.g., Margaret Jolly et al., Capturing Distributed Benefits: Factoring
Customer-Owned Generation into Forecasting, Planning, and Operations, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Aug. 2012, at 32, 34–35.
216.
STERLING ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 7, at ix,
27–28; see also SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 25, 28.
217.
HANSEN & LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 213, at 4.
218.
Richard Perez et al., Why a Smart Fit Policy Is a Smart Policy, SOLAR
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 18, 18, available at http://www.omagdigital.com/publication/
?i=145842&p=19.
219.
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.
220.
Id.
221.
See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11, 18.
222.
See id. at 20.
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charge for all residential DG customers until the Commission more fully
addressed the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.223 The goal of the
interim measure, then, is to not raise the amount of fixed costs APS collects
from residential non-DG customers due to reduced payments by DG
customers.224
The advantage of the seventy-cent fixed cost charge—also
sometimes referred to as an access fee, solar rider, or standby charge—is its
simplicity.225 New DG customers will know what the charge is and why it is
imposed.226 Further, such charges are intended “to recover a portion of the
utility fixed costs that have typically been embedded in volumetric
[electricity] rates.”227 In principle, this approach allows those fixed costs to
be fairly allocated among all customers, and specifically, DG customers.228
The test case raises exactly the correct issues and suggests a
direction for a correct solution as long as all benefits and costs are taken into
account.229 While the Arizona case is an important one to watch, a series of
studies and other actions are occurring throughout the industry and in many
states including California, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Texas,

223.
See MARK NEWTON LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C.,
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION FOR EVOLVING UTILITY CHALLENGES: AN UPDATED SURVEY 21–
23 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/
innovative_regulation_survey.pdf; CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra
note 4, at 19.
224.
See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 2–3, 20.
225.
See id. at 3.
226.
See id.
227.
Id.; see KYLE MACLAURY, CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, ASSESSING
MINNESOTA’S SOLAR RESOURCE: REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEM ORIENTATION
AND RATE STRUCTURE 4 (2011), available at http://www.mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/
SolarValueReport.pdf (noting that Minnesota has several rate designs to accommodate PV
generation).
228.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3.
229.
See CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at
11–12.
There is a middle ground solution on the compensation issue for DG, in
our view. Either: (1) a set fixed charge for T&D or (2) a credit that only reflects
the utilities replacement power cost of generation. Eventually, for DG to work at a
larger scale with the support of the utilities, we expect changes to the compensation
structure for the off grid solar providers in the near future. These changes more
specifically could include: (1) a bill credit that is lowered from the current
avoidance of full retail rates to one that resembles the utilities replace cost of power
(i.e. gas peaker) and/or (2) a demand charge (fixed charge for T&D) to be tacked on
to the off grid solar homeowners electric bills. These items provide a middle
ground solution, in our viewpoint, with net metering battles clearly evident in
several states like CA and AZ.

Id. at 12. See also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model
has been stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”).
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Vermont,230 Idaho,231 and others.232 In California, for example, legislation
was passed directing the California PUC to study the costs and benefits of
net metering and calculate the ratepayer impacts and cost of service to solar
customers.233
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, IOUs have been
experiencing increased competition from technological innovations as well
as from innovative regulatory strategies.234 On the positive side, the
electricity market is becoming more competitive; consumers are enjoying a
wider array of choices; and, energy policy is moving towards a clean energy
economy.235 Incumbents, however, must deal with the negative side of a
changing electric industry.236 More precisely, the challenge is to address the
matter of past investments made by incumbents.237 Now that consumers are
leaving the grid in whole or in part, which, if any, of the capital investments
should be recouped by IOUs?
Fortunately, DG penetration into electricity markets at this time in
history is relatively low and warnings about a death spiral for IOUs is
premature and alarmist.238 The amount of penetration by DG, at this time, is
minimal and manageable.239 A smart electric utility, like the smart
telecommunications firm, can get ahead of the technology and it can
certainly manage it to their advantage even if that necessitates changing the
230.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4; see also Herman K.
Trabish, Rooftop Solar and Net Metering Win a Big Decision in Colorado: Regulators Want a
Better Way to Value Solar, GREENTECHMEDIA (Jan. 30, 2014), http://greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/rooftop-solar-and-net-metering-win-a-big-decision-in-colorado.
231.
ID PUC Rules Against Idaho Power in “Net Metering” Case, SNAKE
RIVER ALLIANCE (July 3, 2013), http://snakeriveralliance.org/id-puc-rules-against-idahopower-in-net-metering-case/; see also Case Summary, PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://
www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/cases/summary/IPCE1227.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2014).
232.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4.
233.
Assemb. 327, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
234.
See Andrew Kosnaski & Ramesh Shankar, Embracing Disruption:
Developing a Leadership Role for Utilities in Alternative Technologies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
2014, at 16, 16.
235.
See id. at 20.
236.
Id. at 16.
237.
See id.
238.
See id.
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher
rates for those customers remaining—first creating a cross subsidy from wealthier
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives.

Kosnaki & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16.
239.
See BART KRISHANMOORTHY ET AL., SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, 2012
SEPA UTILITY SOLAR RANKINGS 6 fig.4 (2013), available at http://
www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51302/final-2012-top-10-report-v2.pdf.
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firm’s business model. But then, that is what smart businesses do. DG
penetration, however, is expanding and therefore caution is warranted.240
Regulators must provide a mechanism that compensates IOUs for their
investments and they must design a new regulatory regime for a clean energy
future. Additionally, regulators must insure that customers are treated fairly,
that cross-subsidization is minimized or justified on sound policy bases, and
that the proper balance between shareholder and ratepayers is realized.241 In
short, rates must respond to the legitimate concerns of the utility and to the
value provided by DG customers.242 Those responses will come from a
renegotiated regulatory compact, new rate designs, and new business models
for IOUs.243 Each of those issues is addressed in the following Parts.
VI.

THE NEW REGULATORY COMPACT

The core of the regulatory compact is that the government sets the
utility’s rates—and consequently, its profits—in exchange for protecting the
IOU’s service territory.244 As long as the IOU operates prudently, it is
virtually guaranteed a return on its capital investment. When the compact
was made, the exclusive business of the IOU was to sell as much electricity
as it could.245 As we have seen, the electric market is changing in significant
ways, such that a new regulatory compact must be considered.246
We can start with certain concrete assumptions. First, large-scale
central power stations will continue to be important generators in the
electricity market, although on a diminishing scale. Second, the T&D
segments of the industry will continue to be regulated as long as they exhibit
natural monopoly characteristics. Third, IOUs can no longer be devoted
240.
See, e.g., id. at 23.
241.
See Sciacca, supra note 192, at 33–34. The rate design issues that plague
rooftop solar and other DG strategies also complicate a utility’s smart grid investments. Id.
More specifically,
[d]o individual end users save enough money on their bills with AMI, for instance,
to offset the increase in rates necessary to pay for that infrastructure? If so, how
long does it take to achieve payback, or ROI? If the benefits [are not] direct and
quantifiable, then what reasoning in metrics justify such a project?

Id. at 33; see Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Patrick Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council,
EEI/NRDG Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp.
242.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 32.
243.
Id. at 36.
244.
Tomain, The iUtility, supra note 94, at 223, 231.
245.
See id.
246.
See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 5; Tomain,
The iUtility, supra note 94, at 234; Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the
Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 931, 933 (2009) [hereinafter Tomain, “Steel in the
Ground”].
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exclusively to electricity sales. Instead, IOUs must be seen as actors in a
broader energy business that provides a wider array of energy services and
products as discussed in Part III.247 Finally, because IOUs will continue to
be regulated, the regulatory compact will continue. However, given these
assumptions a new set of regulatory principles will be necessary and we can
identify five.
A.

Stranded Costs

First, utilities should not be put in a position of incurring excess
costs that, due to regulatory or policy changes, may become stranded and
may then give rise to a regulatory takings claim. This principle is actually a
two-edged sword. On the one hand, investors should not be deprived of a
return on their investments due to regulatory or policy changes.248 On the
other hand, regulators must be careful when imposing requirements on
IOUs.249 As discussed in Part I, regulators and legislators in the past have
provided relief to utilities from previous financial challenges.250 Thus, to the
extent that IOUs invest in reliance on regulatory requirements, then some
protection must be provided.251 Nevertheless, as contemporary energy policy
changes, the problem of stranded costs should be anticipated and, if possible,
avoided.252
The stranded cost problem in the context of an energy transition is
distinct from the problem of nuclear power cancellations and the like, and
from government ordered divestment. First, in the nuclear power and
divestment situations, the stranded costs were more or less identifiable and
occurred at a very time-specific point. 253 A clean energy transition is
distinguishable in that it will not occur at a point in time, but will most likely
occur over decades. This fact alone should allow utilities to plan for changes
in the industry and changes in their own business models. Next, as a utility’s
247.
See supra Part III.
248.
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29; see David B. Raskin, The
Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 47 (2013),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=3673. “[The] inability of utility shareholders to secure the return of,
and a competitive rate of return on, their investment gives rise to the condition known as
stranded investment or stranded costs.” SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29.
249.
See id.; Raskin, supra note 248, at 47.
250.
Raskin, supra note 248, at 47; see supra Part I.
251.
See Raskin, supra note 248, at 47. Raskin also writes: “The differential
was known as ‘stranded costs.’” Id.
252.
KIND, supra note 4, at 17–18. One suggestion for addressing the stranded
cost problem is to impose a stranded cost charge on all DER customers to recoup that portion
of the investment that might otherwise become stranded due to departures from the grid. Id. at
18.
253.
See id. at 8.
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customer base declines, the downward spiral in lost sales will mean that there
will be a smaller group of ratepayers to pick up increasing costs.254 That is a
scenario that is obviously not sustainable.
Nevertheless, although the law regarding regulatory or deregulatory
takings remains opaque, the risks are real.255 Investors will be reluctant to
invest without reasonable assurances of a return on their investment that will
not be negated by prudence hearings, regulatory changes, or legislation that
diminishes the value of their property to the point at which their investmentbacked expectations go uncompensated. Indeed, such financial risk is
reflected in the downward movement of credit ratings for the electric
industry.256 Thus, the issue of distributed generation, particularly coupled
with net metering, can pose a real risk to capital unless the utility recalibrates
the way it does business and regulators rethink their rules.257
B.

Legacy Financing

Second, regulators should avoid legacy financing. Quite simply,
traditionally structured utilities should not continue to be rewarded as they
have in the past. Any argument that utilities should continue to earn revenue
because demand is down must be scrutinized quite closely. Decreased
demand alone is no cause for continuing to allow a regulated firm to earn a
return on investment.258 The problem, of course, is complicated because the
current challenge to IOUs is the consequence of both market and
technological changes, as well as regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, no
utility has any legal claim to continue to maintain its revenue requirement
just because it loses sales.259 The idea that the revenue requirement must be
254.

See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16; Raskin, supra note 248, at

48.
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher
rates for those customers remainingfirst creating a cross subsidy from wealthier
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives.

Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16.
255.
Compare SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222, with Susan RoseAckerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436–38
(2000).
256.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 10 fig.2.
257.
See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
Transition to Distributed Generation Calls for a New Regulatory Model, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Mar. 2013, at 44, 47. “As [distributed generation] grows, such under-recovery has the
potential to materially weaken the utility’s financial integrity and its ability to attract investor
capital, which in turn can lead to higher rates.” Id.
258.
See Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945).
259.
See id.
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maintained as embedded in a cost-of-service mentality to cover a utility’s
costs, regardless of the amount of service, is no longer tenable.
Cost-of-service ratemaking may have had its place; nevertheless, it
should not be used to allow utilities to continue to build dirty coal-fired
plants, nor should it be used to reward utilities for embarking on financially
risky nuclear projects precisely because “investment in conventional
generation [is] hard to justify” in the new market.260 Indeed, financial
analyses indicate that solar, wind, and natural gas generated electricity are
showing increasingly positive cost signals, particularly against nuclear
power.261 As a result, continued investments in coal and nuclear power will
be viewed skeptically by the market while investments in new fuels and
technologies are becoming increasingly attractive.262 Those investments
must also be viewed skeptically by regulators. Thus, instead of maintaining
the status quo, regulators must manage the changing role of IOUs and
encourage alterations in their business models.263
C.

Innovation & Competition

Third, the new regulatory compact should encourage—rather than
inhibit—competition and the development of innovative energy technologies
including sales reducing technologies such as DG. Indeed, the alternative
energy market is attracting significant investments and will only expand.264
DG is becoming an increasingly important actor in electricity
markets. In the test case, APS argued that it needed to revise net metering
rates in order to avoid unfair cross-subsidization.265 Behind that argument,
260.
CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73 (a report for Citi GPS).
261.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY
RELEASE
OVERVIEW
7,
11
fig.8,
12
fig.11
(2013),
available
at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf.
262.
See, e.g., id.
263.
See ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NEW BUSINESS
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE
CONSTELLATION 8 (2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/New_Business_Models.
264.
See JOEL MAKOWER, GREENBIZ GRP. & TRUCOST, STATE OF GREEN
BUSINESS 2014 58, 60 (2014), available at http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2014/01/
19/state-green-business-report-2014; CITI, CITI CLIMATE CHANGE UNIVERSE 3 (2013),
available
at
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/17389986/1546283763/name/CITI+Climate+
Change+Universe.pdf (projecting the need for $37 trillion in energy transformation over the
next twenty-two years, with $24 trillion of that amount devoted to clean energy including gas,
and $6 trillion in renewable power generation).
265.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 12i, Docket No. E-01345A-130248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.,
NET METERING BILL IMPACTS AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY SUBSIDIES: REPORT PREPARED FOR
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.navigant.com/~/media/www/
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however, APS was concerned about loss of sales volume.266 To the extent
that net metering rates do generate an unfair cross-subsidization, then they
should be changed. However, net metering benefits must also be accounted
for,267 and to the extent that net metering rates may slow DG penetration and
therefore, act as a drag on innovation and competition, then that argument
should be rejected. The smart utility will become actively involved with DG
as well as with the development of utility-scale solar, wind, and other
renewable projects.268
D.

Universal Service & Reliability

Next, regulators must be attentive to maintaining universal electric
service. With the expansion of distributed generation and energy-efficient
improvements, some customers will be placed at a disadvantage such that
distributed generation and energy-efficient customers will be using less
electricity which puts pressure on utilities to raise rates to the customers that
remain in that territory. Similarly, regulators must assure energy/electricity
reliability. Electricity must remain available at the flip of a switch for most
consumers. To be sure, those consumers that have access to other sources of
electricity, such as distributed generation and the like, may be able to
negotiate for interruptible rates. Most consumers, however, will need firm
service contracts.
The provision of universal reliable service presents challenges all of
its own.269 However, an increase in electricity providers does have the
potential for bringing significant benefits to a utility’s T&D segments.270
Reduced load can, at times, reduce congestion and improve balancing, and a
larger number of providers should lower cyber security risks. To be sure, the
issue of reliability will be an argument to be made against DG and that

site/insights/Energy/Navigant%20Final%20Net%20Metering%20Impact%20Report_Revised
%20Dec%2011.ashx.
266.
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 265; NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC.,
supra note 265, at 7.
267.
See, e.g., R. THOMAS BEACH & PATRICK G. MCGUIRE, CROSSBORDER
ENERGY, EVALUATING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NET ENERGY METERING IN CALIFORNIA
19–20 (2013), available at http://www.votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Crossborder-Energy-CA-Net-Metering-Cost-Benefit-Jan-2013-final.pdf.
268.
See, e.g., Brad Copithorne, 4 Utilities Thinking Beyond ‘Wires and Poles,’
GREENBIZ.COM (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/10/09/4-utilities-thinkbeyond-wires-poles.
269.
See Amory Lovins, Amory Lovins: Don’t Cry for the Electric Utilities,
GREENBIZ.COM (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/02/12/dont-lamentrenewables-disruption-electric-utilities.
270.
See id.
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argument should be recognized for what it is—a political argument not
necessarily a technical nor economic one.271
E.

Mitigation

The Arizona test case, and others like it, as well as the reports of the
dire threats to electric utilities, clearly demonstrate that IOUs are well aware
of changing electricity market conditions as well as aware of a change in the
policy landscape towards clean energy. As a consequence, utilities cannot
rely on past practices for future revenue. Instead, since IOUs are well aware
of the political economy of a changing energy market, they cannot continue
to do business as usual; to the extent that they can avoid incurring
expenditures based upon past assumptions, they must do so in an effort to
mitigate damages as is required by any contract.
During the period of electric industry restructuring, for example,
New Hampshire passed legislation intended to introduce competition into
retail electric markets.272 As part of those efforts, independent system
operators controlled the transmission grid by accepting bilateral contracts
and operating a power exchange with spot markets.273 The New Hampshire
restructuring plan would treat generation and retail marketing as functionally
separate from T&D services.274 The legislation expressed a preference for
the divestiture of a utility’s generation and transportation assets.275 Utilities
operating under the previous statutory scheme were concerned about
stranded assets.276 More specifically, regulators recognized the fact that if
retail customers could purchase lower-priced electricity from sources other
than the IOU, then a portion of the IOU’s investments may be
unrecoverable.277
The New Hampshire PUC recognized this possibility and made
provisions that would allow the utility to recover its stranded costs if those
costs were found to have resulted from a government regulation.278 The
utility, however, would not be able to recover stranded costs if they were
imprudently incurred.279 Concomitantly, the legislation required utilities to
271.
See id.
272.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:1 (2013); Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util.
Indus., 171 P.U.R. 4th 564, DR 96-150, 1996 WL 591937 (N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 10,
1996).
273.
See Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272.
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272.
279.
Id.
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mitigate their stranded costs.280 Moreover, the commission took a fairly
aggressive approach regarding mitigation efforts that the utility should
undertake.281 Those steps included, among other efforts, “the sale of . . .
excess generating capacity” and the renegotiation of service contracts.282
By adopting these principles, then, the regulatory compact will
continue to balance utility/shareholder interests with customer/ratepayer
interests while maintaining reasonable and fair rates. At the same time, the
new regulatory compact will encourage utilities to adopt new business
models; promote technological innovation and competition; expand market
opportunities; and, increase consumer choice. The regulatory compact,
however, is not self-executing. Instead, PUCs must adopt a forward-looking
approach to ratemaking.
VII.

RATEMAKING

Ratemaking is the mechanism that drives the regulatory compact.
Historically, cost-of-service ratemaking has had remarkable persistence even
though regulators have been experimenting with performance-based rates
and with market-based rates for decades.283 As noted earlier, when the
electric industry was challenged by nuclear and restructuring failures,
regulators relied on cost-based ratemaking.284 In times of financial stress,
when utilities confronted volatile costs for fuel or wrestled with inflation,
they sought refuge behind automatic fuel adjustment clauses that allowed
rates to escalate in tandem with those rising costs.285 Similarly, regulators
have relied on this formula and, in some instances, have expanded its use.286
Such devices as forward test years,287 multi-year rate structures,288 cost
trackers, and the like, are all cost-based.289

280.
Id.
281.
Id.
282.
Id.
283.
See, e.g., SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE:
THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND JURISDICTION 216 (2013).
284.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 18–19.
285.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5 (a
report for the Edison Electric Institute on cost trackers); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST.,
supra note 17, at 18–19 (fuel adjustment mechanisms). Another mechanism for recovering
costs during construction periods is to include construction costs while they are ongoing.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5. This mechanism is
known as construction work in progress. Id.
286.
See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 23.
287.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 27.
288.
Id. at 31.
289.
See id. at 5, 27, 31.
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In brief, cost-based ratemaking functions well when the market is
expanding and demand continues to grow. Once the market slows or stalls,
then cost-based ratemaking may contribute to excess capacity and other
economic dislocations.290 Further, “cost of service regulation can slow the
pace of innovation and may offer little incentive for utilities to improve
operational efficiency or service quality beyond the minimum levels set by
regulators.”291
Nevertheless, cost-of-service ratemaking has a strong hold on the
regulatory structure. “The regulatory framework has been resilient in the
face of the flux brought about by economic, technical, and financial shocks
that often nullified one or more of the assumptions underlying the original
framework, precisely because of the willingness to adopt incremental
changes to the process.”292 However, another way of analyzing cost-of
service ratemaking is to argue that it has not been resistant to change and that
the ratemaking formula must adapt to today’s changing market conditions.
The most immediate problem, then, is that cost-of-service
ratemaking was dedicated to covering a utility’s prudently incurred costs.
Now the problem is that utilities cannot continue to make the same types of
investments that they have in the past particularly in light of falling sales that
can threaten a utility’s of financial stability.293 In brief, the traditionally
structured electric utility, as well as its regulators, must figure out how to
earn money by selling less electricity while promoting other energy services
and products.
Fortunately, there is no shortage of new rate designs294 including:
(1) performance-based ratemaking;295 (2) incentive rates;296 (3) alternative
regulation;297 (4) market-based rates; (5) decoupling;298 (6) feed-in-tariffs;299
290.
See MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3. This tendency to invest
and expand is also known as the A-J effect or the Averch-Johnson effect, based upon the
seminal paper by Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson. Harvey Averch & Leland L.
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052
(1962).
291.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3.
292.
MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 1.
293.
Burr, supra note 9, at 30.
294.
See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 174–79.
295.
See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SCHMIDT, PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2000).
296.
See, e.g., Scott H. Strauss & Jeffrey A. Schwarz, Transmission Incentive
Overhaul: FERC’s ROE Incentive Adder Policy Sends the Wrong Signals, 147 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. Feb. 2009, at 32, 33.
297.
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 1 (a
report for the Edison Electric Institute).
298.
THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND
DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 1–2 (2011), available at http://
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and, (7) results-based regulation as examples.300 In choosing among new
rate designs, regulators must “address the fact that in an efficient, modern
utility, conventional revenue recovery may no longer keep pace with utility
system costs, investment needs, and the changing dynamics of customers
which have a growing range of energy related choices ranging from DG to
demand response.”301 Further, rates should be seen as “a means by which
energy companies communicate their value proposition to their customers—
[and] not merely the process by which they collect revenues.”302 Thus, while
a wide variety of approaches can be adapted for a new electricity market, any
choice should be based upon a set of principles.
A.

Costs

While costs will most likely play some role in any new rate
design,303 the move away from using historically embedded costs—or even
future tests year costs—as the central element of utilities revenue
requirement must be changed. A key move away from cost-based
ratemaking is decoupling. At its simplest form, decoupling means that rates
will not be based on the volume of electricity sales; instead, rates will be
based on other indicators such as the number of customers served.304
Another basic element of decoupling is that it allows for periodic rate
adjustments.305 Still, there are a variety of decoupling mechanisms.306
“Some mechanisms use the revenue authorized in the utility’s last general
rate case; others adjust that for specific cost changes or according to a

www.raponline.org/document/download/id/861; see also LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP.
RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 15–16.
299.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging
Deployment of Renewable Electricity Technologies (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471.
300.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 3.
301.
SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 14.
302.
Philip Q. Hanser, Rate Design by Objective: A Purposeful Approach to
Setting Energy Prices, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2012, at 48, 50.
303.
MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 14.
304.
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 298, at 2.
305.
PAMELA MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR
US ENERGY UTILITIES: RATE IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS 6 (rev. ed. 2013),
available at http://www.switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rcavanagh/decouplingreportMorganfinal
.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Pat Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council,
EEI/NRDC Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp.
306.
MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., supra note 305, at 5.
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formula, and still others calculate revenue on a per-customer account basis
rather than as a single dollar amount.”307
B.

Innovation and Transition

Rate designs can promote innovation and assist in the clean energy
transition by allowing utilities to recover investments in innovation, energy
efficiency, or renewable resources.308 Smart grid investments should be
recouped, for example.309 Similarly, investments in smart meters, energy
savings appliances, energy audits, and the like should be encouraged and
included in any utilities revenue requirement. Regulators, of course, will
have a great degree of discretion. Some investments can be included in rate
base, and therefore can earn a return for shareholders. Other investments can
be treated as costs and recouped dollar-for-dollar.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the utility regulator has
adopted a Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, Innovation, and Outputs
(“RIIO”) rate design.310 The intent is to have “utilities . . . focus on
delivering long-term value to customers.”311 “Revenues [will be] set based
[up]on a review of the utility’s business plan,” including planned operating
expenses as well as an assessment of future capital investment.312 The rates
are then set on a multi-year basis and are intended to “provide[] an incentive
for the utility to pursue efficiency improvements by [allowing a] utility . . . to
retain [some] of [the] cost savings.”313 Indeed, cost sharing is a principal that
should incentivize utilities to earn savings that can then be shared with
customers.314 Again, regulators will have discretion on the proportion of cost
sharing between the parties, but the idea is to create incentives for innovation
and efficiency.315
In the same way that revenue decoupling and shared savings
policies together can provide strong incentives for utilities to
invest in energy efficiency, a similar approach could strengthen
incentives for utilities to invest in distributed generation, storage,
microgrids, smart electric vehicle charging, smart inverters, or
other distributed technologies to reduce operating costs and/or [to]
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 13.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 16.
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defer or avoid the need for investments to expand capacity of
distribution feeders or invest[ed] in . . . other electricity supply,
transmission, or distribution assets.316

A smart rate design, then, may require hybrid pricing models that
apply to different investments and to different expenses. Electricity rates can
be unbundled for different purposes such as “unbundled pricing for
reliability, standby, and power quality services; temporally or locationally
differentiated prices for energy or distribution services; price structures that
reflect how costs are incurred—e.g. fixed, demand-based, energy-based,
etc.—and incentive payments for dispatchable demand response or ancillary
services to the grid.”317
Smart rate designs, then, “may ultimately create a nimble system that
pays for required services, maximizes value, and allows for effective
implementation.”318 The core idea behind moving away from cost-based
ratemaking to rate designs that are more sensitive to the market and
technological developments is to encourage competition and enable utilities
to capitalize on new opportunities.319
C.

Balance of Interests

Shareholders, of course, will only invest if they earn a reasonable
return on their investment. That return must be comparable with investments
of similar risk. Nevertheless, shareholders do take on some investment risk
and they should not be guaranteed a return at the expense of customers who
may receive little or no benefit.320 The trick, of course, is in clearly
identifying the risks to shareholders, as well as the costs and benefits to
consumers. Rates should send clear price signals that account for both fixed
and variable costs,321 avoid cross-subsidization as much as possible,322 and
represent the value of services provided to the customer by the utility.323
“Building a shared understanding among stakeholders and regulators in the
electricity sector about the full range of costs and benefits of distributed
energy resources and the implications of net energy metering is an essential

316.
317.
318.
319.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 46.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 14.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 43.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–

320.
321.
322.
323.

MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 11.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 10.
See id.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 41.

14.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

139

Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

UTILITIES IN A DISTRIBUTED GENERATION WORLD

515

first step toward devising rates and incentives that will create the greatest
benefit for all.”324
D.

Prudence and Needs Reviews

Prudence reviews became a matter of concern to utilities with the
collapse of the nuclear power industry. The possibility of a prudence review
constitutes a risk to investors; however, all risk cannot and should not be
eliminated.325 The fact that utility’s capital investment will be reviewed for
prudence should be considered simply a matter of bringing business
discipline into the electricity market. A prudence review should work handin-hand with the obligation of a utility to mitigate the costs of unwise
investments.
Generally, a prudence review occurs at the time a utility wants to
include specific investments in the rate base as part of a rate hearing.326 The
problem with ex post reviews of investment decisions should be apparent.
At Time One—for example—a utility assesses the need for a capital
investment.327 Construction projects—particularly nuclear plants—take
years and up to a decade or more to complete. Consequently, the decision to
include that investment in the rate base will occur at a time when future
market and financial conditions, as well as the need for energy, can change
significantly. One way of reducing the risk of a disallowance at Time Two
when the prudence review takes place is for regulators to aggressively assess
the need for power before the investment is made.328 These two sets of
principles, both for the regulatory compact and for new rate designs, are
intended to encourage IOUs to reshape the way they do business.329
VIII.

NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL

One need only look at the technological advances in telephony and
computers to realize that the world is changed in ways that will not return.
Landlines and desktop computers have largely become things of the past.
Electricity providers are proliferating, energy efficient appliances and
324.
Id. at 36.
325.
See Rilck Noel, Managing Risk: Prudence Reviews and Nuclear Projects,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2006, at 21, 23.
326.
See id. at 21.
327.
See id. at 22–23.
328.
See Util. Reform Network v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747,
762–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); N. States Power Co., MPUC Docket No. E-002/CN-12-1240
(Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 31, 2013) (PUC reviewed need and setting conditions
regarding how that need can be satisfied); see also Noel, supra note 325, at 22–23.
329.
Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29.
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buildings are reducing per capita use, and competition and consumer choices
for power providers are increasing. IOUs, whether they like it or not, are in a
new market. Indeed, electric utilities should take a lesson from the
telecommunications playbook and invest in change rather than continue to
resist it.330
The renegotiated regulatory compact, together with innovative rate
designs, can encourage utilities to change the way they do business. More
specifically, IOUs whose primary or exclusive business is to increase
electricity sales cannot stay complacent in today’s changing market. Instead,
utilities must offer a wider array of energy products and services, running
from renewable energy and energy efficiency, to performing energy audits
for its customers and broadening the array of power providers.331 In
particular, utilities must act “more aggressively [by] looking at programs to
use distributed assets to their benefit so that they can have a wider
distribution of generation assets throughout their service areas.”332 By way
of example, NRG Energy333 and NextEra Energy334 are developing utilityscale solar and other renewable projects; firms like Direct Energy335 and
Veridian336 have partnered with Solar City to offer solar installations to their
customers; and Duke Energy and PSE&G have been “invest[ing] in
residential solar, microgrids, energy storage and smart grid technologies.”337
Indeed, opportunities abound for forward thinking utilities such as San Diego
Gas & Electric, which has proposed a strategy to engage in three energy
services functions: (1) generate and sell electricity to serve customers’ realtime needs; (2) provide distribution services; and (3) help customers manage
330.
See KIND, supra note 4, at 14–17.
331.
See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 28; Tomain, “Steel in
the Ground,” supra note 246, at 931–933; see also Joint Statement from Edison Elec. Inst. &
Natural Res. Def. Counsel, supra note 305.
332.
Grid: Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility
Business Model (E&ETV Special Report television broadcast Jan. 28, 2014), available at
www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1771/transcript.
333.
Press Release, NRG Energy, Inc., World’s Largest Solar Thermal Power
Project at Ivanpah Achieves Commercial Operation (Feb. 13, 2014), phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=121544&p=irol-newsArticleNRG&ID=1899656.
334.
See Our Company, NEXTERA ENERGY, http://www.nexteraenergy.com/
company/our_company.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
335.
Eric Wesoff, SolarCity and Direct Energy Form $124M Fund for
(Sept.
10,
2013),
Commercial
and
Industrial
Solar,
GREENTECHSOLAR
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/SolarCity-And-Direct-Energy-Form-124MFund-For-Commercial-and-Industrial-S.
336.
Press Release, Solar City, SolarCity and Viridian Team to Provide Clean
Energy Day and Night (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.solarcity.com/pressreleases/204/solarcity-and-viridian-team-to-provide-clean-energy-day-and-night.aspx.
337.
Martin LaMonica, Inside the Utility-Renewables Power Play,
GREENBIZ.COM (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/print/55347.
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electricity use through programs that promote efficiency, smart appliances
and meters, electric vehicle charging, and the like.338
Traditionally structured, vertically integrated electric utilities served
the country well for most of the twentieth century as demand continued to
grow. Now with flattening demand, together with the need for investments
in grid improvement, smart grid technologies, access to the grid by variable
resources, reliability, cyber security, and pushes for greater use of renewable
resources and energy efficiency, the utility of the future must acknowledge
that the integrated utility model will not function effectively in a DG
world.339 In short, as former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) Chair Jon Wellinghoff has stated, “utilities are going to have to
have the ability to morph into those roles of entrepreneurs and marketers and
deliverers of these energy services to be able to effectively compete with all
the other people in the space.”340 Further, today’s electric utilities must also
recognize that the new market “does present new avenues for investment and
growth in terms of grid expansion, smart grid, storage, and downstream
services; the question is whether utilities grasp that opportunity and evolve
themselves.”341
One way of conceptualizing the new utility model is to focus on
distribution and customer service rather than on generation where the
utility’s primary business is to serve as a grid operator in an environment of
wholesale and retail competition.342 Innovative utilities are sensitive to
customer demand.343 Studies show, for example, that consumers are
responding to price information and that they are reducing consumption at
peak times.344 Some of this consumer price responsiveness is due to pilot
programs such as those in California, which are being operated by San Diego
Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison that provide rebates to
customers for electricity saved in particular peak event days.345 In addition,
338.
339.

SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 23.
See CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73; ELEC. INNOVATION LAB,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–14.
340.
Grid: Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility
Business Model, supra note 332.
341.
CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73.
342.
See generally Bain & Co., California Public Utilities Commission: The
Business Model for the Electric Utility of the Future, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/932AC939-CAC7-43E3-BF06-61D5E90FCC25
/0/1ScaliseCPUCenbanc1082013.pdf.
343.
Paul Woods, The Social Utility: Mastering Multi-Channel
Communications for Customer Service Success, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 40, 41–42;
see also Bain & Co., supra note 342.
344.
See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–25.
345.
Id. at 24.
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behind-the-meter technologies such as home displays, programmable
thermostats and other appliances, along with simple social networking, all
provide information about how consumers can increase their energy
efficiency to help IOUs develop their business plans.346
Thus, the utility of the future must start with the recognition that
their primary business is not selling a commodity; it is providing and
managing an infrastructure service.347
The entrepreneurs who put that competitive solar power on your
roof with no money down can provide a portfolio of other equally
unregulated products, like efficiency, demand response, storage,
and so on, that could ultimately add up to a virtual utility providing
the same services that utilities now provide—quite possibly with
lower cost and greater reliability and resilience.348

Another, similar, way of conceptualizing the utility of the future is to
see it as a network entity.
Under a network utility approach, the utility would
provide highly differentiated price signals to direct investments by
other service providers. In this case, the utility’s role would
increasingly be focused on maintaining and operating the grid and
on creating markets, managing transactions, replacing aging
distribution equipment, and/or making smart grid investments and
interconnecting buyers and sellers with the network. This network
utility would shepherd and coordinate the network of increasingly
complex transactions among [a] growing number of actors.349

Such a utility would: (1) pick a distribution area where a utility plans to
expand, upgrade or modernize; (2) assess peak load demand; (3) use demand
side management to target reducing loads; and (4) expand DG rather than
add transportation and distribution.
Such new business approaches should be responsive to any number
of issues. If large capital investments are too financially risky, then they can
be scaled down. If investments in efficiency and in DG are less costly and
less risky than building a new plant or making significant additions to T&D,
then those investments should be made. Similarly, if the concern with
upgrading and modernizing the grid is cyber security, then reducing the scale
346.
See, e.g., Woods, supra note 343, at 41–42 (arguing that utilities are
underutilizing social networks to inform their customers about energy consumption).
347.
Burr, supra note 9, at 31 (referencing a comment by Walt Patterson).
348.
Id. (quoting Amory Lovins).
349.
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at
47.
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of generation and multiplying power sites rather than concentrating them will
reduce those risks. Also, if natural disasters threaten the grid,350 then DG,
microgrids,351 and the like may well prove to be smart alternatives.
The utility of the future, then, will adopt a new vision of the
electricity business. The new utility will see itself not as a isolated actor in
the market, but as part of a network “that provides a platform for the
economic and operational integration of distributed resources.”352 The new
utility will use more transparent costs and benefits of service, including
technical standards, such as those needed for interconnection, as well as
economic standards, such as those used in making value determinations and
pricing goods and services generally.353 The new utility will be a value
creator by serving as: (1) a distributed system operator;354 (2) an integrated
resource planner for both large-scale distributed energy resources, and
storage; (3) a provider of reliability and standby power to customers; and (4)
an energy services provider and financier, through rates, of such things as
energy efficiency retrofits, energy control systems, DG, storage, and the
like.355
As new technologies and new strategies develop, the utility of the
future must integrate them into its portfolio and into its rate designs.
Strategic investments as well as strategic partnerships will be necessary
components of utilities’ new business model. Investments in distributed
generation such as fuel cells356 or rooftop solar—as examples—can in some
350.
See, e.g., Robert Uluski, Modernization Foundation: Near-Term Vision
for Advanced Distribution Management, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2014, at 44, 45 (“Recent socalled ‘storm of the century’ events in the Northeast [United States] and the lengthy power
outages and customer hardships that followed have greatly elevated the need to make power
delivery systems more resilient to major storm events and to provide a more effective electric
utility response during such regional power grid emergencies.”).
351.
See Sara C. Bronin & Paul R. McCary, Peaceful Coexistence:
Independent Microgrids Are Coming. Will Franchised Utilities Fight Them or Foster Them?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 38, 39. “Generally speaking, a microgrid is a small-scale,
low-voltage system for sharing distributed generation among several facilities or end users.”
Id. Microgrids can be powered by conventional fuels, fuel cells, solar panels or wind turbines.
Id. They may also incorporate combined heat and power. Id.
352.
ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 9.
353.
Id.
354.
See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 19.
355.
See id. at 16–20.
356.
Anthony Leo, FuelCell Energy, Stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems with
Direct FuelCell Technology Tackle Growing Distributed Baseload Power Challenge,
DOMINION,
https://www.dom.com/about/stations/fossil/pdf/fuelcell-whitepaper.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2014). As defined by the vendor, FuelCell Energy,
fuel cells are electrochemical devices that combine fuel with oxygen from the
ambient air to produce electricity and heat, as well as water. The non-combustion,
electrochemical process is a direct form of fuel-to-energy conversion, and is much
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instances produce greater efficiency, and in both instances reduce carbon
emissions.357 Companies such as Bloomenergy358 and FuelCell Energy359 are
actively in the market constructing fuel cells on-site as well as developing
them for traditional IOUs and these are partnership opportunities.360 Fuel
cells can achieve greater efficiencies and, as their costs decline, they become
cost competitive in the current electricity market.361 Similarly, rooftop solar
offers a low carbon alternative to baseload power and it is being offered by
such companies such as Solar City that finance, install, and maintain the
systems at a lower cost to the owner than traditional utility service under
long-term power purchase agreements.362
This type of financial
intermediation could also be adopted by the traditional IOU.363
IX.

CONCLUSION

Thus, to succeed in the new electricity market, IOUs should adopt
leadership roles by: (1) developing a plan for technological deployment and
including DG;364 (2) engaging in strategic investments in fuel cells and in
rooftop solar; (3) providing financial assistance to customers who wish to
invest in alternative technologies and in energy efficiency; (4) assisting
regulators in designing new rate structures; and (5) partnering with other
vendors, utilities, and a variety of investors to engage all of these, and other,
innovative and creative activities.365
As such, the new utility will be proactively responding to a new
business environment. Utilities, however, cannot and will not act on their
more efficient than conventional heat engine approaches. CO2 is reduced, due to
the high efficiency of the fuel cell, and the absence of combustion avoids the
production of NOx and particulate pollutants.

Id.
357.
358.

See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17.
BLOOMENERGY, http://www.bloomenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30,

359.

FUELCELL ENERGY, http://www.fuelcellenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30,

2014).
2014).
360.
See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 18, 20; Scott Hempling,
Protecting Innovation During Consolidation:
The Advantages of Alertness,
SCOTTHEMPLINGLAW.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/essays/protectinginnovation.
361.
See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17–18.
362.
Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://www.solarcity.com/
residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see also SUNGEVITY, http://www.sungevity.com (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
363.
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17.
364.
See, e.g., Jolly et al., supra note 215, at 35.
365.
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 20; see also CHANNELL ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 77.
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own. They must be aided and abetted by regulators who adopt new rules for
their relationship with utilities that they regulate. Those new rules will be
sensitive to the new market, sensitive to the demands of customers, and
sensitive to the needs of utilities. The sensitivities are not only responsive to
changing market conditions, they are responsive to a fundamental change in
energy and electricity policy. The traditional fossil fuel policy is no longer
viable. The future demands a clean energy economy and smart IOUs can
play a transformative role. The clean energy future will increase their
reliance on renewable resources and energy efficiency, thus increasing the
diversity of inputs into electricity generation. In addition, the clean energy
future should encourage competition, consumer choice, and technological
innovation, as well as economic growth. Although the challenges are real,
the direction of the future should be clear. IOUs can, then, play a leading
role in building out the DG world.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of global climate disruption requires a rather specific
solution, the phase-out of fossil fuels. 1 Most policy experts and
policymakers are understandably reluctant to face up to the need for such an
ambitious change.2 So, we tend to talk about climate policy in the traditional
language of environmental law, discussing the need for emission reductions.
* University Professor, Syracuse University. J.D. Yale Law School. The author
would like to thank Nicholas Cortese and Joseph Frateschi for research assistance.
1.
See Myles Allen et al., Commentary, The Exit Strategy, NATURE REP.
CLIMATE CHANGE, May 2009, at 56, 58, http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0905/pdf/
climate.2009.38.pdf (calling for phasing out net carbon dioxide emissions altogether and
leaving substantial fossil fuel resources in the ground); James Hansen et al., Target
Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 228
(2008),
http://www.benthamscience.com/open/toascj/articles/V002/217TOASCJ.pdf
(concluding that “remaining fossil fuel reserves should not be exploited without a plan for
retrieval and disposal of resulting atmospheric CO2”); Veerabhadran Ramanathan &
Yangyang Xu, The Copenhagen Accord for Limiting Global Warming: Criteria, Constraints,
and Available Avenues, 107 PNAS 8055, 8057 (2010) (including the replacement of fossil
fuels with renewables as things we must do in order to halve emissions by 2050 while calling
for eighty percent reductions by 2100); Henry Shue, Climate Hope: Implementing the Exit
Strategy, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 388–89 (2013) (pointing out that many of the studies cited
above may understate the need for aggressive action because they focus only on carbon
dioxide, ignoring other greenhouse gases); Michael Le Page, IPCC Digested: Just Leave the
Fossil Fuels Underground, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/
article/dn24299-ipcc-digested-just-leave-the-fossil-fuels-underground.html (interpreting the
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change draft as a call to leave recoverable fossil
fuels in the ground); Alex Morales, Fossil Fuels Need to Stay Unburned to Meet Climate
Target, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0927/fossil-fuels-need-to-stay-unburned-to-meet-climate-target.html.
2.
See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8055–56; Le Page, supra note 1.
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But ultimately, routine emission reductions will not suffice; we need the
virtual elimination of emissions and that requires the phase-out of fossil
fuels.3
This may seem like a radical claim, but we certainly will phase out
fossil fuels. Because they are finite resources, they will run out eventually.4
The question for policymakers then is not whether to phase out fossil fuels; it
is whether to do so in time to avoid many of global climate disruption’s
impacts in a planned way, or whether to wait until after carbon dioxide
emissions throw the climate radically off kilter and our limited fossil fuel
resources become fiendishly expensive, perhaps suddenly, and then run out
altogether. A planned and reasonably rapid fossil fuel phase-out minimizes
economic and environmental disruption.5
Facing up to this need would hardly answer all the questions we
might ask about appropriate climate disruption policy. But it might change
the questions we consider worth asking in productive ways.
This paper will begin by making the case for a goal of phasing out of
fossil fuels. It will then discuss the questions that adopting a phase-out goal
raise about both politics and policy.
II.

ON THE NEED TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS

We need to phase out fossil fuels for four major reasons. First, the
predicted and possible consequences of climate disruption are too serious for
us to risk continued emissions of fossil fuels until they run out.6 Second,
carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels account for some eighty
percent of greenhouse gas emissions both in the United States and globally.7
Third, carbon dioxide—once emitted—remains in the atmosphere for
3.
WORKING GRP. I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 26 (2013) (noting that “a large fraction
of . . . climate [disruption] . . . is irreversible,” and that even with cessation of emissions
“temperature[] will remain . . . constant at elevated levels”).
4.
See Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57–58; Hansen et al., supra note 1, at
228.
5.
Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57.
6.
See WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 11–13 (2007)
[hereinafter WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007] (discussing impacts in detail);
WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 5, 77 (2001) [hereinafter WORKING GRP. II,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001].
7.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990–2011 ES-9 (2013).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1

148

: Nova Law Review 38, #3

2014]

PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUELS

525

centuries, so that emissions have a cumulative effect.8 This means that every
year in which we burn any fossil fuels we will add to climate disruption,
even if we have reduced emissions by a large amount.9 Fourth, fossil fuels
cause an enormous amount of destruction wholly apart from climate
disruption.10
Serious scientists do not doubt that greenhouse gas emissions have
disrupted the climate and will wreak greater havoc still in the future absent
drastic changes. 11 The average mean surface temperature has risen in
response to rising greenhouse gas emissions. 12 We have a rather good
understanding of the sorts of disruption rising temperatures create.13 This
conference devoted a lot of attention to one of the most basic consequences
of all—sea level rise—which has dire implications for Florida. 14 Other
consequences we can expect include more violent weather events, increasing
drought, the spread of infectious diseases, the loss of many endangered
species, and the destruction of ecosystems. 15 As with sea level rise, our
understanding of the magnitude and timing of these consequences is quite
limited.16 We have generally underestimated the extent of global warming in
the past and some ice masses have melted much more quickly than

8.
See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (pointing out that carbon dioxide
emissions generate climate change that is mostly “irreversible on a multi-century to millennial
time scale”).
9.
See id.; Allen et al., supra note 1, at 58.
10.
See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The
Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 35–
37 (2002) [hereinafter Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality] (describing harms
associated with fossil fuel burning).
11.
See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 2–17 (discussing warming trends,
their attribution to greenhouse gas emissions, and likelihood of further warming).
12.
See id. at 2, 11–13, 15.
13.
See id. at 17–27.
14.
See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5
(discussing flooding from sea level rise).
15.
WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 12, 792
(discussing “increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves [sic], floods, storms, fires,
and droughts” and expressing high confidence about loss of endangered species and
ecosystem destruction); WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5, 42–43
(discussing increased incidence of diseases such as malaria, cholera, dengue, and heat stroke
mortality).
16.
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, CLIMATE
ECONOMICS: THE STATE OF THE ART 11–15 (2013) (discussing uncertainties about sea level
rise and other key variables).
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expected.17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports generally
admonish readers to expect surprises, some of which may prove unpleasant.18
The climate system includes feedback loops that have the potential to greatly
accelerate climate disruption.19 For example, a lot of methane lies trapped
below permafrost in Siberia and elsewhere. 20 As the earth warms, it has
melted some of this permafrost, allowing some of the methane trapped
beneath to escape.21 Methane itself is a very potent greenhouse gas, so the
released methane increases warming, which can melt yet more permafrost
and lead to the release of more methane.22 In other words, runaway global
warming is a possibility, where consequences of our previous actions set up a
cycle of warming that we cannot prevent through emission reductions.23 The
possibility of calamitous warming exceeding the amount predicted by most
models cannot be ruled out, partially because of these sorts of feedback
loops.24 We do not know where a tipping point lies, which once crossed,
could have very dire consequences.25 Because of the serious consequences
predicted and the scary nature of what could happen but cannot be predicted,
we need to do everything we can to avoid future temperature increases.

17.
See id. at 12 (explaining that temperature increases have followed the
most pessimistic projections and that sea level rise has outstripped the main projections
altogether).
18.
WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 497 (stating
that “surprises should be anticipated” and are of great concern); WORKING GRP. II,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES 5
(1996) (characterizing surprises as likely).
19.
ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 15–18
(describing various feedbacks).
20.
See id. at 17–18 (describing methane in the boreal region and elsewhere).
21.
Arctic Melt “Bubbling Out” Ancient Methane, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, May
21, 2012 (stating, “[s]cientists have [discovered] thousands of sites in the Arctic where
[trapped] methane . . . is seeping out” from melting permafrost); Steve Connor, Vast Methane
‘Plumes’ Seen in Arctic Ocean as Sea Ice Retreats, INDEP. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://independent.co.uk/news/science/vast-methane-plumes-seen-in-arctic-ocean-as-sea-iceretreats-6276278.html (describing scientists’ shock after witnessing plumes of methane being
released from permafrost and the Arctic seabed).
22.
See ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 17–
18 (discussing the warming from released methane).
23.
See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 249
(characterizing feedbacks from permafrost melting as key uncertainties in need of further
research).
24.
See Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping
Points in the Climate System, 106 PNAS 5041, 5041 (2009).
25.
See id. (discussing tipping points and our inability to accurately gauge the
probability of triggering them).
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Because roughly eighty percent of the United States greenhouse gas
emissions come from burning fossil fuels, any serious effort to address
climate disruption must have the project of addressing fossil fuel burning as
its centerpiece. 26 This does not mean that addressing fossil fuel use
constitutes the only thing we need to do to address global climate disruption,
but it does mean that successfully addressing fossil fuel use must take center
stage. That is why this symposium, like other serious efforts to address
climate disruption, focuses so heavily on energy policy questions.27
Even if we reduce emissions, we will make climate disruption worse
every year in which we continue to burn any fossil fuel at all.28 Carbon
dioxide, once emitted, remains in the atmosphere for many centuries. 29
Given the nature of the consequences and the possibility of triggering
runaway warming, we just cannot continue to increase the global store of
atmospheric carbon year after year until fossil fuels run out. Continued
emissions commit us to future disruption of unknown magnitude.30 If we
find out later that we have crossed some sort of threshold or triggered routine
consequences that we cannot easily live with, such as a level of sea level rise
that inundates Miami, we cannot reverse these consequences by subsequently
reducing emissions.31 This means, as Howard A. Latin has emphasized, that
reducing emissions by ten percent—for example—increases warming above
current levels.32 For a ten percent reduction implies that we continue to add

26.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011 ES-9 (2013) (showing that carbon dioxide made up
seventy-nine percent of United States greenhouse gas emissions in 2011); cf.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 36 fig.2.1 (2008) (indicating that fossil fuels account for 56.6% of global greenhouse
gas emissions).
27.
See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the
Models Tell Us?, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 860, 860 (2013).
28.
See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at
35.
29.
See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8056 (pointing out that the
residence time for carbon dioxide is up to one thousand years).
30.
See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at
35–36.
31.
WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that even after complete
cessation of emissions, elevated temperatures will remain constant for centuries).
32.
HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES: WHY
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED 20–21 (2012) (pointing out that a
ten percent cut in emissions implies continued additions to greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere).
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ninety percent of current emissions to the global store of carbon every year,
thus adding to the current imbalance in the global carbon cycle.33
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions to zero or near zero levels
requires a fossil fuel phase-out.34 Because of the cumulative nature of the
emissions, the importance of carbon dioxide to the overall problem, and the
seriousness of the potential consequences of increasing climate disruption,
we must phase out fossil fuels long before they run out. The sooner the
fossil fuels are phased out, the smaller the likelihood of triggering runaway
warming or suffering some of the more serious consequences associated with
warming generally.35
Although I have discussed a phase-out as the right response to global
climate disruption, a goal of phasing out fossil fuels has broader merit.
Burning fossil fuels contributes greatly to severe local and regional air
pollution problems that kill tens of thousands of people annually in the
United States and even more in developing countries.36 Phasing out fossil
fuels promises relief from serious conventional air pollution, coal mining’s
destruction of land and maiming or killing of miners, an end to oil spills, and
much more. 37 The harms avoided when we phase out fossil fuels go far
beyond limiting climate disruption.
III.

HOW TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS

Phasing out fossil fuels would require a number of changes.38 The
most obvious reform needed involves greatly increased energy efficiency.39
33.
Id. at 21 (equating a ten percent cut in emissions with the addition of
ninety percent of baseline emissions to the atmosphere).
34.
Shue, supra note 1, at 386, 394.
35.
See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING
STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/globalwarmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 (explaining that avoiding an increase in mean
surface temperature of two degrees Celsius, which scientists consider dangerous, would
require leaving eighty percent of current proven industry owned fossil fuel reserves in the
ground).
36.
Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at 28,
35 (pointing out that health studies link particulate pollution to tens of thousands of annual
deaths); e.g., Edward Wong, Early Deaths Linked to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million
in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at A9.
37.
See, e.g., Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note
10, at 51–52.
38.
Id. at 25.
39.
See John C. Dernbach et al., Energy Efficiency and Conservation: New
Legal Tools and Opportunities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2011, at 7, 7
(characterizing energy efficiency as low-hanging fruit).
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Increases in energy efficiency reduce the scope of the project of replacing
fossil fuel as the basis for our economy.40 Happily, many energy efficiency
improvements pay for themselves through savings in electricity costs. 41
They also produce jobs for contractors and engineers.42 So, they produce
win-win situations that prove attractive to rational policymakers.
Fuel switching to achieve zero emissions, even for a greatly reduced
energy requirement, however, poses significant challenges. 43 In 2012,
renewable energy and nuclear power accounted for less than twenty percent
of United States energy consumption. 44 About eighty percent came from
fossil fuels.45 At current levels of total energy consumption, we must replace
almost eighty quads of fossil fuel energy in order to reach zero emissions.46
Even a fifty percent energy efficiency improvement—an ambitious level—
would leave us with the need to replace almost forty quads of energy, a
significant amount. 47 If a phase-out is possible, it would likely require
ambitious policy measures, and might produce significant costs.
Thoroughly analyzing the question of whether a complete phase-out
is possible would require an article of its own. I will note that a recently
published analysis suggests that my home state, New York, could replace all
of its fossil fuel with renewable energy.48 It does not necessarily follow that
all areas in the country could rely solely on renewables, as renewables’
potential varies geographically. 49 The optimistic picture for New York
depends heavily on offshore wind possibilities that take advantage of New
York’s proximity to Long Island Sound and some of the Great Lakes.50 But
if a nationwide shift to one hundred percent renewables is not possible, then
phasing out fossil fuels might require some use of nuclear power.

40.
See id.
41.
Id. (discussing studies finding substantial opportunities to save money
through energy efficiency improvements are available).
42.
See id. (finding that energy efficiency improvements generate jobs).
43.
See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Examining the Feasibility of Converting New
York State’s All-Purpose Energy Infrastructure to One Using Wind, Water, and Sunlight, 57
ENERGY POL’Y 585, 586–87 (2013).
44.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 tbl.1.1
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351401.pdf.
45.
Id.
46.
See id. (showing 77.994 quads of fossil fuel related energy consumption in
2012).
47.
See id.
48.
Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 598.
49.
See id. at 598–99.
50.
See id. at 589 tbl.2 (showing that the study relies on off-shore wind for
forty percent of its power in 2030).
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The history of serious efforts to make major changes should make us
somewhat optimistic about a phase-out’s prospects. When we moved toward
phasing out ozone depleting substances, we discovered that more substitutes
existed at lower costs than academic researchers or experts at individual
companies had believed.51 Although a fossil fuel phase-out appears to pose
much greater challenges than the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals,
aggressive policies have already produced surprising results and probably
will produce more of them.52 The ozone depletion experience teaches us that
we should be wary of claims that we know how rapidly we can phase out
fossil fuels and how much it will cost. For many years prior to the initiation
of the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals, it appeared that substitutes
would either be impossible or costly.53 This proved not to be the case.54 I
am not saying that we can confidently predict that phasing out fossil fuels
will prove cheap. But we must recognize that academic studies lack
information individual companies may possess on technological possibilities,
that individual companies may have incentives not to share information they
have, and that new research can uncover possibilities that nobody knew
about. 55 Strong policies have generally done well at encouraging
innovation.56
IV.

SOME TECHNOCRATIC QUESTIONS

Even if we agree that we should phase out fossil fuels, important
questions remain about how quickly we should do so and what policy

51.
See EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND
STRATEGY 9 (2003) (stating that “it was widely believed that significant cuts in ozonedepleting chemicals would be extremely difficult and costly,” but that agreement to a fifty
percent cut created collaborations that led to subsequent identification and development of
alternatives).
52.
See, e.g., Daniel T. Kaffine et al., Emissions Savings from Wind Power
Generation in Texas, ENERGY J., 2013, at 155, 156 (discussing technological advances and
falling prices of wind energy).
53.
PARSON, supra note 51, at 8–9 (pointing out that ten years of deadlock
preceded the Montreal Protocol and that during that period many believed that cuts would be
costly and difficult).
54.
See id. at 9.
55.
See, e.g., id. (arguing that prior to regime formation, knowledge about
substitutes for ozone depleters was controlled by firms, not academics, and not shared).
56.
See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?,
33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10094, 10103–04, 10106 (2003) [hereinafter Driesen, Does Emissions
Trading Encourage Innovation?] (reviewing empirical evidence of innovation and finding it
correlated with stringent standards).
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mechanisms we should use to accomplish this. I address both of these issues
in turn.
A.

The Speed of a Phase-Out

The argument above suggests that we should phase out fossil fuels as
quickly as feasible.57 But what does that mean for policy? How should a
policymaker determine how quickly we should phase out fossil fuels?
One might think of this rapidity question as a question about the
technical feasibility of replacing fossil fuels. Although engineers studying
these sorts of questions no doubt make a contribution to resolving fossil fuel
policy questions, there are reasons to doubt that these questions are the most
central ones for policymakers.58 No society in the world has done all that is
technically feasible to phase out fossil fuels.59 Furthermore, what I already
said about the limits of any one actor’s information gathering capacity and
our ability to predict advances implies that experts can easily underestimate
our society’s technical capabilities.
One might think that a decision to phase out fossil fuels does away
with the need to consider costs. My justification for the phase-out
commitment suggests a rejection of the reigning economic orthodoxy on how
to consider costs—the theory that we should do so by setting emission
reduction targets or prices designed to equalize costs and benefits at the
margin. We should not do so for at least two reasons. First, we cannot
quantify the costs and benefits of any given mitigation measure with a
reasonable degree of precision, so cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) does not
provide a useful guide to policy.60 Second, a cost-benefit criterion in the

57.
See Brigitte Knopf et al., Managing the Low-Carbon Transition—From
Model Results to Policies, ENERGY J., 2010, at 223, 225 (arguing that the needed steep
decreases in carbon intensity require rapid energy system changes).
58.
See id. at 226; McKibben, supra note 35.
59.
See Knopf et al., supra note 57, at 226; McKibben, supra note 35.
60.
See Donald A. Brown, Climate Change, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 273, 306–07 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (discussing problems in
monetizing climate disruption impacts); Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, Climate
Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon, ECON. E.-J., Apr. 4, 2012, at 1,
2, http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10 (explaining that plausible
assumptions about climate sensitivity can generate estimates of carbon’s social costs at nine
hundred dollars a ton, but that many estimates have come up with much lower numbers);
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1577, 1596–97 (2011); Pindyck, supra note 27, at 861
(finding integrated assessment models at the base of climate disruption CBA close to useless
as policy analysis tools); Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental
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climate context proves even more morally obtuse for United States climate
policy than in other contexts because decisions we make about climate
disruption influence the amount of death, injury, and destruction faced not
only in Florida, but also in Bangladesh, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in Island
States.61 It is not morally acceptable to say that we will not prevent deaths in
developing countries that we—together with other developed countries—
have caused, because the prevention would cost too much.62 Nevertheless,
cost constraints remain relevant to the question of how rapidly we can
feasibly phase out fossil fuels.
A commitment to phasing out fossil fuels, however, changes the
questions we should ask about costs. We should focus primarily on cost
distribution, rather than magnitude. We should ask, for example, whether
phasing out fossil fuels at a given rate would cause unacceptable hardships
for energy consumers. For example, we must go slowly enough so that we
do not leave people with bills so high that they cannot afford electricity, heat,
and transportation. This leaves the question of how rapidly to phase out
fossil fuels somewhat dependent on other policies. We can, for example,
proceed more rapidly if we have good mass transit and robust programs to
pay electricity bills for poor people in place.63 Of course, that means that we
also have to answer questions about how much we want to spend to enhance
these sorts of programs. Furthermore, an emphasis on distribution suggests
that even for relatively cheap changes we must consider the plight of workers
losing their jobs as fossil fuel facilities shut down. It may be true that
phasing out fossil fuels will create more jobs than it takes away. 64 In a
reasonably robust economy, it may be appropriate to expect flexible labor
markets to handle the necessary transitions reasonably well. If we need to
accelerate fossil fuel phase-outs during periods of high unemployment,
however, it may be important to have job training and other kinds of
transition assistance in place to help those losing jobs in the fossil fuel
industry. 65 Congress did this with respect to the acid rain program by
and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 318–19 (2010) (explaining that
models illuminate dynamics and uncertainties rather than generate answers).
61.
See Masur & Posner, supra note 60, at 1563.
62.
See Brown, supra note 60, at 304–06 (arguing that CBA is dubious
because even high costs do not free us of our responsibilities to prevent harms to others).
63.
See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7; Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at
595–96; Shue, supra note 1, at 384–86.
64.
Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95; see also Dernbach et al., supra
note 39, at 7.
65.
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 1101,
104 Stat. 2399, 2710–11 (1990), repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105–220, § 199, 122 Stat. 936 (1998); cf. Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95.
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granting the industry flexibility in how to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions;
Congress allowed the use of low sulfur coal, which would displace coalmining jobs in high sulfur coal regions.66 Accordingly, it did provide some
transitional assistance. 67 Even though we should provide transitional
assistance if we transform the economy during tough times, we should not
accept using unfounded allegations of hardship to justify slowing progress.
B.

Policy Mechanisms

Policymakers must also ask themselves about what policies can most
readily phase out fossil fuels. There seems to be a political consensus around
the globe that we should “put a price on carbon” through environmental
benefit trading or carbon taxes. 68 Yet, if one looks around the world at
advanced countries that have gone far down the road toward phasing out
fossil fuels, these two policies do not always figure as causal factors. 69
Germany now produces twenty-five percent of its energy from renewable
resources.70 Its policies have produced big declines in the price of solar and
other renewable energy sources. 71 As Michael Mehling has made clear,
Germany has achieved this progress primarily through an aggressive feed-in
tariff, which offers renewable energy producers a high price for renewable
energy.72 This policy does not directly put a price on carbon; it aims instead
66.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPACTS OF THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM ON
COAL INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT i–ii, app. at A2A3 (2001).
67.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 1101 (allocating up to
$250,000,000 for retraining and assisting miners adversely affected by employers’ Clean Air
Act compliance).
68.
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN DESIGNING A GLOBAL
AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL WARMING 3 (2009), available at http:/ /www.econ.yale.edu/
~nordhaus/homepage/documents/Copenhagen_052909.pdf (describing the lesson that all
people must “face a market price for the use of carbon” as the economists’ “bottom line for
policy”).
69.
See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the
European Union: The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE
ENERGY 1, 8–9 (2006).
70.
Chris Cottrell, German Renewables Output Hits Record High in H1,
REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/germanyrenewables-idUSL6E8IQIA720120726.
71.
Craig A. Hart & Dominic Marcellino, Subsidies or Free Markets to
Promote Renewables?, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 196, 203 (2012).
72.
Ralph Buehler et al., How Germany Became Europe’s Green Leader: A
Look at Four Decades of Sustainable Policymaking, SOLUTIONS, Oct. 2011, at 51, 57–58; see
Samantha Booth, Community Solar: Reviving California’s Commitment to a Bright Energy
Future, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10585, 10590–91 (2013) (noting that Germany has become the first
country to exceed thirty gigawatts of solar capacity because of its feed-in tariff); Ringel, supra
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to provide an incentive to substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels. 73
France currently relies on fossil fuels for less than ten percent of its energy.74
This extraordinary achievement stems from a government decision to build
nuclear power plants with rigid state control of both design and worker
training in order to ensure safety.75 France did not put a price on carbon;
instead, it mandated construction of zero emission facilities.76 This record
should invite some fairly simple questions: Can putting a price on carbon be
an effective strategy for phasing out fossil fuels? If so, what sorts of design
features are needed to make this approach more effective than in the past?
Are there better tools than taxes and trading for phasing out fossil fuels?
What are the advantages and limits of pricing carbon as a strategy?
I do not propose to answer all of these questions here, but I will say
something about possible answers. First of all, pricing policies must be
much more ambitious than the pricing policies countries have employed so
far if they are to have any chance in succeeding in rapidly phasing out fossil
fuels.77 Countries have generally set caps for trading programs and carbon
taxes without any clear intention to phase out fossil fuels. 78 Indeed, in
Europe, which has the most experience with these programs, the primary
goal of many of these policies is to reduce emissions rather modestly in the
near term.79 Howard Latin has questioned this sort of back-loaded strategy
that saves ambitious reductions for much later.80 He has raised concerns that
such strategies encourage investments in technologies, such as natural gas,
that we must ultimately abandon to get to zero emissions and that those who
make these investments will resist scuttling the infrastructure they have

note 69, at 6 (explaining that a feed-in tariff pays renewable energy providers an above market
price for the power they produce).
73.
Ringel, supra note 69, at 6.
74.
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION, NUCLEAR
ENERGY DATA 43 (2013) (showing that France gets only 9.8% from fossil fuels).
75.
See id. (showing that France gets seventy-five percent of its power
production from nuclear energy); Dieter Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy
Policy, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 247, 249 (Dieter Helm &
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (discussing France’s ownership of the entire technology chain
for nuclear energy and state training of the nuclear workforce).
76.
See Helm, supra note 75, at 249.
77.
See, e.g., Ringel, supra note 69, at 6.
78.
See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151.
79.
Hart & Marcellino, supra note 71, at 197.
80.
See id. at 152–53, 158 (noting that “conversion from coal to natural gas”
is an interim investment that might make eventual achievement of zero emissions more
difficult).
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invested in when the time comes. 81 He would rather see us move more
directly to zero emissions.82 Adopting a goal of phasing out fossil fuels, not
simply reducing emissions, does suggest that the goals for these programs
have not been commensurate with the climate disruption problem.83
Amy Sinden and I have suggested elsewhere that a goal of phasing
out fossil fuels suggests a redesign of environmental benefit trading
programs. 84 Current approaches focus on the end-of-the-pipe and are
designed to reduce emissions.85 We argued for explicitly using trading to
phase out fossil fuels.86 This implies that allowances would limit the amount
of fossil fuels being used in the economy.87 We refer to trading—and nontrading—programs that limit dirty inputs rather than pollution outputs as
Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”).88 We have used DILs in both tradable and nontradable forms before when we phased out ozone-depleting chemicals and
lead. 89 This may seem like a radical idea, but proposed federal
comprehensive climate disruption legislation included DILs for
transportation fuels.90 We simply suggested extending this approach.91
But a bigger question we must ask is whether pricing policies—
which are conceived of as encouraging the most cost effective adjustments in
the status quo—are really the best way of transforming an economy, even if
they were ambitious. The French and German experiences suggest that some
sort of more active state role might be necessary to encourage investments
that are effective, and perhaps even cost effective in the long run, but not
81.
See id. at 158 (arguing that investments in interim technologies like
natural gas will build constituencies for those technologies that will make their abandonment
difficult); see also Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 587 (doubting that natural gas may
produce more global warming than coal because of methane emissions associated with gas
extraction and lower sulfur dioxide emissions, which mask warming).
82.
See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151.
83.
See id.
84.
See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 66–67, 104–09 (2009) (discussing a trading
program limiting consumption of fossil fuel through tradable permits limiting fossil fuel
production).
85.
See id. at 67–68 (stating that we have traditionally focused vehicle
regulation on the exhaust output).
86.
See id. at 104–09.
87.
See id.
88.
See id. at 67 (defining Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”)).
89.
See Driesen & Sinden, supra note 84, at 83–88 (discussing the lead and
ozone-depleting chemical examples).
90.
See id. at 81–83 (discussing the use of DILs in global warming bills
considered in Congress).
91.
See id. at 67.
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cost effective in the short run.92 We need more thinking about what lessons
the most successful approaches have to teach the rest of us, instead of blithe
assumptions that since pricing carbon has good efficiency properties, it must
be the right solution to the climate disruption problem. Indeed, it seems
fairly clear that price alone will not accomplish all that is needed.93 Mass
transit improvements, for example, require public expenditures—although
one can imagine using a carbon tax or auctioned permits to fund this.94
We also must recognize that an enormous project like phasing out
fossil fuels may require a level of innovation that challenges conventional
approaches, like traditional regulation, environmental taxation, and
emissions trading. 95 All of these programs require governments to make
difficult decisions about goals, in the form of choosing a cap for a trading
program or a tax rate for a carbon tax. 96 Political difficulties and the
government’s inability to predict innovation rates will tend to constrain the
ambition of these goal-setting decisions. 97 This raises the question of
whether we can invent new approaches that will do better.
I have suggested the possibility of an environmental competition
statute.98 Such a statute would allow any polluter who is reducing carbon
emissions to collect the cost of making its reductions from any competitor
with higher emissions, plus a statutory profit margin.99 In all likelihood this
would spur a race to phase out fossil fuels, since getting to zero emissions
generally secures payments, whereas continuing to pollute risks having to
pay cleaner competitors.100 This approach seeks to emulate the innovation
stimulating properties of a very competitive market, where making a superior
product allows an innovator to steal market share from its competitors,

92.
See, e.g., MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES:
MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY 117 (1994), and Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 57.
93.
See Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 52, 57.
94.
See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7.
95.
See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, 2 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 199, 201–05 (2010) [hereinafter Driesen, An Environmental
Competition Statute].
96.
Id. at 203–04.
97.
Id. at 203.
98.
Id. at 200–01 (describing and advocating this mechanism).
99.
Id. at 206–07 (describing the basic mechanism of an environmental
competition statute).
100.
See Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, supra note 95, at
200–01 (characterizing an environmental competition statute as “encourag[ing] contests to
improve environmental quality”).
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thereby potentially making the innovator wealthier at the expense of less
nimble competition.101
Howard Latin has proposed using carbon taxes to fund an expert
commission to fund research into zero emissions technologies and to
subsidize their deployment.102 His approach mirrors my own in following
the principle that using negative economic incentives to fund positive
economic incentives provides a powerful driver for innovation.103
These comments focus on the most challenging aspect of the phaseout problem—the problem of fuel switching. The question of how best to
minimize the use of fuel altogether—the energy efficiency problem—also
raises questions about effective policies. Policymakers around the world
have adopted a lot of successful approaches, from improved mass transit to
least cost planning for electric utilities, to regulations mandating increased
energy efficiency in appliances. 104 They have done so because of strong
evidence that people often do not adopt energy efficiency measures on their
own, even when doing so would save them money.105 The data suggest that
pricing policies without redistribution of the revenue may have limits in
encouraging the cheapest options for limiting the use of fossil fuels. On the
other hand, pricing policies that help fund energy efficiency improvements
can pair economic benefits with fuel switching, thus lessening—and perhaps
eliminating—the pain associated with rapid change.106

101.
Id. at 207 (developing the analogy between this statutory mechanism and
the “economic dynamics of [a] competitive market[]”).
102.
LATIN, supra note 32, at 162–63 (describing this scheme along with other
less central remedies).
103.
ANDERSEN, supra note 92, at 18–19, 26–27 (promoting taxes like the
French effluent tax which raise funding for environmental programs).
104.
See Veronika Czakó, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Action at
the City Level: The Hungarian Experience, in OPPORTUNITIES AND DRIVERS ON THE WAY TO A
LOW CARBON SOCIETY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMER ACADEMY ‘ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT’ 95, 99–101 (2013) (discussing subsidies funding energy efficiency
improvements in Hungarian apartment buildings); Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7
(describing various approaches used in the United States).
105.
See Cameron Hepburn & Nicholas Stern, The Global Deal on Climate
Change, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 36, 49 (Dieter Helm &
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating that because of energy efficiency investment’s
insensitivity to price, carbon pricing will do little to increase deployment of energy
efficiency); cf. Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Capand-Trade System, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 198 (Dieter
Helm & Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating flatly that polluters will undertake all
reductions that are less costly than the allowance price in “[a] well-designed cap-and-trade
system”).
106.
See id.
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SOME POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The major reason that the United States has not become a leader in
moving toward a phase-out of fossil fuels has been political.107 The United
States has been unwilling to even take the relatively modest step of
implementing a nationwide so-called cap-and-trade program to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.108 Nor has the United States eliminated massive
subsidies for fossil fuels, in spite of repeated proposals from the Obama
Administration to do so.109
So, a major question that the need to phase out fossil fuels raises is a
political one: What sorts of strategies would help change the political
climate over time to one that might accept measures that would phase out
fossil fuels? My own view is that we are unlikely to gain acceptance of a
program phasing out fossil fuels without environmental leaders making such
a phase-out an explicit political goal. The evidence suggests that the Obama
Administration and many environmental groups disagree with me on that.
They either do not see the need for a phase-out, or assume that it can best be
accomplished by selling steps in that direction indirectly, justifying
individual regulations as cost effective and helping with the problem of
climate disruption. 110 Thus, the Obama Administration has passed very
strong standards improving vehicle emissions and promises significant
regulation of power plants, but supports an “all-of-the-above” energy
strategy.111
I have my doubts about whether the American public can be brought
around to support a phase-out of fossil fuels without a rhetorical strategy that
prepares them to accept much more significant changes than are currently
politically feasible. If nobody tells the American public that fossil fuels are
finite resources, that an increase in their price is inevitable as they become
scarce, that renewable energy has fallen in price in countries with good
policies and will likely fall further if supported appropriately, that new
107.
See Neela Banerjee, Warning on Greenhouse Gases; A Study Says
Emissions Are on Track to Raise Global Temperatures by up to 9.54 Degrees by Century’s
End, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A11.
108.
See Stavins, supra note 105, at 198; Banerjee, supra note 108.
109.
See Banerjee, supra note 107 (stating “Congress has shown no interest in
ending fossil fuel subsidies”); Gary Gentile et al., Obama Seeks to Slash Oil Industry Tax
Breaks, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 15, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 5108712
(stating that, as of 2011, President Obama proposed eliminating fossil fuel subsidies three
times).
110.
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Limits Set on Pollution from Autos, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2010, at B1.
111.
See McKibben, supra note 35.
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industries can generate new jobs, that climate disruption will wreak havoc
unless we take ambitious measures, and that phasing out fossil fuels would
save thousands of lives and spare us all from many types of environmental
destructions wholly apart from climate disruption, I do not see how we can
ever phase out fossil fuels.
The political challenge, however, goes beyond how we debate
environmental policy. We live in an era in which many politicians oppose
any governmental role in solving most societal problems. Although we
surely need limits on governmental power, climate disruption poses
problems of coordination that make it insolvable without a significant
governmental role.112 Countries that have made significant progress on the
climate issue take a more pragmatic and less ideological view of the
appropriate role of government than we do. So, progress on the climate issue
is linked to making progress on broader issues of the appropriate role of
government.
This requires environmental advocates and their political allies in
Congress to figure out how to advance a broader project of sensible
governance. They should, for example, repeatedly remind the American
people of the role deregulation played in creating the financial crisis. 113
Reasonable standards of conduct are as important to well-functioning
markets as they are to our efforts to solve environmental problems.
Furthermore, politicians who do not want to see the government dismantled
need to simply say, repeatedly, that they support an adequate government.
This would start a healthy debate about what constitutes an adequate
government and marginalize those who oppose an adequate government. At
any rate, progress in phasing out fossil fuels will require political changes
and strategic actions to make them come about.114
I do not think it is possible for anybody to prove a view about what
political strategy is best. I provide my views merely to clarify the questions
that a phase-out goal raises. These questions include whether we can sell a
phase-out without arguing against continued fossil fuel use directly, and how
we can move the political process to accept a legitimate role for government
more generally. An effort to change the political climate to make a phaseout politically plausible requires answers to these questions.

112.
113.
114.
supra note 107.
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CONCLUSION

Addressing climate disruption requires a phase-out of fossil fuels.
Accepting this proposition reframes the questions we should ask ourselves
about how to design effective environmental policy and how to create a
political climate where we can adopt sensible policies.
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